Douthit v. State

Decision Date12 May 1977
Docket NumberNo. 31768,31768
Citation239 Ga. 81,235 S.E.2d 493
PartiesRonald DOUTHIT v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Tom Charron, Dist. Atty., B. Wayne Phillips, Marietta, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Isaac Byrd, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

This is a death case. Following trial by jury in Cobb County, Ronald Douthit was found guilty of the offense of murder. The case is before this court on appeal and for review of the death sentence. The jury had before it the evidence which follows.

While walking along Log Cabin Drive in Smyrna, Georgia, at approximately 9:30 a. m. on Wednesday, December 17, 1975, Silas Stephens noticed the feet of a body protruding from a ditch. The body was clothed except that the victim's shoes were missing. The police were summoned and the body of Leonard Karl Frazier was identified. During autopsy three bullets were recovered from the victim's head, one of which caused death by passing into the brain. The victim had been dead at least eight hours but not more than three days.

In an interview with two of the victim's brothers, the police learned that the defendant and the victim were cousins, that the defendant formerly employed the victim, and that the two stayed together with Rodney Dulaney at a former kennel where they kept a small caliber gun. After obtaining a search warrant the police proceeded to the kennel where they met and interrogated Michael Beasley and Michael Barrett (see below). While police were conducting the search, the defendant and Dulaney arrived. They were then advised of their constitutional rights.

The police found that the defendant had insurance on Leonard Frazier's life. The defendant subsequently retrieved a .22 caliber pistol from the place where he was employed.

The defendant told police that he, Dulaney, and Frazier were together at the kennel, and the defendant went across the street to a fruit stand. On his way back, the defendant heard two shots and entered the kennel where he saw Dulaney coming up the basement steps saying he had shot Frazier. He and Dulaney then took Frazier's body to Log Cabin Drive, where they dumped it. They threw his shoes into a river. The defendant took the detectives to the basement and showed them where Frazier had been shot and pointed out some aluminum screen with blood stains and stated Frazier had fallen on it. Although the blood test was not conclusive, the blood on the aluminum screen had the same A and B blood factors as found in the victim's blood.

Ballistics comparison of the three bullets found in the victim's body with bullets fired from the .22 caliber pistol retrieved from the defendant revealed that one of the bullets found in the body was fired from the gun. The second bullet was too mutilated to compare, but a firearms expert testified that the third bullet was probably fired from the gun.

Michael Barrett, an acquaintance of the defendant, was in the insurance business. The defendant had asked him numerous detailed questions about insurance, including hypothetical questions regarding insurance taken out on an elderly person with heart trouble who would probably die. Dulaney was present during these discussions. Barrett replied that the insurance company would investigate and discover that the person was a poor risk, and that the insurance would be refused. The defendant asked about getting insurance on a cousin who drank, shot guns, and would eventually get killed. The defendant said the father would be the beneficiary and that this would help out the family.

The defendant then told Barrett that he already had insurance on his cousin and wanted another $37,000 with double indemnity. He offered Barrett $25,000 of the resulting insurance money if he would arrange things so that the policy would be issued. On Saturday, December 13, 1975, when Barrett went to the kennel to tell the defendant and Dulaney he wanted nothing more to do with them, he noticed a .22 caliber pistol. After leaving and going to a nearby convenience store, Barrett saw Dulaney in a car pointing a gun at him. The defendant was with Dulaney in Michael Beasley's car.

On the following Monday, December 15, Barrett went to the kennel because Dulaney told him they had something to tell On the Saturday night before Frazier's body was found, Michael Beasley was visiting the defendant and Dulaney at the kennel. After stating they wanted to find Leonard Frazier, Beasley accompanied defendant and Dulaney in Beasley's car and drove around looking for Frazier. They saw Frazier on Log Cabin Drive and then drove to the defendant's house. The defendant and Dulaney then told Beasley that they wanted to cut through the woods and kill Frazier. Later the defendant and Dulaney returned saying someone had seen them and that they would get Frazier later. The defendant and Dulaney told Beasley that they would collect insurance money. On Sunday night Beasley went with the defendant and Dulaney to look at cars. They were looking at Continental Mark IVs. They told Beasley they would also buy him a car.

him. Barrett noticed some bullet holes in the den. Dulaney said he had shot the .22 pistol. Dulaney also stated he would be buying a new car later because he was coming into some money. After defendant's arrest he [239 Ga. 83] called Barrett several times. Defendant said that Dulaney threatened Barrett's life if Barrett testified. Defendant also said that Dulaney had wanted to kill Barrett at the convenience store, but the gun had not been loaded. The defendant told Barrett that Dulaney "did it" and that he (the defendant) had never fired the gun.

Jeffrey Lee Faircloth, insurance agent, had written a $15,000 life with double indemnity policy on Leonard Frazier at the defendant's request. It had been issued on September 28, 1975, and named Frazier's father as beneficiary. The defendant told Faircloth that Frazier was no longer employed at the kennel, but that since Frazier was his cousin, the defendant would continue to pay the premiums to help him out. When Faircloth first delivered the policy to the defendant, the defendant had said that Frazier might change beneficiaries. Later, a person identifying himself as Leonard Frazier called Faircloth. Faircloth had never met Frazier. The caller informed Faircloth that he wanted to change his life insurance beneficiary because his father, the beneficiary at the time, was an alcoholic. The caller then stated he wanted the defendant, Ronald Douthit, as his beneficiary because they were cousins. When Faircloth suggested getting together to sign the forms, the caller said he was too busy and just wanted the forms mailed. Faircloth mailed the forms and defendant Ronald Douthit became the beneficiary on December 10, 1975. When the defendant called Faircloth and asked if Frazier had changed beneficiaries, the defendant was informed that Frazier had done so.

The defense called no witnesses.

The jury found the defendant guilty and thereafter imposed the death penalty. The defendant's motion for new trial, as amended, was overruled by the trial court.

1. Defendant urges that the evidence does not support the verdict and that the verdict is contrary to law. In light of the facts, recited in summary above, the verdict of the jury is amply supported by the evidence and is not contrary to the law or evidence. See Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720, 721, 221 S.E.2d 556 (1975). We agree with the findings of the trial court in denying the defendant's motion for new trial: "There was evidence sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the death of Frazier was deliberately planned, conceived and intended by Dulaney and Douthit for the purpose of obtaining the proceeds of an insurance policy purportedly in effect on Frazier's life, payable to Douthit. After Frazier had been slain, his body was deliberately placed on the roadway so that it could be discovered and the insurance collected. The life insurance policy, obtained and allegedly paid by Douthit, was in the possession of defendant, the beneficiary had been changed to Douthit in less than a fortnight from Frazier's murder, and the weapon that caused his death was found in Douthit's possession. This evidence was uncontradicted. A finding by the jury that Douthit, if not the slayer, was the 'mastermind' of the crime, was warranted."

The defendant nevertheless urges that the conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted because the evidence was circumstantial and such evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. The jury was fully charged on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable hypothesis rule pursuant to Code, § 38-109. We do not find from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, a hypothesis pointing to the innocence of the accused. Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 242, 223 S.E.2d 643 (1976). The defendant's statement to police that Dulaney shot the victim during the defendant's absence does not, when considered with the other evidence, present a hypothesis of innocence as a matter of law. Harris v. State, supra.

2. The defendant asserts that it was error for the court to overrule defendant's motion for new trial as amended on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The evidence relied on by the defendant as "newly discovered" consisted of evidence that his accounts in two banks had been closed before the murder and that the insurance company was taking the position that the insurance was not in force after October 28, 1975, the last date for which payment had been received. (Defendant concedes that this information was also unknown to the district attorney.)

The defendant relies on Bell v. State, 227 Ga. 800, 805, 183 S.E.2d 357 (1971), where the court set out six criteria that must be satisfied for the grant of a new trial on newly discovered evidence. In Pulliam v. State, 199 Ga. 709(...

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