Simpson v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 August 1917 |
| Docket Number | 2943. |
| Citation | 245 F. 278 |
| Parties | SIMPSON v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Rehearing Denied October 1, 1917.
Alfred F. MacDonald and Jud R. Rush, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff in error.
Albert Schoonover, U.S. Atty., and J. Robert O'Connor and Clyde R. Moody, Asst. U.S. Attys., all of Los Angeles, Cal., for the United States.
Before GILBERT and HUNT, Circuit Judges, and DIETRICH, District Judge.
James B. Simpson, the plaintiff in error, was convicted of a violation of section 3 of the White Slave Act (36 Stat. 825) which provides that any person who shall knowingly induce 'any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce * * * for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person that such woman or girl shall engage in the practice of prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral practice,' etc., shall be punished as therein directed. There are two counts in the indictment, in the first of which the defendant is charged with having unlawfully induced one Vida White, alias Rogers, to travel in interstate commerce from California to Tia Juana, in the republic of Mexico 'for a certain immoral purpose, to wit, for the purpose of placing said Vida White, alias Vida Rogers, in a house of prostitution and having her remain therein. ' The sufficiency of this count we need not consider, for upon it the defendant was acquitted. The second count, upon which he was found guilty, is in all particulars identical with the first, except that here it is charged that the defendant's purpose was to have the woman 'manage a house of prostitution and conduct a place where persons of the opposite sexes meet and have illicit sexual intercourse.'
It is first contended that the indictment is insufficient for the reason that the management of a house of prostitution does not come within the denunciation of the statute, in that, as is claimed, only the personal sexual immorality of the woman induced to travel in interstate commerce is contemplated, and a woman may conduct a house of prostitution without engaging in such immoral practice. We do not think the scope of the statute is limited to cases of personal acts of sexual immorality upon the part of the woman transported. It is to be conceded that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the phrase 'other immorality' implies sexual immorality, but it would be too rigorous an application of this rule to limit the phrase to the personal sexual immorality of the woman herself. It is well understood, of course, that the general purpose of Congress in enacting the law was to check the spread of prostitution and other forms of sexual debauchery by denying, in a large measure, to those engaged in that business, the facilities of interstate commerce, and for one having a house of prostitution in Mexico to induce a woman to go there to become the efficient means for maintaining what is perhaps the most offensive form of the evil against which the statute is expressly directed would admittedly be violative of the letter, and, as we think, clearly contrary to the spirit, of the statute. This view is thought to be supported by the construction placed upon the act in the Athanasaw Case, 227 U.S. 326, 33 Sup.Ct. 285, 57 L.Ed. 528, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 911, and is not inconsistent with anything decided by this court in Suslak v. United States, 213 F. 913, 130 C.C.A. 391.
It is further objected that the indictment does not conform to the California Penal Code. But it charges the offense in the language of the statute, and sets it forth with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant intelligently to prepare his defenses; no more is required. Indictments in the federal courts are not amenable to state laws.
It is next assigned that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and emphasis is particularly laid upon the dearth of proof touching the averment that the defendant induced the woman...
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Ford v. State
...the prostitution actually occurs. See United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Simpson v. United States, 245 F. 278, 279 (9th Cir.1917)). Similarly, our case law recognizes that the “primary emphasis” of NRS 201.300(1)(a) is “upon the recruitment of females in......
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La Page v. United States, 12863.
...41 S.Ct. 8, 65 L.Ed. 449; Gillette v. United States, 8 Cir., 236 F. 215; United States v. Barton, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 484; Simpson v. United States, 9 Cir., 245 F. 278, 280. ...
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Twitchell v. United States
...activity was within the meaning of the statutory phrases "any other immoral purpose," and "other immoral practice." (Simpson v. United States, 9 Cir., 1917, 245 F. 278) The same language appears in the first paragraph of section 2421, on which count seven is based. Perhaps a distinction can......
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