Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump

Decision Date25 April 2017
Docket NumberCase Nos. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 17-cv-00485-WHO.
Citation250 F.Supp.3d 497
Parties COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff, v. Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants. City and County of San Francisco, Plaintiff, v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

John Watkins Keker, Cody Shawn Harris, Daniel Edward Purcell, Edward Andrew Bayley, Nicholas Samuel Goldberg, Robert A. Van Nest, Keker Van Nest & Peters LLP, San Francisco, CA, Adriana Lee Benedict, Danielle Luce Goldstein, Greta Suzanne Hansen, James Robyzad Williams, Julia Blau Spiegel, Julie Wilensky, Kavita Kandala Narayan, Lawrence Javier Serrano, San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff.

Sara Jennifer Eisenberg, Office of the City Attorney of San Francisco, Ronald P. Flynn, Office of the City Attorney, Neha Gupta, Matthew Stephen Lee, Mollie M. Lee, Aileen Marie McGrath, Yvonne Rosil Mere, Tara M. Steeley, Christine Van Aken, Office of the City Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for City and County of San Francisco.

W. Scott Simpson, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, VA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA'S AND CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S MOTIONS TO ENJOIN SECTION 9(a) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13768

William H. Orrick, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

This case involves Executive Order 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States," which, in addition to outlining a number of immigration enforcement policies, purports to "[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law" and to establish a procedure whereby "sanctuary jurisdictions" shall be ineligible to receive federal grants. Executive Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (the "Executive Order"). In two related actions, the County of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco have challenged Section 9 of the Executive Order as facially unconstitutional and have brought motions for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin its enforcement. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump , No. 17–cv–0574–WHO; City and County of San Francisco v. Trump , 17–cv–0485–WHO.

The Counties challenge the enforcement provision of the Order, Section 9(a), on several grounds: first, it violates the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution because it improperly seeks to wield congressional spending powers; second, it is so overbroad and coercive that even if the President had spending powers, the Order would clearly exceed them and violate the Tenth Amendment's prohibition against commandeering local jurisdictions; third, it is so vague and standardless that it violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and is void for vagueness; and, finally, because it seeks to deprive local jurisdictions of congressionally allocated funds without any notice or opportunity to be heard, it violates the procedural due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.1

The Government does not respond to the Counties' constitutional challenges but argues that the Counties lack standing because the Executive Order did not change existing law and because the Counties have not been named "sanctuary jurisdictions" pursuant to the Order. It explained for the first time at oral argument that the Order is merely an exercise of the President's "bully pulpit" to highlight a changed approach to immigration enforcement. Under this interpretation, Section 9(a) applies only to three federal grants in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that already have conditions requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. This interpretation renders the Order toothless; the Government can already enforce these three grants by the terms of those grants and can enforce 8 U.S.C. 1373 to the extent legally possible under the terms of existing law. Counsel disavowed any right through the Order for the Government to affect any other part of the billions of dollars in federal funds the Counties receive every year.

It is heartening that the Government's lawyers recognize that the Order cannot do more constitutionally than enforce existing law. But Section 9(a), by its plain language, attempts to reach all federal grants, not merely the three mentioned at the hearing. The rest of the Order is broader still, addressing all federal funding. And if there was doubt about the scope of the Order, the President and Attorney General have erased it with their public comments. The President has called it "a weapon" to use against jurisdictions that disagree with his preferred policies of immigration enforcement, and his press secretary has reiterated that the President intends to ensure that "counties and other institutions that remain sanctuary cites don't get federal government funding in compliance with the executive order." The Attorney General has warned that jurisdictions that do not comply with Section 1373 would suffer "withholding grants, termination of grants, and disbarment or ineligibility for future grants," and the "claw back" of any funds previously awarded. Section 9(a) is not reasonably susceptible to the new, narrow interpretation offered at the hearing.

Although the Government's new interpretation of the Order is not legally plausible, in effect it appears to put the parties in general agreement regarding the Order's constitutional limitations. The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that the total financial incentive not be coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves.

To succeed in their motions, the Counties must show that they are likely to face immediate irreparable harm absent an injunction, that they are likely to succeed on the merits, and that the balance of harms and public interest weighs in their favor. The Counties have met this burden. They have demonstrated that they have standing to challenge the Order and are currently suffering irreparable harm, not only because the Order has caused and will cause them constitutional injuries by violating the separation of powers doctrine and depriving them of their Tenth and Fifth Amendment rights, but also because the Order has caused budget uncertainty by threatening to deprive the Counties of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal grants that support core services in their jurisdictions. They have established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and that the balance of harms and public interest decisively weigh in favor of an injunction. The Counties' motions for preliminary injunction against Section 9(a) of the Executive Order are GRANTED as further described below.

That said, this injunction does nothing more than implement the effect of the Government's flawed interpretation of the Order. It does not affect the ability of the Attorney General or the Secretary to enforce existing conditions of federal grants or 8 U.S.C. 1373, nor does it impact the Secretary's ability to develop regulations or other guidance defining what a sanctuary jurisdiction is or designating a jurisdiction as such. It does prohibit the Government from exercising Section 9(a) in a way that violates the Constitution.

BACKGROUND
I. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." See Harris Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A ("EO") (SC Dkt. No. 36–1). In outlining the Executive Order's purpose, Section 1 reads, in part, "Sanctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States." EO § 1. Section 2 states that the policy of the executive branch is to "[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law." EO § 2(c).

Section 9, titled "Sanctuary Jurisdictions" lays out this policy in more detail. It reads:

Sec. 9. Sanctuary Jurisdictions. It is the policy of the executive branch to ensure, to the fullest extent of the law, that a State, or a political subdivision of a State, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.
(a) In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary. The Secretary has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.
(b) To better inform the public regarding the public safety threats associated with sanctuary jurisdictions, the Secretary shall utilize the Declined Detainer Outcome Report or its equivalent and, on a weekly basis, make public a comprehensive list of criminal actions committed by aliens and any jurisdiction that ignored or otherwise failed to honor any detainers with respect to such aliens.
(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is directed to obtain and provide relevant and responsive information on all Federal grant money that currently is received by any sanctuary jurisdiction.

EO § 9.

Section 3 of the Order, titled "Definitions," incorporates the definitions listed in 8 U.S.C. §...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Colorado v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • 23 Abril 2020
    ......Trump , 406 F. Supp. 3d 940, 963 (D. Or. 2019) (holding DOJ did not have ...of San Francisco , 349 F. Supp. 3d at 959 (quoting Cty. of Santa Clara , 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ). More to the point, ......
  • United States v. California
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 4 Julio 2018
    ......at 400, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ...Cnty. of Hudson , 352 N.J. Super. 44, 799 A.2d 629 (2002) (finding § 236.6 ... See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump , 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 534 (N.D. Cal. 2017), ("The Executive Order ......
  • City of Chi. v. Sessions
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 15 Septiembre 2017
    ......Tex. Aug. 30, 2017). In County of Santa Clara v. Trump , the court found that the plaintiff established a ......
  • City of Chi. v. Sessions
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 27 Julio 2018
    ......705 v. Burlington N. Santa Fe, LLC , 741 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In doing ...2011) ; County of Santa Clara v. Trump , 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal dismissed as ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7 books & journal articles
  • Bias and Immigration: a New Factors Test to Examine Extrinsic Evidence of Animus in Immigration Cases
    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory Law Journal No. 71-1, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...deportation squarely on the Attorney General, where Congress has put it.").207. Id. at 268.208. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (2017) (considering statements by the President and the Attorney General to grant a motion for a nationwide injunction of an executive orde......
  • ONLY WHERE JUSTIFIED: TOWARD LIMITS AND EXPLANATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 95 No. 5, May 2020
    • 1 Mayo 2020
    ...Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, No. C17-716, 2017 WL 3189032, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2017); County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 17-16886, 2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (mem.); Int'l Refugee Assistance P......
  • Presidential Power in the Obama and Trump Administrations
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 87-8, September 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...280 F.Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp. 3d 93 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (same); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F.Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017). [69] Estimates as of September 4, 2017, available on U.S.C.I.S. website, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCI......
  • Presidential Power in the Obama and Trump Administrations
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 87-8, September 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 93 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (same); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017). [69] Estimates as of September 4, 2017, available on U.S.C.I.S. website, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT