Meaders v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 1895
• Parties: MEADERS v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

22 S.E. 527

96 Ga. 299

MEADERS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 13, 1895

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A wrongful trespass upon personal property in the presence of its owner may or may not amount to such provocation as will justify the latter in using to the wrongdoer on the spot opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace. When, in a prosecution for using language of this kind, such a trespass is alleged by the accused as his provocation for so doing, it should be left to the jury to determine whether or not there was in fact such a trespass, and, if so, whether or not it was in their judgment sufficient to justify the accused.

2. After passing sentence in a criminal case, and reducing the same to writing, the court should not change it, and make the penalty more severe, simply because counsel for the accused gave notice of his intention to move for a new trial.

Error from superior court, White county; J. J. Kimsey, Judge.

John Meaders was convicted of a misdemeanor, and brings error. Reversed.

J. W H. Underwood and H. H. Dean, for plaintiff in error.

Howard Thompson, Sol. Gen., and F. M. Johnson, for the State.

SIMMONS C.J.

1. The plaintiff in error was indicted under section 4372 of the Code, which declares that "any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence opprobrious words, or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace, *** shall be guilty of misdemeanor," etc. In order to convict under this section, the state must prove that the words were used without provocation; and, if the accused defends on the ground that he had provocation, this defense raises an issue which must be submitted to the jury. The evidence in this case shows that there was a line fence between the premises of the accused and those of the prosecutor's father, and that, in the absence of the accused, the prosecutor and his father, with others, tore down the fence, and moved it to another place, and were thus engaged when the accused came upon the scene. He did not know until then that they were tearing down and carrying off the fence, and it was immediately upon his arrival on the scene that he used the language for which he was indicted. The court instructed the jury, in substance, that under this state of facts the accused was not justifiable in using the words. The court thus assumed to pass upon the defense of the accused without submitting it to the jury, and thereby decided that the conduct of the prosecutor was not a sufficient provocation. W...