Black v. J.I. Case Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-7010,91-7010
• Parties: 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1137, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,878 Marie BLACK, Individually and as representative of Randy A. Black, Pam Black Gum, Kitty Black, adults, and William A. Black and Tammy Black, minors, the sole and only heirs at law of Romie Black, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 568

22 F.3d 568

40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1137, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,878

Marie BLACK, Individually and as representative of Randy A.

Black, Pam Black Gum, Kitty Black, adults, and William A.

Black and Tammy Black, minors, the sole and only heirs at

law of Romie Black, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-7010.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 27, 1994.

Bradford L. Henry, Dan W. Webb, Webb, McLurrin & O'Neal, Tupelo, MS, for appellants.

John S. Hill, Nathan W. Kellum, Mitchell, McNutt, Lagrone & Sams, Tupelo, MS, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before GARWOOD and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, SCHWARTZ ^*, District Judge.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

This is a Mississippi diversity case arising from the death of Romie Black (Decedent) who was killed in an accident involving a backhoe. His successors, plaintiffs-appellants herein (collectively, the Blacks), appeal the judgment on the jury verdict in favor of defendant-appellee J.I. Case Company, Inc. (Case). We affirm.

This appeal was previously considered by another panel of this Court which issued an opinion affirming the judgment below. This earlier opinion was subsequently withdrawn and vacated. ¹ Black v. J.I. Case Co., 973 F.2d 1226, 1227-1231 (5th Cir.1992). It appears likely that the withdrawal was because of a perceived uncertainty concerning the propriety of reviewing an interlocutory order denying summary judgment on an appeal following trial on the merits and final judgment based thereon adverse to the summary judgment movant. ² We now conclude that this Court will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment where on the basis of a subsequent full trial on the merits final judgment is entered adverse to the movant. ³

Facts and Proceedings Below

On September 13, 1986, Decedent was killed while operating a backhoe loaned to him by Case when the machine rolled over and his head struck one of the posts which supported the backhoe's canopy. On March 26, 1990, the Blacks, as successors to Decedent's interest, brought this suit against Case. They subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, failure to warn of latent defects, failure to instruct the operator on the safe operation of the machine, and failure to inspect. Case opposed the motion for summary judgment, contending that it did not cause the accident, but rather that the Decedent's death was caused by his operation of the backhoe on too steep a slope while not wearing a seatbelt. Case, however, did not submit any summary judgment evidence to support its position, but rather relied on the Blacks' summary judgment evidence which included answers to interrogatories indicating Case's anticipated expert testimony at trial and affidavits of Case's employees. The district court denied the Blacks' partial summary judgment motion noting that their own evidence created factual disputes as to each asserted theory, and that, in any event, the court had the power to deny summary judgment where it thought "the better course would be to proceed to trial."

The case was subsequently fully tried on the merits. At the close of all the evidence, the Blacks made a motion for a directed verdict which the district court denied. The jury thereafter found for Case. The Blacks then filed for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) or for a new trial. These motions were also denied by the district court. The Blacks now bring this timely appeal, arguing that the district court erred in denying their motion for partial summary judgment, and that it also erred in several other respects. We affirm.

Discussion

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

The Blacks first argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for partial summary judgment because Case failed to present any evidence to create a disputed fact issue. Based on earlier precedent of this Court and other circuits, the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, the discretion of district courts in this area, and other prudential concerns, we agree with the prior panel's conclusion that this order should not be reviewed.

This Court has already held that an interlocutory order denying summary judgment is not to be reviewed where final judgment adverse to the movant is rendered on the basis of a subsequent full trial on the merits. See Wells v. Hico ISD, 736 F.2d 243, 251 n. 9 (5th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 11, 87 L.Ed.2d 672 (1985); Zimzores v. Veterans Administration, 778 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.1985). ⁴ In Wells, the defendants-appellants suffered an adverse judgment entered on the jury's verdict following full trial on the merits, and prior to trial the district court had denied their motion for summary judgment on the question whether the plaintiffs-appellees had a property interest in their teaching positions. 736 F.2d at 251. We held that the district court's rulings denying the summary judgment motions could not be reviewed because, "Once trial began, the summary judgment motions effectively became moot." Id. at 251 n. 9. Similarly, in Zimzores, we declined to review the denial of the plaintiff-appellant's motion for summary judgment which contended that there existed no factual dispute as to liability. We noted that "it is particularly difficult to understand how the ends either of justice or of orderly procedure would be furthered were we to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment when the facts adduced at the full trial on the merits adequately support the findings and judgment for the defendants." 778 F.2d at 267. By reaffirming our rule announced in these cases that orders denying summary judgment motions will not be reviewed in such circumstances, we remain in harmony with the overwhelming majority of other circuits which have considered the issue. See Bottineau Farmers Elevator v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 963 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 n. 5 (8th Cir.1992); Lum v. City of Honolulu, 963 F.2d 1167, 1170 & n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 659, 121 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992); Summit Petroleum v. Ingersoll-Rand, 909 F.2d 862, 865 n. 4 (6th Cir.1990); Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir.1990); Locricchio v. Legal Services Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir.1987); Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573 & n. 14 (Fed.Cir.1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1072, 107 S.Ct. 1262, 94 L.Ed.2d 124 (1987); Boyles Galvanizing & Plating Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 372 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir.1967). ⁵

Furthermore, the rule reaffirmed today is in keeping with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b), and our related jurisprudence. We have long recognized that where a party has a judgment rendered against him based on an adverse jury verdict, judgment may not be rendered for him on appeal (and j.n.o.v. in his favor may not be granted) unless that party has moved for a directed verdict in the district court. See, e.g., Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 80, 107 L.Ed.2d 46 (1989); McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1186-88 (5th Cir.1989); see also Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R., Co., 344 U.S. 48, 52, 73 S.Ct. 125, 128, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952). However, reviewing on appeal a pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment would circumvent this rule by allowing us to reverse and render even when no motion for directed verdict and motion for j.n.o.v. had been made at trial. If such motions have been made, their denial can be reviewed on appeal and there is no good reason to also review the pretrial denial of the same party's motion for summary judgment.

To review pretrial denials of summary judgment motions would also diminish the discretion of the district court, in contravention of our jurisprudence and that of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has recognized that, even in the absence of a factual dispute, a district court has the power to "deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We, too, have recognized that (except in cases of qualified or absolute immunity) a district court "has the discretion to deny a [motion for summary judgment] even if the movant otherwise successfully carries its burden of proof if the judge has doubt as to the wisdom of terminating the case before a full trial." Veillon v. Exploration Services, 876 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th Cir.1989); see also Marcus v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 651 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir.1981). If we were to review denied motions for summary judgment, the district court would no longer have this discretion.

Finally, prudential concerns argue against reviewing such motions. To review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment, we would have to review two different sets of evidence: the "evidence" before the district court at pretrial when it denied the motion, and the evidence presented at trial. Of course, the "evidence" presented at pretrial may well be different from the evidence presented at trial. It makes no sense whatever to reverse a judgment on the verdict where the trial evidence was sufficient merely because at summary judgment it was not. ⁶ As we noted in Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.1948): "The saving of time and expense is the purpose to be attained by a summary judgment in a proper case. When in due course the final trial is had on the merits it becomes the best test of the rights of the movant. If he wins on trial he has his judgment. If he loses on a fair trial it shows that he ought not to have any judgment." Id. at 541. For all of these reasons, we are firmly convinced that the better course is to...