United States v. Reading Co.
Decision Date | 03 July 1915 |
Docket Number | 1095. |
Citation | 226 F. 229 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. READING CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Supplemental Opinion, October 27, 1915. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
J. C McReynolds, Atty. Gen., G. Carroll Todd, Asst. Atty. Hen and Thurlow M. Gordon, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Robert W. De Forest and Wm. A. Barkalow, both of New York City, for defendants Central R. Co. of New Jersey.
Jackson E. Reynolds, of New York City, for defendants Reading Co., Philadelphia & R.R. Co., and Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co.
Henry S. Drinker, Jr., Abraham M. Beitler and John G. Johnson, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co.
Wm. Jay Turner and John G. Johnson, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant Lehigh & N.E.R. Co.
Before BUFFINGTON, HUNT, and McPHERSON, Circuit Judges.
This action was begun in September, 1913, and is the successor of an earlier action brought in 1907, which was decided by this court in 1910 (183 F. 427), and by the Supreme Court in 1912 (226 U.S. 324, 33 Sup.Ct. 90, 57 L.Ed. 243). The suit of 1907 was brought against six of the railroads that reach the anthracite coal field of Pennsylvania, with certain coal companies and other defendants. It rested entirely on the Anti-Trust Act of 1890; the commodities clause of 1906 was not involved. The result of the suit was to declare two transactions unlawful-- a combination through the Temple Iron Company to prevent the construction of a railroad, and a class of contracts known as the '65 per cent. contracts'-- while the principal complaint of the government, namely, that the carriers had combined to distribute the coal tonnage among themselves, was not sustained.
But, as a part of the general combination charged to exist among the carriers, the government had averred that several minor combinations had been made, and upon the existence and the lawfulness of these the Supreme Court did not pass, declaring that if such combinations had been made they must be separately attacked, and therefore dismissing the bill as to them, but without prejudice to the government's right to sue them in detail. The action now before us undertakes to prove the existence of one of these combinations, although the charge made in the suit of 1907 has now been expanded so as to embrace other transactions and other defendants than were embraced by that proceeding. The situation is complicated, and may be difficult to state with clearness. It may perhaps simplify matters if we premise some general statements before taking up the government's case and the various answers thereto.
The present proceeding in equity declares its object to be: (1) To prevent the defendants 'from further restraining and monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, interstate and foreign trade and commerce, especially in anthracite coal, in violation' of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890; and (2) to prevent some of the defendants 'from transporting in interstate or foreign commerce anthracite coal (not intended for their use as common carriers) mined or produced by them, etc., in violation' of the commodities clause of the act of 1906.
Confining ourselves for the present to the alleged violation of the act of 1890, we note that the subject-matter of the litigation is the interstate and foreign trade in anthracite coal. The coal in question is produced solely from the Pennsylvania deposit, which in the light of our present knowledge seems to be unique. The United States has never owned or controlled it; the present landowners derive their title either from the Penns or from their successor, the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. What kind of regulation the state might have put in force over this mineral asset, if its value had been realized a century ago, and if the views now current in many quarters about the conservation of natural resources had then prevailed, is purely a matter of academic speculation. What actually happened was this: By gradual degrees anthracite coal came to be recognized as an excellent fuel, and thereupon the attention of private capital, always in search of profitable undertakings, was attracted thereto. The region was wild and unsettled, and the state desired to see it developed and was willing to offer inducements to that end. As a result, many persons acquired coal lands for small sums under the liberal land laws of Pennsylvania, and various mining and transporting enterprises were promoted, usually under the direct encouragement and authority of state legislation. Obeying an inevitable tendency, the ownership of these lands in the course of years passed into the hands of a comparatively small number of individuals and corporations, so that now, although there are still many smaller owners, the great bulk of the deposit belongs to a few large corporate producers. The agencies of production and transportation have been vastly improved and multiplied, and the use of the fuel has become so widespread that many industries and a very large number of homes are now greatly interested in the way the owners deal with their property.
The general situation from the point of view of the large coal-carrying and coal-producing companies was thus summarized by Judge Gray in the first Reading Case, 183 Fed.at page 437:
We think the contentions then made fairly state many of the facts, and in the present case we may say of them, as was said by Judge Gray, that while they are not decisive they are pertinent because their importance challenges the court's careful consideration of the question at issue. When we consider that some of the defendants ship coal to almost all the states and to three foreign countries, we obtain some conception of the magnitude of the trade, and the need of caution in dealing with so vast a subject.
The government is not making any attack on the title by which the defendants hold the lands they own in the Pennsylvania region, nor does it seek directly to divest or disturb their enjoyment thereof. The bill does not complain of the method (in and of itself) by which the title is held, and it does not complain of the methods of producing and distributing the coal, so far as these methods are confined to transportation and sale within the state. Neither is the government complaining of the mere amount of the defendants' holdings, or of the mere extent of their business; the act of 1890 has not declared either such amount or such extent to be unlawful, in and of itself; the act is directed simply against unreasonable restraint of interstate and foreign trade, and neither the amount of the defendants' holdings, nor the extent of their business, is relevant to the present inquiry except for the light that may be thrown thereby upon the effect of the defendants' conduct on interstate and foreign trade. In a...
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