220 U.S. 338 (1911), 102, Gavieres v. United States

Docket Nº:No. 102
Citation:220 U.S. 338, 31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 489
Party Name:Gavieres v. United States
Case Date:April 03, 1911
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 338

220 U.S. 338 (1911)

31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 489

Gavieres

v.

United States

No. 102

United States Supreme Court

April 3, 1911

Submitted March 13, 1911

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Syllabus

Protection against double jeopardy was by § 5 of the Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, carried to the Philippine Islands in the sense and in the meaning which it had obtained under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100.

The protection intended and specifically given is against second jeopardy for the same offense, and where separate offenses arise from the same transaction, the protection does not apply.

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A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution or conviction under the other. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 367.

In this case, held that one convicted and punished under an ordinance prohibiting drunkenness and rude and boisterous language was not put in second jeopardy by being subsequently tried under another ordinance for insulting a public officer, although the latter charge was based on the same conduct and language as the former. They were separate offenses, and required separate proof to convict. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, distinguished.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions in the Philippine Island Act of July 1, 1902, as to second jeopardy, are stated in the opinion.

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DAY, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the single question whether the plaintiff in error, by reason of the proceedings hereinafter

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stated, has been twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

Gavieres, plaintiff in error, was charged, convicted, and sentenced in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a violation of Article 257 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor shall also be imposed on those who outrage, insult, or threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in their presence, or in a writing addressed to them.

Gavieres was charged under this article with the crime of calumniating, outraging, and insulting a public official in the exercise of his office by word of mouth and in his presence. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to four months of arresto mayor and to pay the cost of the prosecution. He had been previously convicted, because of the same words and conduct, under Article 28, § 2 of the ordinance of the City of Manila, which provides:

No person shall be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place open to public view; or be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any place or premises to the annoyance of another person.

Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, c. 1369, provides: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment."

This statute was before this Court in the case of Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, and it was there held that the protection against double jeopardy therein provided had, by means of this statute, been carried to the Philippine Islands in the sense and in the meaning which it had obtained under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

It is to be observed that the protection intended and specifically given is against second jeopardy for the same

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offense. The question therefore is are the offenses charged, and of which a conviction has been had in the municipal court and in the court of first instance, identical? An examination of the ordinance shows that the gist of the offense under it was behaving in an indecent manner in a public place, open to public view. It was not necessary to charge or prove under the municipal ordinance any outrage, insult, or threat to a public official or agent of the authorities. The charge contained in the record shows that,...

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