Crews v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 15,15
• Citation: 253 N.W.2d 617,400 Mich. 208
• Parties: Glen CREWS and Barbara Crews, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 400 Mich. 208, 253 N.W.2d 617
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 617

253 N.W.2d 617

Glen CREWS and Barbara Crews, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15.

400 Mich. 208, 253 N.W.2d 617

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 2, 1977.

Ripple & Chambers, P.C. by John F. Chambers, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellants.

Thomas W. Watkins, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

COLEMAN, Justice. (To affirm).

Glen and Barbara Crews filed suit against General Motors Corporation (GM) on November 6, 1967 in Wayne County circuit court.

Count I of the complaint said GM breached an "implied warranty that the engine was fit for the purpose intended . . . the express warranty that said engine would operate properly and safely and was safe to operate and maintain . . . (and) express warranties by agents or employees . . . that said engine was not defective and would operate properly and was safe to operate and maintain". Count II accused GM of negligence in failing to examine and test the engine and in failing to make adequate repairs.

GM countered that it would show that "plaintiff misused the product and was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to repair the engine without following accepted repair procedures and in starting the engine with the head off".

At the close of plaintiffs' proofs, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed being convinced that "even if the evidence sufficed to show a defect in the engine, there was absolutely no showing that this defect caused the fire".

We would affirm the Court of Appeals.

I

Mr. Crews was employed by Groesbeck Lumber Co. as a truck mechanic. He "was supposed to do the motor tune-up, change the oil, do all the greasing and maintenance of the truck". Crews had been employed as a mechanic by several other businesses. He considered himself a qualified automobile mechanic and said he was "hired in (at Groesbeck) to keep the trucks going, it was my job".

A GM truck owned by Groesbeck had a V-12 engine which plaintiff's brief admits "consists essentially of two 6-cylinder engines, front and rear, with a common crank When the problem persisted, Mr. Crews tried to fix it. ¹ On November 24, 1964, he removed the floor boards which covered part of the engine. He checked the fuel pressure and then removed a manifold. He was sitting in the cab with one foot on the engine when he "turned the key on and an explosion . . . came out number 7 intake port". This started a fire. Mr. Crews dropped the fuel lines he was holding and the gasoline also ignited. Mr. Crews was badly burned.

shaft". The truck lost power while pulling a full load. GM had serviced it on several occasions.

When plaintiffs' proofs were presented, GM received a directed verdict. The transcript containing the judge's ruling is garbled. The Court of Appeals reviewed the testimony and was convinced that "even if the evidence sufficed to show a defect in the engine, there was absolutely no showing that this defect (an allegedly defective valve) caused the fire".

The fire was caused by Mr. Crews turning the ignition key under what he knew to be unsafe conditions. Because certain wires were not disconnected, a spark was produced which ignited the gasoline. General Motors should not be liable for the resulting injuries.

On cross-examination, Mr. Crews admitted that the "Entire commission (sic), the engine, the design or shape are mainly the same" as between gasoline engines no matter how many cylinders they have 4, 6, 8, 12. He knew the engine might start if the ignition key were turned. He knew how to avoid this by disconnecting the ignition from the wires in the coil before cranking the engine.

Mr. Crews believed the fire was caused by sparks produced by turning the ignition key. There would have been no spark if the wires were disconnected:

"Q. And they will tell on the front page of the ignition system, that is the thing to do, don't they?

"A. That says V6, am I right?

"Q. Did you have some notion that V12, which was made up of two 6 cylinders wouldn't spark and wouldn't ignite the gas?

"A. Certainly.

"Q. How about a four cylinder engine if you crank that and you don't disconnect the ignition, the ignition wires, you can get a spark can't you?

"A. Right.

"Q. And it can ignite because of that?

"A. Right.

"Q. On a six the same thing and on a eight the same thing, right?

"A. Right.

"Q. And on a twelve the same thing?

"A. It doesn't say in the book.

"I didn't say it said twelve, but you know that without being told in the book?

"A. A twelve sir

"Q. Did you know that without the book, Mr. Crews, without the book telling you?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. So you want to be sure to disconnect it right?

"A. Right."

Mr. Crews was an experienced automotive mechanic, familiar with trucks. He was hired to service and maintain the trucks of Groesbeck Lumber Co., including two with V-12 engines (2 V-6 engines). He knew that the ignition wires of gasoline engines should be disconnected under the circumstances. Mr. Crews said he did not need a manual to tell him the wires should be disconnected. He was working with a fuel line. Fumes were escaping. It would not take even such an expert mechanic to know that sparks could result in fire. Mr Perhaps for these reasons he did not even plead failure to warn.

Crews knew what he should have done, but did not do it.

II

In their brief, plaintiffs say the case was tried

"on the theories of breach of express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose, breach of express warranty of repair, and negligence in repair. * * * Plaintiffs also tried their case on the theory that GM's breach of its express warranty to repair proximately caused the injuries to Crews and GM is liable for such injuries, whether there was a defect in the engine or not."

This was the case GM defended.

Breach of warranty and negligence are inapplicable to these facts. In Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), plaintiff was injured when his brother's shotgun exploded. The trial court said there was no implied warranty because there was no privity of contract. In reversing, the Court said the "essence of . . . (the developing weight of authority) . . . is that the manufacturer is best able to control dangers arising from defects of manufacture". This is not "liability without fault", the Court said. Plaintiff "must prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains". Also see, Heckel v. American Coupling Corp., 384 Mich. 19, 179 N.W.2d 381 (1970).

In Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 231 N.W.2d 46 (1975), the original defendants filed "a common 'garden variety' products liability lawsuit" against two third-party defendants. The claims involved negligence and breach of warranty. The Court cited Piercefield and applied it to negligence claims. The original defendants "had an initial burden to (1) produce evidence of a defect which caused the accident and (2) trace that defect into the hands of the third-party defendants". Also see Kupkowski v. Avis Ford, 395 Mich. 155, 235 N.W.2d 324 (1975): "The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove, not the defendant to disprove, the existence of a defective brake system and its causal connection with the injury or damage suffered".

The Court of Appeals was correct in saying "there was absolutely no showing that (a defect in the engine) caused the fire". Plaintiffs claimed the engine's hydraulic valve lifter system was defective. They did not "(introduce) evidence which tended to prove either directly or by way of permissible inference, that there was a defect (in the engine) when it left the manufacturer and that the defect was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage". Meli v. General Motors, 37 Mich.App. 514, 195 N.W.2d 85 (1972). Compare the Court's reversal of a summary judgment in McLaughlin v. Consumers Power Co., 52 Mich.App. 663, 218 N.W.2d 122 (1974).

A defect was alleged. If there was one, it did not cause the fire which injured Mr. Crews. Under existing law and rules of fairness, we cannot attribute to GM the acts of Mr. Crews which resulted in his truly regrettable injuries. The company should not be liable under any theory advanced by plaintiffs.

III

Further reason for affirming the Court of Appeals is found in Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Co., 386 Mich. 61, 191 N.W.2d 465 (1971). The plaintiff was burned when he removed a gas tank cap from an engine powering an asphalt manufacturing machine. Pressure had built up in the tank. Removing the cap released gasoline and vapors which ignited.

The jury said plaintiff had no cause of action, a decision which the Court found "defendants would have been entitled to" even "had the jury not found in their favor":

"Every adult person having a reasonable measure of intelligence, such as each of the Parsonson brothers exhibited while on the stand, knows better than to open a partly-filled gasoline tank for checking or Manufacturers are not required to "design their products as to warrant freedom from injury or damage . . . when the dangers of improper use of such products are known well to all users thereof". Mr. Crews was a qualified mechanic. He knew that unless certain steps were taken, his turning of the key would produce a spark which might cause a fire. He was not deterred by his knowledge.

filling when there is some or any nearby source of ignition. Assuredly is this true when the opening is within inches of an already heated and continuously-running gasoline engine."

We agree with Justice Williams that testimony of the later repair of the truck was properly disallowed. We cannot say that the judge abused her discretion in excluding the last minute expert testimony of Dr. Bolt.

IV

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the alleged defect was not proved and even if it had been, no causal connection between the defect and the injury was...