Flagner v. Wilkinson, et al
| Decision Date | 16 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-4145,99-4145 |
| Citation | 241 F.3d 475 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) Hbrandon Lee Flagner, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reginald Wilkinson, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 96-00887
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Michael J. O'Hara, O'HARA, RUBERG, TAYLOR, SLOAN & SERGENT, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Todd R. Marti, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS LITIGATION SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.
Before: NELSON and MOORE, Circuit Judges; WILHOIT, District Judge. *
The plaintiff, Hbrandon Lee Flagner, filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action alleging that an Ohio prison grooming regulation violated his constitutional right to practice his religion. The defendants ask this court to reverse the district court's order denying the defendants' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, arguing that Flagner has not alleged a constitutional violation and that the regulation has a valid penological basis. Based on our precedent in Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 659-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897 (1988), we REVERSE the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We also conclude that Flagner may bring an as-applied challenge to the Ohio prison grooming regulation and that there is a factual dispute on the issue of whether the defendants have a valid penological interest. Accordingly, we REMAND to the district court so that Flagner's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed.
Flagner has been incarcerated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) since 1986. Flagner is a practicing Orthodox Hasidic Jew who brought a §1983 suit against prison officials challenging the enforcement of Ohio Administrative Code §§5120-9-25 (D) and (F), 1 a prison grooming regulation which requires Flagner to cut his beard and sidelocks, also referred to as "peos," in contravention of the tenets of his religious faith. 2 The defendants are ODRC employees who work at either the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LeCI) or the Madison Correctional Institution (MaCI). Flagner was imprisoned at LeCI from July 8, 1994 to November 20, 1996, and transferred shortly thereafter to MaCI. Prior to his transfer to LeCI, Flagner resided at the Mansfield Correctional Institution. He is currently incarcerated at Ross Correctional Institution.
In 1987, Flagner began studying Judaism and formally converted to Orthodox Judaism in 1991 while incarcerated at the Mansfield Correctional Institution. His religious affiliation has been recognized by the defendants and is not in dispute in this case. Flagner testified during the preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing held on December 3, 1996, that between 1991 when he converted to Judaism and prior to his transfer to LeCI in 1994, Mansfield prison officials did not make any effort forcibly to cut his beard or sidelocks. In fact, a period of five years passed between the time Flagner converted to Orthodox Judaism in 1991 until his first forced cutting in 1996.
On January 26, 1996, Flagner was given a direct order by Defendant Bobby Couch of LeCI, to comply with the grooming regulation, but Flagner refused, stating his religious tenets prevented compliance. On February 16, 1996, the Rule Infractions Board found Flagner guilty of disobeying the order and sentenced him to time in a disciplinary isolation unit. On June 21, 1996, Flagner received another direct order from Defendant Couch to comply with the grooming regulation. Flagner then filed a grievance on June 28, 1996, which was reviewed by Defendant David Gardner, Inspector of Institutional Services, on July 11, 1996. In his disposition, Defendant Gardner stated that Flagner was in violation of §5120-9-25(D) and was required to comply with the regulation. Failure to comply would subject Flagner to "appropriate disciplinary action [] [w]hich may include requiring [Flagner's] hair to be cut or trim[med] against [his] will." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 135 (Disposition of Grievance Form). Flagner continued to refuse to comply with the regulation. On July 29, 1996 and in April 1998, the defendants forcibly cut Flagner's beard and sidelocks. Between the time of Flagner's forced cuttings in July 1996 and April 1998, the defendants exempted him and four Native American inmates from the grooming regulation.
Defendant Curtis Wingard, the warden of MaCI testified in his deposition that exempting Flagner from the grooming regulation did not pose additional security problems at MaCI; no additional security precautions were taken with Flagner in excess of the security measures taken with inmates who complied with the grooming regulation. Defendant Wingard also testified that MaCI has neither been required to provide additional security, nor to approve additional overtime to provide security for Flagner and the four Native Americans who were exempted from the grooming regulation. The defendants have only searched Flagner's beard on less than five occasions. These searches have typically involved the defendant running his own fingers through his beard and sidelocks; this process generally took two to three seconds to complete, and contraband has never been recovered from Flagner's beard.
On September 6, 1996, Flagner filed a pro se §1983 action against the Director of ODRC and the warden of LeCI where he was then incarcerated, alleging violations of his religious rights. On January 3, 1997, Flagner filed an amended complaint to include allegations against the warden at MaCI. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on January 9, 1997 regarding Flagner's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from forcibly cutting his beard and sidelocks. On January 14, 1997, the magistrate judge recommended granting Flagner's motion for preliminary injunction. The district court reversed the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and denied Flagner's motion in an order filed on August 8, 1997. The defendants moved for summary judgment on March 27, 1998, and Flagner filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on June 8, 1998. On February 3, 1999, the magistrate judge entered a Report and Recommendation denying both the defendant's motion for summary judgment and Flagner's cross motion for summary judgment, which the district court adopted in an order dated March 29, 1999.
On May 13, 1999, the defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity which is at issue in the present case. On August 24, 1999, the district court entered an order denying the defendant's motion because "[a] reasonable prison official would have known in 1996 that he could not cut Flagner's beard and sidelocks in contravention of his sincerely held religious beliefs in the absence of legitimate penological interests relating to the enforcement of the hair length regulation." 3 J.A. at 236-37 (D. Ct. Order of 8/24/99). The defendants timely filed their Notice of Appeal on September 20, 1999.
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court's order because denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order. See Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 518 (6th Cir. 1999) (). In Johnson v. Jones, a unanimous Supreme Court held that "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
The determination of whether qualified immunity applies to an official's actions is a legal determination that we review de novo. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the evidence presented to the court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We must not weigh the evidence, but rather we must only determine whether there is a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity protects public officers "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." Id. at 806. In Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court explained that "damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of [qualified] immunity." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
As we explained in Dickerson, the first step in determining if the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is to examine "whether, based on the applicable law, a constitutional violation occurred." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1157. If a constitutional violation is found, we next consider whether the violation involved ...
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