Hannon v. Allen

• Decision Date: 22 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 02-10582MLW.,CIV.A. 02-10582MLW.
• Citation: 241 F.Supp.2d 71
• Parties: Francis HANNON, Plaintiff v. Peter ALLEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

241 F.Supp.2d 71

Francis HANNON, Plaintiff v. Peter ALLEN, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 02-10582MLW.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

January 22, 2003.

Valeriano Diviacchi, Diviacchi Law Office, Boston, MA, for Francis Hannon, Plaintiff.

David J. Rentsch, Department of Correction, Legal Division, Boston, MA, for Peter Allen, Superintendent, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

I. SUMMARY

The plaintiff, Francis Hannon, was convicted of murder by a Pennsylvania state court in 1978. His direct appeal was ultimately denied in 1981. In 1991, Hannon filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence.

Hannon has been moved from a prison in Pennsylvania to several other prisons pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. See generally M.G.L. ch. 125 App., § 2-1. He is currently incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction in South Walpole, Massachusetts. The defendant, Peter Allen, is the superintendent of that facility.

Hannon filed a verified complaint in this court alleging that Allen has violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 by denying the plaintiff access to Pennsylvania case law and research materials. Hannon seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs. Hannon also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The court scheduled a hearing on the motion for October 18, 2002 at 11:30 a.m. Counsel for Allen informed the court by letter that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a conflict with a criminal jury trial earlier that week. In the letter, counsel for Hannon represented that the court could decide the preliminary injunction motion on the parties' submissions.

The court has carefully reviewed the plaintiffs motion and the defendant's opposition, as well as the complaint and answer. For the reasons described below, Hannon's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is being denied.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts appear to be undisputed at this stage in the proceedings:

Hannon was convicted of murder under the laws of Pennsylvania in 1978. The conviction was affirmed in 1981. In 1991, a Pennsylvania court appointed an attorney ("Deady") to represent Hannon on a post-conviction relief petition. Attorney Deady neglected the case, failed to return Hannon's papers to him, and was disbarred. A new court-appointed lawyer was assigned to Hannon in 1997. The Pennsylvania DOC transferred Hannon to various prisons throughout the country, beginning in the late 1990's, pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. He was sent to MCI-Cedar Junction in December 2001. MCI-Cedar Junction does not provide Pennsylvania case law or research material in its library.

Def.'s Memo, at 2 (citations to Complaint omitted). It is also undisputed that Allen is the superintendent of MCI-Cedar Junction and that "he is the state official responsible for the supervision, operation, and care of that facility." Answer ¶2.

In his complaint, Hannon does not identify a particular case or claim that he is pursuing for which he needs Pennsylvania legal materials. In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and accompanying affidavit, however, Hannon identifies two matters for which he claims to need Pennsylvania legal materials: (1) his petition for post-conviction relief; and (2) an ongoing grievance against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pertaining to legal materials lost during shipment as Hannon was being transferred from one prison to another. See Pl.'s Memo, at 3^4; Hannon Aff. ¶¶ 1-2. Apparently, these lost legal materials relate directly to Hannon's petition for post-conviction relief. See Def.'s Opp. Ex. 2 at 1.

Hannon asserts that he does not have legal counsel for either of these matters despite valiant efforts on his part to secure legal assistance. See Pl.'s Memo, at 4; Hannon Aff. ¶1. Allen, referring to correspondence between Hannon and the Pennsylvania DOC, states that Hannon claims to be involved in ten pro se legal matters. See Def.'s Opp. at 4. Allen disputes whether Hannon is really without representation in any case where representation would make a difference. See id. at 3-5. However, Allen does not address Hannon's claim that he is without representation with regard to his case concerning missing legal materials. Furthermore, Allen does not provide an affidavit authenticating the exhibits to his Opposition or otherwise supporting his assertion that Hannon is represented by counsel. Nevertheless, for purposes of ruling on this motion, the court is considering these exhibits.

Finally, Hannon alleges that the attorney in his criminal appeal is not providing adequate representation. See Hannon Aff. ¶11.

III. ANALYSIS

The standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction is familiar. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 160 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir.1998). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Id.; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Astra USA Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 742 (1st Cir.1996). The court is required to weigh four factors. RossSimons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1996); Astra, 94 F.3d at 742. The first is whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Ross-Simons, 102 F.3d at 15. The second is whether the plaintiff has established an imminent threat of irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Id. The court is also required to balance the hardship to the plaintiff if no injunction is issued against the hardship to the defendants if the requested injunction is ordered. Id. In addition, the court must consider the effect of the proposed injunction on the public interest. Id.

As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has said on a number of occasions, the likelihood of success on the merits is of primary importance. Id. at 16 (citing cases). It is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Gately v. Commonwealth of Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir.1993); Weaver v. Henderson., 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993). If a great showing of likely success on the merits is made by a plaintiff, a reduced showing of irreparable harm may be appropriate. Ross-Simons, 102 F.3d at 19; Astra, 94 F.3d at 743.

In addition, a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). It does not issue automatically even if the foregoing criteria indicate that an injunction is warranted. Converse Constr. Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 899 F.Supp. 753, 760 (D.Mass.1995). Thus, a court may properly consider any inequitable conduct by the plaintiff. The court may also consider any adverse impact on the public interest for which a bond cannot compensate and withhold relief for this reason alone. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312-13, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91; Converse, 899 F.Supp. at 760.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) requires a prevailing plaintiff to post a bond to pay for costs and damages that may be suffered by defendants if the defendants later prevail on the merits of the case. Cablevision v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 38 F.Supp.2d 46, 53 (D.Mass. 1999).

For the reasons explained below, Hannon has not satisfied his burden of proving likelihood of success on the merits. Although Massachusetts shares with Pennsylvania the duty to provide Hannon with access to the courts, it appears that the defendant will be able to prove that Pennsylvania is doing so.

"It is undisputed that inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts." Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433, 435 (1st Cir.1986). There are several alternate, constitutionally acceptable methods to assure meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Carter, 786 F.2d at 435. Two customary methods are providing prisoners with access to law libraries or access to legal assistance. A prison need not provide both; either one can be sufficient. See Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir.1989).

However, there is no "abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). As with any case or controversy heard by an Article III court, there must be actual injury to the plaintiff. See id. at 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174. "[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Thus, in order to establish standing, an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, Hannon must "demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded." Id. at 352-58, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Furthermore, "the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim." Id. at 354-55, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Rather, the Constitution demands only that prisons provide inmates with the tools they "need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement." Id. at 355 n. 5, 116 S.Ct. 2174. "Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Id. "While undoubtedly prisoners alleging a lack of judicial access must make a prima facie showing, the ultimate burden of proving that the avenues of research and/or legal or paralegal aid are adequate rests with the state." Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1981).

Allen makes two arguments as to why Hannon has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. First, Allen argues that the Pennsylvania DOC is responsible for providing Hannon with access to the courts and the Massachusetts prison system bears no responsibility for this aspect of Hannon's confinement. See Def.'s Opp. at 6-7. Second, Allen argues that...