Barry v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n.

Decision Date01 March 1885
Citation23 F. 712
PartiesBARRY v. UNITED STATES MUTUAL ACCIDENT ASS'N.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

C. M Bice, for plaintiff.

Finches Lynde & Miller, for defendant.

DYER J., (charging jury.)

On the twenty-third day of June, 1882, the defendant association issued to John S. Barry, then residing at Vulcan, Michigan but since deceased, what may be termed a contract of insurance, by which it agreed to pay his wife, Theresa A Barry, a sum not exceeding $5,000, within 60 days after sufficient proof that, at any time within the continuance of membership of Dr. Barry in the association, he had sustained bodily injuries, effected through external, violent, and accidental means, and that such bodily injuries alone had occasioned death within 90 days from the happening thereof. This is a suit brought by the beneficiary named in the policy to recover the amount of the insurance.

It is alleged that the deceased sustained an injury, within the meaning of the policy, on the twentieth day of June, 1883, and it is proven that he died on the twenty-ninth day of that month. There is no question, therefore, that if he was injured as claimed, he died within the time after the alleged injury named in the policy; nor is there any question that the policy was in force at the time of his death. By the terms of the policy it was provided, as already stated, that to entitle the beneficiary to the sum of $5,000, the death should be occasioned by bodily injuries alone, effected through external, violent, and accidental means. Also that the benefits of the insurance should not extend to an injury of which there was no external and visible sign; nor to any injury happening, directly or indirectly, in consequence of disease; nor to any death or disability caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities, or disease existing prior or subsequent to the date of the policy; nor to any case except where the injury was the proximate or sole cause of the disability or death. The issue between the parties may be briefly stated:

It is claimed by the plaintiff that, on the occasion mentioned by Dr. Hirschman, when the deceased was at Iron Mountain, he sustained an injury by jumping from a platform to the ground; that this injury was effected by such means as are mentioned in the policy; that the deceased at the time of the alleged accident was in sound physical condition and in robust health; and that the alleged injury was the proximate and sole cause of death. The defendant denies that the deceased sustained any injury that was effected through accidental means, and also contends that if any injury was sustained, it was one of which there was no external or visible sign, within the meaning of the policy; and that the supposed injury was not the cause of the death of the deceased, but that he died from natural causes. The case therefore resolves itself into three points of inquiry: First. Did Dr. Barry sustain internal injury by his jump from the platform on the occasion testified to by Dr. Hirschman? Second. If he did sustain injury as alleged, was it effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the sense and meaning of the policy, and was it an injury of which there was an external and visible sign? Third. If he was injured as claimed, was that injury the proximate cause of his death? To entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, each and all of these questions must be answered by you in the affirmative; and if, under the testimony, either one of them must be negatively answered, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

The first question,-- viz., was the deceased, Dr. Barry, injured by jumping from the platform,-- is so entirely a question of fact to be determined upon the testimony, that the court must submit it without discussion to your determination. In passing upon the question, you will consider all the circumstances of the occurrence as laid before you in the testimony, the apparent previous physical condition of Dr. Barry, the subsequent occurrences and circumstances tending to show the change in his condition, the relation in time which the first developments of any trouble bore to the time when he jumped from the platform, the nature of his last sickness, and the symptoms disclosed in its progress and termination. Further, you will inquire what evidence, if any, did the post mortem examination, and any and all subsequent examinations of the parts alleged to have been the seat of the supposed injury, furnish of an actual physical injury; what connection, if any, does there or does there not appear to be between the act of jumping from the platform and the subsequent events and circumstances which culminated in death, including the result, as you shall find it to be, of post mortem investigations. The question is before you, in the light of all proven facts, for determination. The court cannot indicate any opinion upon it without invading your exclusive province, and by your ascertainment of the facts the parties must be bound. There is presented in the case a train of circumstances. Do they, or not, so to speak, form a chain connecting the ultimate result with such a previous cause as is alleged? Was the act of jumping from the platform adequate or inadequate to produce an internal injury? Thus may you properly pursue the inquiry, guided by and keeping within the limits of the testimony.

If you find that injury was sustained, then the next question is was it effected through external, violent, and accidental means? This is a pivotal point in the case, and therefore vitally important. The means must have been external, violent, and accidental. Did an accident occur in the means through which the alleged bodily injury was effected? It does not help you to a proper conclusion to say merely that the injury itself, if there was one, was an accident or accidental. That was the result, and not the means, through which it was effected. The jumping off the platform was the means by which the injury, if any was sustained, was caused. Was there anything accidental, unforeseen, involuntary, unexpected in the act of jumping, from the time the deceased left the platform until he alighted on the ground? The term accidental is here used in its ordinary, popular sense, and in that sense it means 'happening by chance, unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of things,' or not as expected. In other words, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or...

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13 cases
  • Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1925
    ... ... There ... appears to be only two other states of the Union with ... statutes in any respect similar to ... here by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal ... from the ... , 298 Mo. 1, 249 S.W. 912; Landau ... v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 267 S.W ... 370; Caldwell v ... contention. Barry v. Association (C. C.) 23 ... F. 712, 131 U.S. 100, 9 ... ...
  • Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company v. Schmaltz
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  • Wright v. Order of United Commercial Travelers Travelers America
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    ... ... Interstate Cas. Co., 99 Wis. 73; ... Keen v. N.E. Acc. Assoc., 161 Mass. 149; ... Hastings v. Trav. Ins. Co., ... Wright, were accidental. Joyce on Ins., sec. 2863; Barry ... v. Mut. Acc. Assoc., 23 F. 712; Payne v. Frat. Acc ... [United ... States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 23 L.Ed. 707; Hamilton ... v. Kansas ... ...
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    ... ... 544, 547, 24 N.E. 221, 27 L.R.A. 399; United ... States Casualty Co. v. Hanson (1905), 20 ... immaterial. Bernays v. United States Mut. Acc ... Assn. (1891), 45 F. 455, 457; 4 ... [104 N.E. 884] ... Assn. v. Barry (1889), 131 U.S. 100, 111, 9 ... S.Ct. 755, 33 ... ...
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