Hall v. South Carolina Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 November 1886 |
| Citation | 25 S.C. 564 |
| Parties | HALL v. SOUTH CAROLINA RAILWAY CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
1. In action by a passenger against a railway company for ejecting him from its train after tender of the sum at which tickets were sold, and while on his way to a point beyond the State limits, the report of the railroad company fixing rates was admissible in evidence, there being testimony that those rates had been accepted and acted upon by the company.
2. The Railroad Commission of this State cannot regulate passenger fare to a point in another State, but a regulation as to the hours for opening the ticket office is not a matter of inter-State commerce.
3. There being some evidence upon all the points necessary to plaintiff's case, the Circuit Judge erred in granting a non-suit.
Before FRASER, J., Aiken, April, 1885.
This was an appeal from an order of non-suit. In granting the order the Circuit Judge made the following remarks:
From the little time I have had to consider the authorities relied on by the plaintiff, I do not see that I am bound by these decisions out of the State. It seems to me that the decisions relied on are not founded upon a correct view of the relations of these employees to the railroad company and each other; although the decisions quoted are from eminent sources. What may be the rule ultimately adopted, I am not able to say; but if that rule is adopted which is contended for, it would amount to a virtual repeal of all the rules of the railroad company requiring passengers to buy tickets at places where tickets are sold. Take, for instance, a train with fifty or a hundred passengers, none of them having tickets and ignoring the regulations of the railroad company. The conductor would be called upon, at his peril or that of the company, either to pass them over the road or to put them out, and in that case the regulations would be of no avail as there would be no practicable way of recovering the ten cents (as in this case) back again.
I do not think that the rule cited in those cases ought to be the rule in this State. The application for the ticket ought to have been made within office hours, and if the railroad company advertises its office hours from six until ten, as in this case, I think that the application for the ticket ought then to have been made. I think that if the train passed out of office hours, the ticket should have been purchased previously.
Again this was a ticket for a ride from Aiken to Augusta. It is true that Augusta is just across the Savannah river, but the principle is just the same whether it was outside of the State a half mile or a hundred and fifty miles, and whether it was to Augusta or to Atlanta, neither the State nor the railroad commission had a right to regulate inter-State travel any more than they have a right to regulate inter-State commerce. This purchase of a ticket, which I think is established to be one of the rules of the company, was merely one of the incidents of the trip from here to Augusta, and the commission had no more right to regulate the ticket than the fare itself.
I think the case might as well be reviewed by the appellate tribunal at this point as at any other, and I will grant the non-suit.
Mr. G. W. Croft , for appellant.
Messrs. Henderson Bros. , contra.
The plaintiff, being a passenger on the South Carolina Railway, travelling from Aiken, in this State, to Augusta, Ga., was ejected from the train by the conductor of defendant company; for this the action below was brought, demanding $2,000 damages. In the course of the trial he offered in testimony the 5th annual report of the railroad commission, to show the rates allowed to charge passengers, and also to show the regulations requiring railway companies to have their depot open a reasonable time before the departure of the trains. This testimony was ruled incompetent, and therefore was excluded. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the defendant moved a non-suit, which was granted. The appeal raises but two questions: 1st. Was the testimony referred to above, to wit, the report of the railroad commission, properly and legally excluded? 2d. Was it error to grant the non-suit?
The complaint alleged, in substance, that the price of a ticket from Aiken to Augusta was fifty-five cents; that he was unable to procure a ticket at Aiken, where he boarded the car, on account of the negligence of the ticket agent in not having the office opened in time; that when the conductor called for his fare he tendered fifty-five cents, the ticket price, informing the conductor that, the office not being open, he could not get a ticket before leaving Aiken. The conductor refused the tender and demanded sixty-five cents, which the plaintiff refusing to pay, he was ejected.
His honor, Judge Fraser presiding, held the report of the commission incompetent testimony-we suppose upon the ground that the commission having no right to regulate inter-State commerce, and the plaintiff being on his way from a point in this State to a point in Georgia, its regulations could have no application here, as this was a case governed by the doctrine of inter-State commerce. Doubtless, this is a case involving inter-State commerce in some of its aspects, as that doctrine applies as well to the transportation of passengers as of goods, and the railroad commission had no authority to fix rates for passenger fare from Aiken to Augusta. See 22 S.C. 236. But even an unconstitutional act, when adopted and acted upon by a party with reference to whom it has been enacted, may be binding upon such party. See Hand v. S. & C. R. R. Co. , 21 S.C. 179.
Now, the allegation of the complaint was that the ticket price between these points was fifty-five cents, and the object of the testimony offered was to show that this price was established by the railroad commission as a matter of fact, which seems to have been followed up by evidence from the ticket agent that that was the price adopted by the company. This agent said: So whether the action of the commission was legal and binding on the company or not, yet if the company adopted the regulation made, and held it out to the community as the rate charged, until changed parties would have the right to demand a compliance therewith. In this point of view, we think this testimony should have been admitted as a statement of a fact, having more or less bearing upon the merits of the case, as the judge in his judgment might determine in the further progress of the case, and which he could explain in his charge.
But if we are wrong here, that portion of this report which referred to regulations in reference to having the depot open a reasonable time before the departure of trains, we think was competent, under the principle of Munn v. Illinois , 94 U.S. 135, the case of the grain elevator erected in Chicago; also The State Tax Case , 15 Wall. , 293, where it was said: ...
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