People ex rel. Durham Realty Corr. v. La Fetra

• Decision Date: 08 March 1921
• Citation: 230 N.Y. 429,130 N.E. 601
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. DURHAM REALTY CORRORATION v. LA FETRA, City Court Justice. PEOPLE ex rel. BRIXTON OPERATING CORPORATION v. SAME.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

230 N.Y. 429

130 N.E. 601

PEOPLE ex rel. DURHAM REALTY CORRORATION

v.LA FETRA, City Court Justice.

PEOPLE ex rel. BRIXTON OPERATING CORPORATION

v.SAME.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 8, 1921.

Two mandamus proceedings by the People, on the relation of the Durham Realty Corporation and on the relation of the Brixton Operating Corporation, against Edward B. La Fetra, justice of the city court of the city of New York. From an order of the Appellate Division, First Department (194 App. Div. 523,186 N. Y. Supp. 58; 186 N. Y. Supp. 63), in each case, affirming, as a matter of law, an order of the Special Term which denied a motion for a peremptory writ requiring defendant to issue a precept for the eviction of a hold-over tenant from relator's premises, each relator appeals.

Affirmed.

McLaughlin, J., dissenting.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

George L. Ingraham, John M. Stoddard and Alexander C. MacNulty, all of New York City, for appellants.

William D. Guthrie and Julius Henry Cohen, both of New York City (Elmer G. Sammis and Bernard Hershkoff, both of New York City, of counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Housing, on the brief), for the Attorney General.

John P. O'Brien, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (John F. O'Brien, and Russell Lord Tarbox, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (Robert P. Beyer, of New York City, of counsel), for State of New York.

Alexander C. MacNulty, of New York City, for Real Estate Board of New York, intervener.

Leonard Klaber, of New York City, for Battery Realty Co., intervener.

POUND, J.

The relator in each case, except for the laws enacted at the extraordinary session of the Legislature convened in September, 1920, to deal with an emergency in the housing situation in Greater New York, was, under subdivision 1 of section 2231 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled to institute summary proceedings for the removal of its tenant upon the expiration of his term. The leased premises were used for dwelling purposes. The tenant had, by written lease executed before the passage of the September laws, contracted to surrender the premises at the expiration of the term, and the term had expired on the 30th day of September, 1920. The defendant, when applied to by the landlord to issue a precept under section 2238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refused to entertain the application on the ground that by the provisions of chapter 942 of the Laws of 1920 the proceeding could not be instituted before the 1st day of November, 1922. The landlord thereupon applied for a writ of mandamus requiring the defendant to issue such precept, asserting that chapter 942 was unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the contract of lease (U. S. Const. art. 1, § 10), depriving the landlord of its property without due process of law, denying to it the equal protection of the laws (Const. U. S. Amend. 14), and taking private property not only for private use but without compensation (N. Y. Const. art. 1, § 6); in brief, that its private property was taken and turned over to another without its consent. The courts have thus far upheld the constitutionality of the law in question on the ground that summary proceedings are a creature of the statute and may be abolished at the legislative will. But the official explanation of the law appended to and submitted with the bill states its purpose and effect to be ‘to do away with the anxiety of the many people in New York who have been served with notices to move on October 1st.’ This declared purpose draws with it the consideration of a group of statutes enacted at the same session to meet a supposed crisis which are closely related to each other; are a part of the same plan of remedial protection to the tenants in possession on October 1st; and can be fairly understood only when considered as parts of one comprehensive design.

These statutes, commonly and collectively known as the September housing laws, include chapters 942-953, inclusive, but chapters 943, 945, 946, 948-953, inclusive, are not directly before the court on this appeal. The reason stated for their enactment is that within New York City and contiguous counties an emergency in the housing situation had arisen as a sequence of the activities of the World War and the astonishing growth of large cities whereby at the same time building had stopped and the home-seeking population of the city had vastly increased; dispossess proceedings, more than had ever been known before, were pending to the number of upwards of 100,000; each proceeding practically involved a family averaging four or five persons; the demand for homes thus became in excess of the supply; the landlordstook advantage of the situation to exact, under threats of eviction, whatever exorbitant rents the necessities of the occasion would bring forth; tenants offered themselves who would submit to such demands rather than take the chance of finding other places of abode. The Legislature had investigated the situation through the agency of its joint committee; the Governor had called the Legislature in special session to deal with the subject, although at its regular session in April it had passed what are known as the April housing laws, dealing with the same subject, which had failed substantially to relieve the existing conditions. While the inadequacy of housing facilities in cities had become a matter of world-wide concern, in the closely settled metropolis it was a problem of the utmost gravity, calamitous in its possibilities. The Legislature, unequal to the task of caring for all, decided to make the tenants in possession a preferred class by staying until November 1, 1922, all proceedings to dispossess them, except for reasons hereinafter stated, so long as they paid a ‘reasonable rent,’ which is the term used for a statutory charge for use and occupation, to be ascertained judicially through a method provided by the statutes.

The owners of dwellings, including apartment and tenement houses (but excepting buildings under construction in September last, lodging houses for transients, and the larger hotels), were therefore wholly deprived until November 1, 1922, of all possessory remedies for the purpose of removing from their premises the tenants or occupants in possession when the laws took effect, except where the person holding over is shown to be objectionable or the landlord seeks to occupy the premises as a dwelling for himself and family, or intends to demolish the building and construct a new building, or has sold to a co-operative ownership plan corporation, providing such tenants or occupants are ready, able, and willing to pay a reasonable rent or price for their use and occupation. The presumption is created that any demand for rent greater than that in any year prior to such demand is unreasonable and oppressive. The landlord may not evict the statutory tenants, although they remain as free to depart as they were prior to the enactment of the housing laws. To accomplish this purpose the Legislature first enacted chapter 942, to amend the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to summary proceedings, which recited that, a public emergency existing, no summary proceedings should be maintained until the 1st day of November, 1922, to recover possession of real property, except for one of the four reasons indicated above. It also provided that in pending hold-over proceedings, where no warrant had been issued, the warrant should not be issued unless the proceeding came under one of the exceptions above quoted. This chapter is supplemented by chapter 947, which amends the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to actions to recover possession of real property, and prohibits the landlord for the same period from maintaining an action to recover possession of real property, with the same exceptions previously indicated, and by chapter 944, which recites that unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive agreements for the payment of rent have been made and exacted from tenants under stress of prevailing conditions whereby the freedom of contract has been impaired, and congested housing conditions resulting therefrom have seriously affected and endangered the public welfare, health, and morals in certain cities of the state, preserves the action for rent, provides that the plaintiff may recover a fair and reasonable rent for the premises, and further provides that on default of payment of the fair rental value the landlord may obtain possession of his premises by a dispossess warrant. The provision in chapter 944 above quoted was first incorporated in chapter 136, Laws of 1920, and applies at least to leases made after April 1, 1920. Its retroactive effect is not at present before the court for consideration. Chapters 942 and 947 apply only to ‘cities of a population of one million or more and in cities in a county adjoining such a city.’ Chapter 944 applies to cities of the first class and cities in a county adjoining such city.

[1] Whether or not a public emergency existed was a question of fact, debated and debatable, which addressed itself primarily to the Legislature. That it existed, promised not to be presently self-curative, and called for action, appeared from public documents and from common knowledge and observation. If the lawmaking power on such evidence has determined the existence of the emergency and has, in the main, dealt with it in a manner permitted by the constitutional limitations upon legislative power, so far as the same affect the class of landlords now challenging the statutes, the legislation should be upheld. How it may operate on other classes or individuals not before the court is not our present concern. The relator comes indisputably within the main purpose of the statutes, but it has no standing to raise questions which do not directly affect it. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 409, 39...