Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 16 April 1923 |
Citation | 244 Mass. 530 |
Parties | ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
November 22, 1922.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., DE COURCY CROSBY, & CARROLL, JJ.
Tax, Excise on foreign corporation. Interstate Commerce. Corporation Taxation. Constitutional Law, Taxation.
The legislation set forth in G.L.c. 63, Sections 30-43, 52, constitutes an effort on the part of the General Court on the one hand to avoid a basis for taxation of for eign corporations offensive to limitations imposed upon the power of the State by the Constitution of the United States, and on the other hand to minimize the preferences in favor of foreign corporations revealed by the practical operation of corporation tax laws theretofore in force. Per RUGG, C.J.
The tax law embodied in G.L.c. 63, Sections 30-43, 52, placing as it does both domestic and foreign corporations on common ground as to taxation except so far as essential differences require different treatment in details, follows the policy established in this Commonwealth for many years of levying an excise instead of a property tax on corporate franchises and corporate transaction of business. Per RUGG, C.J.
The excise imposed by G.L.c. 63, Sections 39-43, upon foreign corporations doing business in this Commonwealth is intended to be measured solely by the property and net income fairly attributable to the business done by them within this Commonwealth and is in place of any other tax on personal property within the Commonwealth from which, except as to machinery used in manufacture or in supplying and distributing water, foreign corporations are expressly exempted by G.L.c. 59, Section 5 cl.
16.
The excise upon a foreign corporation having a usual place of business in this Commonwealth used by it solely for interstate commerce, which is plainly provided for by the language of G.L.c. 63 Sections 39-43, rightly may be levied, it not being repugnant to provisions of the
Federal Constitution either by reason of the method of measuring the valuation of the "corporate excess employed within the Commonwealth," as defined by Section 30, cl. 4, of the statute, which is one factor forming the basis for the computation of the tax, or by reason of the use, as a second factor in such computation, of the amount of the net income of the corporation from business transacted in this Commonwealth.
The tax above described considered as a whole with both its main factors is general in nature and reasonable in amount and violates no guaranty established by the Constitution of the United States.
A tax, levied under the statute above described upon a foreign corporation with a usual place of business in this Commonwealth which it used solely for the purposes of interstate commerce, was in the amount of $800.45.
The only property of the corporation in the Commonwealth was its office furniture, valued at $573. Its gross receipts were $12,774,825, and its total net income was $1,148.041. Attributable to business in this
Commonwealth were gross receipts of $424,982, and net profits of $15,370. Wages paid to employees in the Commonwealth were considered and included in them were wages paid for services rendered by salesmen going also to other States. The validity of the computation being raised by a petition under G.L.c. 63, Section 77, it was held, that
(1) A contention of the petitioner that its property outside the Commonwealth had been included in the tax and hence that it had been deprived of its property without due process of law, contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, was without merit;
(2) The question was not whether a subsidiary percentage standing alone may impinge upon property outside the Commonwealth, but whether the use of all of the percentages makes the final result a tax which violates constitutional guaranties;
(3) Excises may be measured to some extent by property not subject to direct taxation;
(4) It did not appear that the proportion of net income ultimately allocated to this Commonwealth was in excess of a just amount;
(5) The inclusion in the computation of wages paid salesmen who operated in other States was not sufficient alone to make the tax invalid.
PETITION, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on November 30, 1921, under G.L.c. 63, Section 77, for recovery of a tax of $800.45 alleged to have been assessed to the petitioner, a foreign corporation, under the provisions of G.L.c. 63, and St. 1921, cc. 361, 493, and paid by it under protest.
The case was reserved by Crosby, J., for determination by the full court upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. Material facts are described in the opinion.
Relevant statutory provisions of G.L.c. 63, are as follows: "Section 30. When used in this section and sections thirty-one to fifty-two, inclusive, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
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