Peterson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 29046.,29046.
• Citation: 187 Minn. 228,244 N.W. 823
• Parties: PETERSON v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

244 N.W. 823

187 Minn. 228

PETERSON v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO.

No. 29046.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 28, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Washington County; Alfred P. Stolberg, Judge.

Action by Fred N. Peterson, as special administrator of the estate of O. K. Miller, deceased, against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company. From an order granting the plaintiff certain relief as prayed for, the defendant appeals.

Order affirmed.

J. C. James, of Chicago, Ill., and Stearns, Stone & Mackey, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Barton & Mogren, of St. Paul, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

The appeal is from an order granting plaintiff certain relief.

From the record herein it appears that O. K. Miller, an employee of defendant in interstate transportation, was injured while so engaged in the state of Iowa; such injury causing his death. Miller and his family, consisting of his wife, Bessie M. Miller, and their two minor children, resided in Wapello county, Iowa. She was duly appointed administratrix of her husband's estate by the probate court of Wapello county. Later she petitioned the probate court of Ramsey county, this state, that plaintiff be appointed special administrator to enforce a claim against defendant for the death of her husband, caused by defendant's negligence. The appointment was made, and plaintiff thereupon brought an action accordingly against defendant in the district court of Washington county, this state. Issue was joined, and plaintiff gave notice to take the depositions of Bessie M. Miller and other witnesses in Iowa. Before the time arrived for so doing, defendant brought an action in Wapello county, Iowa, to restrain Bessie M. Miller, the other witnesses, and the notary public, from giving and taking the depositions, and perpetually to restrain and enjoin Mrs. Miller from litigating her alleged cause of action in any other state than Iowa, on the grounds that it was contrary to the statute and public policy of Iowa, and would be unduly burdensome to defendant to try the case in any other state than Iowa where the injury occurred and all witnesses including Mrs. Miller resided, and also that it would interfere with interstate commerce. A temporary injunction was issued by the Iowa court. Thereupon the present suit was instituted to prohibit defendant from placing obstacles in the way of plaintiff's obtaining the depositions of witnesses in Iowa for use in the trial of his action pending in the district court of Washington county. Upon the pleadings the court made its order commanding defendant within five days to cause the temporary injunction it obtained from the court of Wapello county, Iowa, to be vacated, and the suit in which it was issued to be dismissed, and on failure so to do that its answer, in the pending action brought by plaintiff to recover for the death of O. K. Miller, be stricken and plaintiff be permitted to prove his cause of action as if in default of an answer.

Appellant contends that the probate court of Ramsey county lacked jurisdiction to appoint a special administrator. The cause of action set forth by the special administrator is transitory and arises under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59). It is not suggested that the record of his appointment in the probate court of Ramsey county on its face shows want of jurisdiction. Therefore the case of State ex rel. v. Probate Court, 149 Minn. 464, 184 N. W. 43, cited by appellant, is against its contention. So are the other cases referred to in the case mentioned. See particularly Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 46 N. W. 79. The motive in having a special administrator appointed is not here open to question or inquiry. Mecom, Adm'r v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183, 52 S. Ct. 84, 76 L. Ed. 233.

As to the contention that an affirmance of the order results in denying full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a sister state, demanded by the Federal Constitution, we feel that, until the Federal Supreme Court declares otherwise, the law is settled against appellant by our decisions announced in State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589, 1 A. L. R. 145; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. 161; Hoch v. Byram, 180 Minn. 298, 230 N. W. 823. In the Rule Case, there was a final judgment restraining the prosecution of an action in any other state, whereas in this case there is only a temporary injunction. The plaintiff herein seeks the right to try in the usual manner an action here instituted prior to the beginning of the injunction proceedings by defendant in Iowa. The facts herein are parallel to those involved in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Schendel (C. C. A.) 292 F. 326, 333, except that there the railroad company had secured the temporary injunction in Iowa, the home of the deceased and his widow, enjoining the widow and other witnesses from testifying in any case brought outside of her residence district in the state of Iowa, before the action was brought in the federal court of Minnesota. In the case at bar, the suit in Iowa was subsequent; but this appears to be immaterial. The opinion is convincing that the proceedings in Iowa cannot be allowed to interfere with the proper trial of an action pending in the federal district court of this state, where it has proper jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. In the Schendel Case, as well as in this, it appears that the order of the Iowa court was based on the ground of the public policy of the state of Iowa. Judge Kenyon said: "The subject-matter of the suit in the state court was not the cause of action for the death of Baker. The subject-matter of the action in the federal court was damages arising from said death. No state court had acquired jurisdiction of this cause of action. That jurisdiction was in the federal court, and the fact that an injunction suit was brought in the state court prior to commencing the action in the federal court could not give any jurisdiction of a matter not embraced therein. If, when an action is about to be brought in a proper jurisdiction in a federal court, the prospective defendant can secure a sweeping injunction against witnesses appearing in that court in an action not yet brought, or giving testimony by deposition, it would be a perversion of the law to say that thereby the state court had acquired jurisdiction, and the federal court could not complain or interfere. The jurisdiction of the federal court would be impaired or defeated by such a...