State v. Middlebrooks
| Decision Date | 07 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 30344,30344 |
| Citation | 236 Ga. 52,222 S.E.2d 343 |
| Parties | The STATE v. Odell MIDDLEBROOKS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for appellant.
James C. Carr, Jr., Atlanta, for appellee.
We granted the State's application for writ of certiorari to review the decision and judgment of the Georgia Court of Appeals adverse to the State in Middlebrooks v. State, 135 Ga.App. 411, 218 S.E.2d 110 (1975).
Respondent Middlebrooks was arrested on September 1, 1973 and placed in the City of Atlanta jail; he was not taken before a magistrate nor afforded a commitment hearing; he was indicted by a grand jury on September 28, 1973; he was then removed from the City jail to the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff; counsel was then appointed for him, and prior to pleading guilty or not guilty to the indictment, he filed a written motion to quash the indictment for the failure of the State to afford him a commitment hearing; the motion prayed that the indictment be quashed and that he be afforded a commitment hearing; the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion on November 6, 1973, overruled the motion, and called the case for trial; the trial began that same day and resulted in conviction; and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction saying: 'The conviction is reversed, the indictment quashed, and the cause remanded to the trial court to give the defendant his preliminary hearing, after which the case could proceed anew by reindictment and another trial.' Middlebrooks v. State, supra.
1. Commitment hearing issues which are presented to us in post-conviction proceedings usually arise in one of two situations. In one, a commitment hearing has been held but at the hearing accused was denied the assistance of counsel; in the other, no commitment hearing has been held at all. This case presents the latter situation, and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970), is therefore inapposite because it considered only the necessity for counsel at certain 'pretrial confrontation(s) of the accused' id., p. 7, 90 S.Ct. p. 2002, when such a confrontation actually occurred. 1
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), sets forth in clear and unambiguous language the Fourth Amendment mandates pertaining to pre-trial hearings. First, the Fourth Amendment does not require a full-fledged adversarial commitment hearing. 2 Second, what it does require is some minimal 'probable cause' hearing that has nothing to do with whether the accused should be prosecuted. 3 Third, the sole question is whether he should be detained pending further proceedings. 4 Fourth, if he is incorrectly detained without a hearing in violation of the Fourth Amendment, while such detention lasts he may be entitled to habeas corpus relief, but in no event will the illegal detention void a subsequent conviction. 5
2. There is no basis under Georgia law for reversing this conviction because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing under Code Ann. Chaps. 27-2 and 27-4. Wynn v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 763, 765, 204 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1974). For a collection of similar holdings see Douglas v. State, 132 Ga.App. 694, 209 S.E.2d 114 (1974). The Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42, 165 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1969). Anything to the contrary found in Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866(2), 148 S.E.2d 305 (1966) is expressly overruled and will not hereafter be followed.
It is of interest to note that our sister state of Alabama, in which Coleman arose, has consistently adhered to these same principles of law following Coleman. Jordan v. State, 56 Ala.App. 55, 318 So.2d 793 (1974), cert. den. 294 Ala. 761, 318 So.2d 801 (1975). The same rule is applied in prosecutions in the federal courts. United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 416 U.S. 990, 94 S.Ct. 2399, 40 L.Ed.2d 768; United States v. Stith, 479 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 845, 94 S.Ct. 107, 38 L.Ed.2d 83; 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal, § 80, p. 138, Preliminary Proceedings (1969).
We hold that a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing. Finally, in no event will we overturn a conviction on direct appeal or on collateral attack because a commitment hearing was denied appellant.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except GUNTER, INGRAM and HILL, JJ., who dissent.
I disagree with the majority and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
My basic disagreement with the majority is that I think a preliminary hearing is a 'required step' in a felony prosecution in Georgia if the accused is incarcerated for more than 72 hours before indictment, if the accused seeks a preliminary hearing before pleading to the indictment, and if the accused, of course, does not waive a preliminary hearing. I concede that under Georgia's procedure, a person not imprisoned until after indictment has no right to a preliminary hearing.
My position is that an unindicted, imprisoned person must be accorded a preliminary hearing: such a hearing is required by statutes enacted by the General Assembly; such a hearing is a valuable right accorded to an accused person by Georgia's statutes; and such a hearing is both a 'required step' and a 'critical stage' in Georgia's criminal procedure.
This was the position that I took in my dissenting opinion in Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430, 437, 202 S.E.2d 26 (1973). I adhere to that position. The case at bar places the contrary viewpoints in sharp focus, because here the respondent was imprisoned for 28 days without a preliminary hearing and without an indictment being returned. Before pleading to the indictment the respondent applied in writing to the trial court for a preliminary hearing. He did not waive his statutory right to a preliminary hearing, and the trial judge denied this statutory right and placed the respondent on trial. This case presents a vivid example of what I call 'an arbitrary denial by the State of procedural due process of law' mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When a right is given by a state legislature, as is the case is Georgia in this instance, even though it is not a right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the arbitrary denial of the statutory right violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. Ga.Code Ann. § 1-815. Procedural due process of law, as I understand the constitutional concept, relates to the procedural requirements that must be followed by the State in allowing it to regulate a person's liberty or in allowing it to deprive a person of his liberty. And once a State by statute accords all persons a procedural right to which they are entitled in the regulation of their liberty by the State, an arbitrary denial of such procedural, statutory right to any person is a denial by the State of due process of law.
A Georgia statute gave respondent a right to a preliminary hearing after his arrest. Ga.Laws 1956, pp. 796, 797 (Ga.Code Ann. §§ 27-210, 27-212). This statute makes a preliminary hearing for an imprisoned person a 'required step' in a criminal prosecution in Georgia. This statute and the provisions of Chapter 27-4 of the Georgia Code make a Georgia preliminary hearing a critical stage in a criminal...
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