Louisville Nashville Railroad Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company
Decision Date | 08 June 1914 |
Docket Number | No. 337,337 |
Citation | 234 U.S. 369,34 S.Ct. 810,58 L.Ed. 1356 |
Parties | LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt., v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Gregory L. Smith and Henry L. Stone for appellant.
Messrs. Rush Taggart, J. B. Harris, and George H. Fearons for appellee.
[Syllabus from page 370 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:
By a bill in equity exhibited in the district court, the appellant seeks the annulment of three judgments of special courts of eminent domain in Harrison, Jackson, and Hancock counties, Mississippi, purporting to condemn portions of its right of way in those counties for the use of the appellee. According to the allegations of the bill, when given the effect that must be given to them for present purposes, the case is this: The appellant has a feesimple title to the land constituting the right of way, and is in possession, and the appellee is asserting a right to subject portions of the right of way to its use under the three judgments recently obtained. The appellant insists, for various reasons fully set forth, that the judgments were procured and rendered in such disregard of applicable local laws as to be clearly invalid, and that they operate to becloud its title. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000, the right of way is within the district in which the bill was filed, and the appellant and appellee are, respectively, Kentucky and New York corporations. The prayer of the bill is, that the judgments be held null and void and the appellee enjoined from exercising or asserting any right under them. Appearing specially for the purpose, the appellee objected to the district court's jurisdiction, upon the ground that neither of the parties was a resident of that district, and that the suit was not one that could be brought in a district other than that of the residence of one of them without the appellee's consent. The court sustained the objection, dismissed the bill, and allowed this direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code. [36 Stat. at L. 1157, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 228.]
We are only concerned with the jurisdiction of the district court as a Federal court; that is, with its power to entertain the suit under the laws of the United States. Fore River Shipbuilding Co. v. Hagg, 219 U. S. 175, 55 L. ed. 163, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; United States v. Congress Constr. Co. 222 U. S. 199, 56 L. ed. 163, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79, 83, 56 L. ed. 990, 991, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659. Whether, upon the showing in the bill, the appellant is entitled to the relief sought, is not a jurisdictional question in the sense of § 238, and is not before us. Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; Citizens' Sav. & T. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 205 U. S. 46, 58, 51 L. ed. 703, 707, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; R. J. Darnell v. Illinois C. R. Co. 225 U. S. 243, 56 L. ed. 1072, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760.
As the matter in controversy is of the requisite value and the parties are citizens of different states, the suit manifestly is within the general class over which the district courts are given jurisdiction by the Judicial Code, § 24, cl. 1 [ ]; so the question for decision is whether the suit is cognizable in the particular district court in which it was brought.
In distributing the jurisdiction conferred in general terms upon the district courts, the Code declares, in § 51, that, 'except as provided in the six succeeding sections, no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.' If this section be applicable to suits which are local in their nature, as well as to such as are transitory (as to which see Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66, 26 L. ed. 52; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 39 L. ed. 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24; Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. 158 U. S. 105, 39 L. ed. 913, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771; Kentucky Coal Lands Co v. Mineral Development Co. 191 Fed. 899, 915), it is clear that the district court in which the suit was brought cannot entertain it, unless one of the six succeeding sections provides otherwise, or the appellee waives its personal privilege of being sued only in the district of its or the appellant's residence. Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164; Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. 210 U. S. 368, 52 L. ed. 1101, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720.
The appellant relies upon § 57, one of the six succeeding sections, as adequately sustaining the jurisdiction. This section reads as follows:
It will be perceived that this section not only plainly contemplates that a suit 'to remove any encumbrance, lien, or cloud upon the title to real or personal property' shall be cognizable in the district court of the district wherein the property is located, but expressly provides for notifying the defendant by personal service outside the district, and, if that be impracticable, by publication. The section has been several times considered by this court, and, unless there be merit in an objection yet to be noticed, the decisions leave no doubt of its applicability to the present suit, even though both parties reside outside the district. Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 39 L. ed. 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24; Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 39 L. ed. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co. 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 647, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; Citizens' Sav. & T. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 205 U. S. 46, 51 L. ed. 703, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79, 56 L. ed. 990, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659.
The appellee, after asserting that each of the judgments is void upon its face if the attack upon it in the bill is well taken, calls attention to the general rule that a bill in equity does not lie to cancel, as a cloud upon title, a conveyance or instrument that is void upon its face, and then insists that § 57 must be regarded as adopted in the light of that rule, and as not intended to displace it, or to embrace a suit brought in opposition to it. The difficulty with this contention is that it seeks to make the usages of courts of equity the sole test of what constitutes a cloud upon title, so as to bring a suit to remove it within the operation of § 57, and disregards the bearing which the state law rightly has upon the question. As long ago as 1839 this court had occasion, in Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 10 L. ed. 123, to consider whether a Federal court sitting in the state of Kentucky could entertain a suit to remove a cloud from the title to real property in that state where the right to such relief depended upon a remedial statute of the state; and in the opinion, which fully sustained the jurisdiction, the court pointed out that the nature of the right was such that it could only be enforced in a court of equity, and then said (p. 203): ...
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