Meli v. General Motors Corp., Docket No. 9582
| Citation | 37 Mich.App. 514,195 N.W.2d 85 |
| Decision Date | 17 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 9582,1 |
| Parties | Frank MELI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Peter R. Barbara, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt & Peacock, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and DANHOF, JJ.
This is an appeal from the judgment of a directed verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant. The judgment was entered on April 10, 1970. Plaintiffs moved for a rehearing on the motion for a directed verdict on April 23, 1970, which was denied on May 8, 1970. Claim of appeal was filed on May 26, 1970.
Frank Meli got into his 1965 Oldsmobile on January 1, 1966. The motor was running, but the transmission was in 'park'. He put the car in gear; and as he stepped on the gas, the car leaped forward. The car continued forward even after his foot was removed from the accelerator, and the car jumped a ditch and hit a tree causing damage to the car and injuries to the plaintiff. Meli testified that the car had been serviced on a monthly basis by the dealer and that he had experienced no previous trouble with the accelerator. The auto had 28,733 miles on it at the time of the accident.
Roger DuMortier, an adjuster for AAA, the insurer of the automobile, was called as a witness. Mr. DuMortier testified that as a part of his adjustment of the damages claim on the car, he examined the automobile. His examination revealed that the accelerator was stuck to the floor and that the accelerator spring was knocked off rather than broken and that there was no evidence of mechanical failure.
Expert witness, Dr. Thomas Manos, was then called by the plaintiffs. Dr. Manos testified that he had performed certain experiments upon a 1964 Oldsmobile which was similar to plaintiffs. The experiments involved the acceleration behavior of the automobile with a disconnected accelerator spring.
Dr. Manos was then asked whether he had an opinion as to what would cause an automobile to suddenly accelerate when a slight pressure was applied to the accelerator pedal and to continue forward when the accelerator pedal was released. Dr. Manos testified that, in his opinion, the hypothetical factual situation would indicate that either the accelerator spring was broken or disconnected.
Finally, Dr. Manos testified that he would not expect a properly manufactured spring to either break or become dislodged after 28,733 miles and that the spring should last the life of the car. However, when asked if he had an opinion whether the spring in plaintiffs' car was properly manufactured and installed, defense counsel objected. The objection was sustained. Dr. Manos did indicate that he could not tell whether the spring was broken or knocked off at the time of the accident, but only that the circumstances indicated that it was not connected.
On this appeal, plaintiffs present the following question:
Did the trial court err in granting a directed verdict for defendant on the grounds that there was not sufficient evidence for the jury to find that there was a defect attributable to defendant manufacturer in a suit based on breach of implied warranty?
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question for the trial court. Evans v. Hackard, 29 Mich.App. 291, 294, 185 N.W.2d 104 (1970). However, plaintiffs first contend that the trial court, in directing the verdict in defendant's favor, passed on the credibility of the expert witness, a function which can be performed only by the trier of fact, in this case the jury. However, our reading of the trial court's opinion reveals that he addressed himself to the sufficiency of the evidence only. Therefore, plaintiffs' contention that the trial court invaded the province of the jury by passing on credibility is without merit.
The trial court must, when deciding whether to grant a directed verdict, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing it. 1 Therefore, in the instant case, if plaintiffs introduced evidence which tended to prove, either directly or by way of permissible inference, that there was a defect in the accelerator spring when it left the manufacturer and that the defect was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages, then there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury.
Expert testimony established only that the...
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...factors is whether the part which fails is open and exposed, where it may be tampered with, or is sealed. In Meli v. General Motors Corp., 37 Mich.App. 514, 195 N.W.2d 85 (1972), where the Court could find nothing to support the inference of a 'defect', malfunctions inside a 'sealed package......
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