Rehak v. Mathis, 32471

Decision Date07 September 1977
Docket NumberNo. 32471,32471
Citation239 Ga. 541,238 S.E.2d 81
PartiesHazel Virginia REHAK v. Archie S. MATHIS.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Patton & Hoyt, Wade C. Hoyt, III, Rome, for appellant.

Cook & Palmour, Bobby Lee Cook, Cecil Palmour, Summerville, for appellee.

BOWLES, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Floyd County granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

The appellant, Hazel Rehak, filed an action in equity against the appellee, Archie Mathis, and in her complaint alleged that the parties, in 1957, had jointly purchased a home in Floyd County, Georgia. For the first two years, 1957 and 1958, she paid all installment payments upon the home. From 1959 through February of 1975, the appellant and appellee each made one-half of the monthly installment payments on the house. The complaint further alleged that both parties lived and cohabited together in the house for 18 years, during which time, appellant alleged she "cooked for, cleaned for, and in general cared for the comforts, needs, and pleasures of the (appellee) . . . while they cohabited together." The appellant alleged that on numerous occasions the appellee told her that the house belonged to them jointly and that for the rest of her life he would support and take care of her and her financial needs.

In December of 1975, the appellee moved out of the house and told the appellant to vacate the home. The appellee refused to pay her anything for her purchase money interest in the house or for the services rendered to the appellee over the 18-year period during which they cohabited.

The appellant, in January of 1976, filed a verified petition for divorce against appellee in the Superior Court of Floyd County, wherein the appellant admitted that she cohabited with the appellee for 18 years. Following repeated hearings and negotiations between the parties, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss the divorce action with prejudice. The court entered an order dismissing the complaint, said dismissal to affect the question of marriage only and in no way to affect any future civil suit of equitable action by either party against the other.

Following the dismissal, the appellant brought the present equitable action seeking an award of $100.00 a month for the 18 years that she lived with and took care of the needs of the appellee and additionally sought exclusive title and possession to the house in Floyd County.

Subsequent to the filing of the complaint a motion for summary judgment was made by the appellee, which motion was supported by a brief. The appellant filed no response to appellee's motion. The court entered an order granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment for reason that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and, therefore, appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellant appeals that order.

Summary judgment will be granted only where there is no issue as to any material fact, and as a matter of law the moving party is entitled to a judgment. Code Ann. § 81A-156(c). When a defendant makes a motion for summary judgment under the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, which motion is supported by affidavits, depositions, or other evidentiary matters, showing a prima facie right on the part of the defendant to have a summary judgment rendered in his favor, the duty is then cast upon the plaintiff to produce rebuttal evidence at the hearing thereof, by the introduction of depositions, affidavits, or other evidence sufficient to show to the court that there is a genuine issue of fact to be decided by the jury. Stephens County v. Gaines, 128 Ga.App. 661, 197 S.E.2d 424 (1973); Bussie v. Wilson, 114 Ga.App. 298, 151 S.E.2d 186 (1966).

In the instant case, the appellee moved for a summary judgment contending "the pleadings in this case conclusively show that all property and monetary claims asserted thereon are based upon a meretricious relationship, which claims are not recoverable because contrary to the public policy of this State."

It is well settled that neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration. Code Ann. § 20-501; Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958); Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 372, 45 S.E. 262 (1903).

The appellee's motion for summary judgment was...

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17 cases
  • Hewitt v. Hewitt
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • September 19, 1979
    ...815, 822 n.5, 557 P.2d 106, 113 n.5; Tyranski v. Piggins (1973), 44 Mich.App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595, 597; contra, Rehak v. Mathis (1977), 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81.) In Latham v. Latham (1976), 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144, and Carlson v. Olson (Minn.1977), 256 N.W.2d 249, on allegations simila......
  • Knauer v. Knauer
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • December 16, 1983
    ...which we have found that completely refuse recovery of any sort on public policy grounds. The first of these is Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977), where, despite the fact that the plaintiff had contributed more than one-half of the purchase price for the house which the par......
  • Kelley v. Cooper
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • November 22, 2013
    ...is derived from OCGA § 13–8–1 and its precursors. Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga.App. 761, 766(5), 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003); Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (citing Code Ann. § 20–501). OCGA § 13–8–1 provides: “A contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is void. If the con......
  • Knauer v. Knauer
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • December 16, 1983
    ...... refuse recovery of any sort on public policy grounds. The. first of these is Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238. S.E.2d 81 (1977), where, despite the fact that the plaintiff. had ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Nonmarital Contracts.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 73 No. 1, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...omit cases that examine agreements but are really actions in equity, rather than breach-of-contract claims. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (asserting the court would not "lend its aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration" b......
  • Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration - Mary F. Radford
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 56-1, September 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...at 442. 80. Id. at 765, 586 S.E.2d at 440. 81. Id. 82. Id. at 766, 586 S.E.2d at 441. 83. Id. 84. O.C.G.A. Sec. 13-8-1 (1982). 85. Id. 86. 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977). 87. Id. at 543, 238 S.E.2d at 82. 88. Abrams, 262 Ga. App. at 766, 586 S.E.2d at 440. 89. O.C.G.A. Sec. 16-6-18 (1968......
  • § 1.02 Disputes Between Cohabitants
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 1 Disputes Between Unmarried People
    • Invalid date
    ...Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935). A few more recent cases have adhered to this view. See, e.g.: Georgia: Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977). Illinois: Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.2d 49, 31 Ill. Dec. 827, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). Tennessee: Roach v. Buttons, 6 Fa......
  • Domestic Relations - Barry B. Mcgough and Elinor H. Hitt
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 62-1, September 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...ten 96. Sprouse, 285 Ga. at 470, 678 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247, 250 (Alaska 1997)). Cf.Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (holding that when plaintiff brought an action to recover the money she invested in a house with defendant and the comp......

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