245 U.S. 366 (2014), Selective Draft Law Cases

Citation:245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349
Party Name:Selective Draft Law Cases
Case Date:January 07, 1918
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 366

245 U.S. 366 (2014)

38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349

Selective Draft Law Cases

United States Supreme Court

Jan. 7, 1918

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA AND THE SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

The grant to Congress of power to raise and support armies, considered in conjunction with the grants of the powers to declare war, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to make laws necessary and proper for executing granted powers (Constitution, Art. I, § 8), includes the power to compel military service, exercised by the Selective Draft Law of May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76. This conclusion, obvious upon the face of the Constitution, is confirmed by an historical examination of the subject.

The army power, combining the powers vested in the Congress and the States under the Confederation, embraces the complete military power of government, as is manifested not only by the grant made, but by the express limitation of Art. I, § 10, prohibiting the States, without the consent of Congress, from keeping troops in time of peace or engaging in war.

The militia power reserved to the States by the militia clause (Art. I, § 8), while separate and distinct in its field, and while serving to diminish occasion for exercising the army power, is subject to be restricted in, or even deprived of, its area of operation through the army power, according to the extent to which Congress, in its discretion, finds necessity for calling the latter into play.

The service which may be exacted of the citizen under the army power is not limited to the specific purposes for which Congress is

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expressly authorized, by the militia clause, to call the militia; the presence in the Constitution of such express regulations affords no basis for an inference that the army power, when exerted, is not complete and dominant to the extent of its exertion.

Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it.

The power of Congress to compel military service as in the Selective Draft Law, clearly sustained by the original Constitution, is even more manifest under the Fourteenth Amendment, which, as frequently has been pointed out, broadened the national scope of the government by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant, instead of being subordinate and derivative, thus operating generally upon the powers conferred by the Constitution.

The constitutionality of the Selective Draft Law also is upheld against the following objections: (1) That, by some of its administrative features, it delegates federal power to state officials; (2) that it vests both legislative and judicial power in administrative officers; (3) that, by exempting ministers of religion and theological students under certain conditions and by relieving from strictly military service members of certain religious sects whose tenets deny the moral right to engage in war, it is repugnant to the First Amendment, as establishing or interfering with religion, and (4) that it creates involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Affirmed.

The cases are stated in the opinion.

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WHITE, J., lead opinion

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

We are here concerned with some of the provisions of the Act of May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76, entitled "An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States." The law, as its opening sentence declares, was intended to supply temporarily the increased military force which was required by the existing emergency, the war then and now flagrant. The clauses we must pass upon and those which will throw light on their significance are briefly summarized:

The act proposed to raise a national army, first by increasing the regular force to its maximum strength and there maintaining it; second, by incorporating into such army the members of the National Guard and National Guard Reserve already in the service of the United States (Act of Congress of June 3, 1916, c. 134, 39 Stat. 211) and maintaining their organizations to their full strength; third, by giving the President power, in his discretion, to organize by volunteer enlistment four divisions of infantry; fourth, by subjecting all male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty to duty in the national army for the period of the existing emergency after the proclamation of the President announcing the necessity for their service, and, fifth, by providing [38 S.Ct. 161] for

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selecting from the body so called, on the further proclamation of the President, 500,000 enlisted men and a second body of the same number, should the President in his discretion deem it necessary. To carry out its purposes, the act made it the duty of those liable to the call to present themselves for registration on the proclamation of the President, so as to subject themselves to the terms of the act, and provided full federal means for carrying out the selective draft. It gave the President, in his discretion, power to create local boards to consider claims for exemption for physical disability or otherwise made by those called. The act exempted from subjection to the draft designated United States and state officials, as well as those already in the military or naval service of the United States, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion and theological students under the conditions provided for, and, while relieving from military service in the strict sense the members of religious sects as enumerated whose tenets excluded the moral right to engage in war, nevertheless subjected such persons to the performance of service of a noncombatant character to be defined by the President.

The proclamation of the President calling the persons designated within the ages described in the statute was made, and the plaintiffs in error, who were in the class and, under the statute, were obliged to present themselves for registration and subject themselves to the law, failed to do so, and were prosecuted under the statute for the penalties for which it provided. They all defended by denying that there had been conferred by the Constitution upon Congress the power to compel military service by a selective draft, and asserted that, even if such power had been given by the Constitution to Congress, the terms of the particular act for various reasons caused it to be beyond the power and repugnant to the Constitution. The cases are here for review because of the constitutional

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questions thus raised, convictions having resulted from instructions of the courts that the legal defences were without merit, and that the statute was constitutional.

The possession of authority to enact the statute must be found in the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress power

to declare war; . . . to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; . . . to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

Article I, § 8. And, of course, the powers conferred by these provisions, like all other powers given, carry with them, as provided by the Constitution, the authority "to make ah laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers." Article I, § 8.

As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution, the objection that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for further notice. It is said, however, that since, under the Constitution as originally framed, state citizenship was primary, and United States citizenship but derivative and dependent thereon, therefore the power conferred upon Congress to raise armies was only coterminous with United States citizenship, and could not be exerted so as to cause that citizenship to lose its dependent character and dominate state citizenship...

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