Reagan v. Andrews

• Citation: 241 S.W.2d 249
• Decision Date: 01 June 1951
• Docket Number: No. 15253,15253
• Parties: REAGAN v. ANDREWS et al.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas

Page 249

241 S.W.2d 249

REAGAN v. ANDREWS et al.

No. 15253.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

June 1, 1951.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1951.

Chas. M. Cocke, of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Richard Owens, of Fort Worth, for appellees.

CULVER, Justice.

Appellant Reagan sued appellees Leola Andrews and husband for title and possession of two adjoining lots of land in Fort Worth. The trial court rendered judgment for appellees on an instructed verdict. Appellant presents nineteen points of error, under which are raised the questions herein discussed.

It appears without dispute that William Cofield is the common source of title, the land having been conveyed to him in the year 1925. Although appellant argues that appellees are not entitled to treat Cofield as the common source of title, it clearly appears from the record that the case was tried by all parties on the theory that Cofield was the common source of title, and appellant himself made no effort to prove title from the sovereignty of the soil.

On February 14, 1931, Cofield executed a deed conveying the land to appellant Reagan but the deed was not filed for record until June 1, 1950. On November 29, 1944, Cofield executed and delivered another deed to the land, in which the grantee was described as 'Mrs. J. L. Stuckert, Trustee for Crown Investment Company.' This deed was filed for record in the following month, and on June 18, 1945, Mrs. Stuckert executed a quitclaim deed to the property naming the appellee Leola Andrews as grantee. Both in the body of the deed and in the signature Mrs. Stuckert was referred to as 'Mrs. J. L. Stuckert, Trustee.' Shortly thereafter, appellee Andrews built a small house on the lots. Before that time the lots had been vacant.

We shall discuss the several contentions which appellant makes without undertaking to set out in detail each of his nineteen points of error.

The first contention presented under several points of error is to the effect that the deed from Cofield to Mrs. Stuckert as trustee was void and ineffective for any purpose because it was an attempted conveyance to her as trustee for Crown Investment Company, a corporation which had been dissolved prior to the time of said deed.

The record shows that there had theretofore been in existence a corporation bearing the name of Crown Investment Company, and that Mrs. Stuckert at one time was secretary of the corporation. The corporation was dissolved by unanimous action of its stockholders on August 16, 1943. Mrs. Stuckert testified without dispute, and there was other evidence in the record to corroborate her testimony, that at the time she received the deed from Cofield in 1944 she and her three children were partners in a concern bearing the name of Crown Investment Company, and that she executed the deed to appellee Andrews under authority of a power of attorney from the other partners. She testified that the articles of partnership had been prepared by attorneys, and that an assumed name certificate had been properly filed. At the time she testified to these facts no objection was made to her testimony, although appellant later filed a motion to strike her testimony on the ground that the writings themselves would be the best evidence, and appellant claims here that there is no evidence of such partnership and that we should treat the evidence as showing that the partners were operating in violation of law by not having filed an assumed name certificate, as required by Articles 1067-1070 of the Penal Code.

Appellant also contends that the deed to Mrs. Stuckert, granting that it was for the benefit of said pertnership, should be held void on the ground that the partners, in doing business under the name of the former corporation, were violating the provisions of Article 141 of the Penal Code, which provides that in cases where the charter or right to do business of a...