City of Dayton v. Adams

• Decision Date: 15 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 39838,39838
• Citation: 9 Ohio St.2d 89,38 O.O.2d 223,223 N.E.2d 822
• Parties: , 38 O.O.2d 223 CITY OF DAYTON, Appellee, v. ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 89

9 Ohio St.2d 89

223 N.E.2d 822, 38 O.O.2d 223

CITY OF DAYTON, Appellee, v. ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 39838.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 15, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Municipal police cars used in the enforcement of municipal ordinances regulating the speed of motor vehicles upon the streets of the municipality are required to be marked as provided in Section 4549.13, Revised Code.

2. A municipal police officer, who is on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing motor vehicle or traffic ordinances of the municipality, providing the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor, is incompetent to testify as a witness in any prosecution against a person he arrests or participates or assists in arresting for the violation of the motor vehicle or traffic ordinances of the municipality, if such officer, at the time of the arrest, was using a motor vehicle not marked in accordance with Section 4549.13, Revised Code.

This cause is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts.

The appellant was stopped in the city of Dayton by Dayton police officer, W. K. White, who issued the appellant a citation accusing the appellant of operating a motor vehicle at 35 miles an hour in a 25-mile an hour zone. The speed of appellant's motor vehicle was checked by the use of a radar device.

Officer White operated a properly marked Dayton police cruiser known as a 'chase vehicle.' Officer Burns operated an unmarked motor vehicle owned by the city of Dayton, which carried a radar box, a radar recording device and radar tape.

The appellant was tried in the Dayton Municipal Court and found guilty. It is stipulated by the parties that appellant's counsel entered timely objections to the admission into evidence of the testimony of both police officers pertaining to the radar device.

A motion for a new trial was overruled. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the Municipal Court was affirmed. (3 Ohio App.2d 126, 209 N.E.2d 638.)

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Henry W. Phillips, Dayton, for appellee.

Bailie & Allen and David H. Bailie, Dayton, for appellant.

O'NEILL, Judge.

The sole question presented to this court for determination is: Are municipal police cars, used in the enforcement of municipal ordinances regulating the speed of motor vehicles upon the streets of the municipality, required to be marked as provided in Section 4549.13, Ohio Revised Code?

The answer to this question is found in the statute itself, Section 4549.13, Revised Code, which says:

'Any motor vehicle used by a member of the state highway patrol or by any other peace officer, while said officer is on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the motor vehicle or traffic laws of this state, provided the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor, shall be marked in some distinctive manner or color. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

The intent of the Legislature in enacting this provision of law was to provide uniformity in traffic control and regulation in an effort to make driving safer in all political subdivisions within the state. As Judge Herbert, speaking for a unanimous court, stated in City of Cleveland Heights v. Woodle, 176 Ohio St. 113, at page 116, 198 N.E.2d 68, at page 70:

'* * * uniformity is essential both for traffic safety and for efficient traffic regulation.'

It was also the intent of the Legislature, in part, in enacting this provision of law, to put a curb upon the speed traps which were often operated by 'peace officers' of the municipalities and townships.

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