Rubinstein v. Administrators of Tulane Educ.

Decision Date06 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-30777,98-30777
Citation218 F.3d 392
Parties(5th Cir. 2000) ASHER RUBINSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND; MICHAEL LYNCH; WILLIAM C. VAN BUSKIRK,Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Professor Asher Rubinstein filed a Title VII and related state-law lawsuit against Tulane University, his employer, in October, 1995, asserting several grounds for relief of discriminatory and retaliatory employment decisions made against him. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims, except a later-added claim of retaliation for the 1997 school year. This issue was submitted to a jury and the jury awarded $2500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages. The district court then entered judgment for Rubinstein in the aforementioned amounts, as well as for a 3.5% raise as an equitable remedy for the retaliatory act taken by Tulane. The parties now each appeal from the adverse rulings against them.

Finding the district court's rulings correct on all but the punitive damages issue, we affirm. As we further find that the $75,000 punitive damage award is excessive, we remit the award and remand the issue to the district court so as to afford Rubinstein the opportunity for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because this appeal involves several issues of summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants, as well as a jury verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, we recount the facts in a light most favorable to Rubinstein's arguments so as to facilitate a review of the facts deferential to the non-movant vis-a-vis summary judgment, and deferential to the jury verdict, as rendered in favor of Rubinstein. The more notable factual disputes, however, are highlighted.

Appellee-cross-appellant Rubinstein, a Jewish man born and raised in the former USSR, is, and was at all time relevant to this action, a tenured professor of mechanical engineering at Tulane's School of Engineering. Rubinstein achieved the rank of Associate Professor in 1990, when he was granted tenure. In Rubinstein's tenure recommendation it was noted that he was "an outstanding researcher" and a "satisfactory teacher." It is undisputed that faculty evaluations at Tulane reference three major areas of performance: teaching, university citizenship and research. In the two years subsequent to achieving this rank, Rubinstein received raises in excess of eight percent, reflecting his outstanding research skills and contributions to the University.

Sometime in 1991, William Van Buskirk was promoted to Dean of the School of Engineering. In 1992, Paul Michael Lynch was named Department Chair of the Mechanical Engineering department. It is around this time that Rubinstein asserts the discrimination began.

Specifically, Rubinstein contends that the defendants-appellants-cross-appellees Tulane, Lynch and Buskirk (hereinafter "Tulane"), refused to grant him a raise in 1993, out of discriminatory animus directed toward his status as a Russian Jew. In support of this claim, Rubinstein references a conversation he had with defendant Van Buskirk concerning his 1993 raise, during which Van Buskirk apparently speculated that defendant Lynch might be discriminating against him because he was Russian and Jewish.

Sometime in 1993 or 1994, Rubinstein contends a senior faculty member of the mechanical engineering department, Prof. Robert Watts, began referring to Rubinstein as a "Russian Yankee" and a "commie." Apparently, around this time, Watts also began making anti-Semitic remarks, such as a comment concerning placing a propeller on a yarmulke and a remark about Jewish frugality.

In 1994, Rubinstein received a 2.02% raise, purportedly the lowest in the department, excluding the former dean who was about to retire. That fall, Rubinstein requested consideration for promotion to the level of Full Professor. Sometime after making this request, Rubinstein complained to Van Buskirk that he was being unfairly considered with respect to raises and promotion. Rubinstein asserts that Van Buskirk responded by inquiring: "what are you going to do, sue me? Do you know what happens to people who sue their employer?" While denying ever uttering these exact words, Van Buskirk admits he inquired into whether Rubinstein planned to file suit, expressing the opinion that it would be a bad idea. Rubinstein filed what appears to be his first of two complaints with the EEOC in December of 1994.

Rubinstein's promotion request was denied in early 1995. Although Tulane acknowledges his excellent research record, the denial was purportedly based on Rubinstein's poor university citizenship, low teaching evaluation scores, and an insufficient record in mentoring students. Rubinstein, however, insists that the evidence supports the finding that the teaching evaluations were tampered with.

Rubinstein again filed a complaint with the EEOC, in April of 1995. Shortly thereafter, it appears he again received the lowest raise in the department, of approximately 2.53%. Rubinstein filed this lawsuit on October 11, 1995, asserting claims of discrimination and retaliation in the decisions concerning his promotion and pay raise consideration.

In early 1996, Rubinstein's additional request for promotion was denied. Later that year, Tulane announced a campus-wide policy that only Assistant Professors and newly hired Associate Professors would be eligible for raises for the 1996-97 academic year. Rubinstein does not complain about his lack of raise for this year.

The following fall, Rubinstein's request for promotion was again denied. When the time came again for raise consideration, it appears that Tulane implemented a policy designed to use the limited raise pool to remedy inequities among the faculty both internally and with reference to salaries at comparable institutions. Rubinstein did not receive a raise for the 1997-98 academic year. He contends that despite this policy, and despite the fact that his salary was well above both Tulane's average and the national average, he was denied a raise out of retaliation for filing suit. Van Buskirk admitted as much, Rubinstein maintains.

The district court granted summary judgment on all issues raised in Rubinstein's complaint and amended complaints, except the issue of retaliation concerning the refusal to grant the 1997-98 raise. The retaliation issue was submitted to a jury, and the jury returned a verdict for Rubinstein in the amount of $2500 plus $75,000 in punitive damages.1 Both sides now appeal the adverse decisions against them.

II. ANALYSIS

Tulane and Rubinstein both assert several grounds of error, each of which will be addressed below in turn.

A. Scope of Discovery

From the beginning of this action, Rubinstein and Tulane have disputed the appropriate breadth and scope of discovery that should be allowed in this case. On appeal, Rubinstein maintains that the district court's decision to limit discovery to the records of the Mechanical Engineering Department constituted error. We review orders concerning discovery under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir.1990); see also Hodges v United States, 597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir.1979).

The record reveals that the district court limited discovery to the records of the Mechanical Engineering department based on its finding that Rubinstein is similarly situated only to those in his department. This finding is based on evidence demonstrating that salary and initial promotion decisions are made on a departmental basis. Rubinstein maintains that this is error, as our case law requires broader discovery into university-wide tenure and promotion decisions.

The cases cited by Rubinstein in support of this contention, however, do not mandate broad discovery in all university discrimination suits. Rather, the cases stand for the proposition that discovery orders are fact-based and must be reviewed in the context of the claims at issue. Specifically, Rubinstein relies on Travis v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Texas, 122 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that university-wide statistics are more relevant than statistics limited to plaintiff's division, as similar officials are responsible for approving promotion decisions. However, importantly, and as Rubinstein fails to note in his brief, this Court reached this conclusion in ruling on a Rule 50 motion - not in settling a discovery dispute. See id. at 263. The evidence concerning school-wide practices was already admitted before the jury, and, additionally, in Travis, the plaintiff alleged sex-discrimination. Thus, this Court concluded, wider statistics concerning the treatment of women at the university generally were relevant to a determination concerning whether the defendant had engaged in illegal discrimination.

Here, the district court exercised its discretion properly in concluding that Rubinstein's requests for discovery concerning his claim that he was discriminated against for being Jewish and Russian did not implicate the salary and promotion decisions of the School of Engineering with regard to every foreign-born professor. The record reflects that initial promotion decisions are made on a departmental basis, followed by highly deferential, not de novo, review of these decisions by a school-wide tenure committee. Further, raise decisions are made based on the recommendation of the department chair to the Dean. Based on these pertinent characteristics which distinguish the case from Travis, it is clear the district court did not abuse...

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