Robia Holding Corp. v. Walker

Decision Date17 November 1931
Citation257 N.Y. 431,178 N.E. 747
PartiesROBIA HOLDING CORPORATION v. WALKER, Mayor, et al.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by the Robia Holding Corporation against James J. Walker, as Mayor of the City of New York, and others. Judgment of the Appellate Division (230 App. Div. 666, 246 N. Y. S. 210) affirming a judgment of the Special Term (136 Misc. Rep. 358, 239 N. Y. S. 659) granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing complaint, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Louis B. Eppstein and Louis J. Altkrug, both of New York City, for appellant.

Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (William E. C. Mayer and J. Joseph Lilly, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

LEHMAN, J.

The board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York has, by resolution adopted on or about March 15, 1929, determined that a bridge connecting the boroughs of Manhattan, the Bronx, and Queens, and a tunnel connecting the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, should be constructed at the public expense, and has directed the comptroller to issue corporate stock or serial bonds of the city of New York ‘for the purpose of providing the necessary means for the construction of the said tri-borough bridge and the said tunnel at the public expense.’ Thereafter, and on June 27, 1929, it adopted a second resolution providing that ‘subject to the concurrence herein of the Board of Aldermen and pursuant to the provisions of Section 169 of the Greater New York Charter the Comptroller be and hereby is authorized to issue, in the manner provided by section 169 of the Charter, corporate stock in an amount not exceeding three million dollars * * * the proceeds to the amount of the par value thereof to be used by Department of Plant and Structures for preparation of plans and construction (partial appropriation) for the Triborough Bridge connecting the Boroughs of Manhattan, The Bronx and Queens.’ The board of aldermen thereafter by ordinance concurred in this resolution.

Section 169 of the Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, c. 466, as amended Laws 1916, c. 615, § 2) provides for the issue of corporate stock and serial bonds for ‘revenue-producing’ improvements. That term is declared in the same section to be applicable ‘to that class of improvements * * * the expenditure for which shall, at the time it is authorized, be determined by the board of estimate and apportionment to have a substantial * * * prospective earning power.’ The board of estimate and apportionment has formally made such a determination in its resolution. Only through tolls or charges exacted for the use of the proposed bridge or tunnel can such improvements have any substantial prospective earning power. Claiming that the city is without power to exact such tolls or charges, this plaintiff has, in a taxpayer's action, challenged the validity of the resolution and ordinance authorizing the issue of the bonds. The courts below have passed upon the merits of the challenge without regard to the form of action in which the challenge is offered. We follow the same course.

After the board of estimate and apportionment had adopted its resolution of March 15, 1929, determining that the bridge and the tunnel should be constructed as ‘revenue-producing public improvements,’ the municipal assembly, in accordance with a suggestion contained in the resolution, passed two local laws which purported to give to the board of estimate and apportionment power ‘to establish and fix such charges and tolls as it may deem convenient or necessary for the operation and maintenance’ of the proposed bridge and tunnel. If these local laws constitute a valid exercise of a legislative power conferred upon the city of New York under the ‘Home Rule’ Amendment to the Constitution and the statutes adopted by the Legislature to carry out its purpose, then there can be no doubt that the city of New York may charge rates and tolls for the use of the proposed bridge and tunnel, and may issue bonds to provide for the cost of their construction as ‘revenue-producing improvements.’

This court has pointed out that, under the City Home Rule Law (Consol. Laws, c. 76), local laws may be enacted by a city only where they ‘touch the city's property, affairs, or government in one or more of certain enumerated ways.’ Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 119, 149 N. E. 211, 218. There we said: ‘Under the Home Rule Law, the city may redistribute its powers among its officers and employees. For the better execution of those powers, it may at times create instrumentalities that have been theretofore unknown. It may not transform its own powers under the guise of an amendment of the powers of its agents.’ Page 121 of 241 N. Y.,149 N. E. 211, 218. Because of that distinction, this court held that a local law is ineffective if its purpose or effect is to confer upon an agent or officer of the city a power which the Legislature has denied to the city itself. We must apply the same test here.

In the opinion in which this court formulated the test, it pointed out that the line of division ‘will at times be hard to draw, for the two classes shade into each other.’ Page 120 of 241 N. Y.,149 N. E. 211, 218. Since a municipal corporation performs its functions through its officers and agents, a statutory enlargement or limitation of the powers and functions of the instrumentalities created to perform the corporate functions may in effect enlarge or limit the corporate functions of the city. So long as the Legislature had sole and exclusive authority both to confer corporate powers on a municipal corporation and to distribute such powers among its officers or employees, such distinctions carried no practical consequences. Where the court could discern in the language of the statute a legislative intent that the city might exercise a particular power, it was immaterial whether the power was conferred directly upon the city by express terms or indirectly, and by necessary implication, from a grant of power to a municipal officer. When the legislative authority was divided and authority conferred upon the city to pass local laws relating to the powers and duties of its officers and employees, but not to enlarge its own corporate functions, the distinction marks the line between the field which is still reserved to the Legislature and the field in which legislative authority has been conferred upon the city.

In Browne v. City of New York, supra, the line was plainly marked. The purpose of the local legislation was to confer upon an agent of the city a power which, as the courts had previously decided, was not conferred upon the city by the Greater New York Charter, or by any other statute. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. v. Whalen, 191 App. Div. 737, 182 N. Y. S. 283, affirmed 229 N. Y. 570, 128 N. E. 215. The Legislature had, indeed, consistently denied this power to the city.

In the case now under consideration, the Legislature has not in express terms conferred upon the city the right to charge rates or tolls for bridges or tunnels which it is authorized to construct and operate, and the courts have not heretofore decided whether that power is granted by fair implication. The Legislature has never refused to grant such power to the city. On the contrary, after the city had passed the local laws which purported to confer upon a city instrumentality authority to fix charges and tolls for bridges and tunnels, the Legislature in at least two statutes unequivocally recognized the power of the city and its officials to fix such charges and tolls. Laws of 1930, cc. 373, 437.

Unquestionably, the Legislature still has authority, under the methods provided in Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution (article 12, §§ 1-7), to pass laws conferring such power upon the city. An unequivocal recognition by the Legislature of the power of a governmental...

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12 cases
  • Crohn v. Firemen's Benev. Fund Ass'n of City of Mount Vernon
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • September 12, 1973
    ...amendment in 1930 leads to the inescapable conclusion that legislative intent was not clearly manifested (Robia Holding Corp. v. Walker, 257 N.Y. 431, 178 N.E. 747.) Accordingly, the issue narrows down to the effect to be accorded the 1930 amended certificate of incorporation. Petitioners c......
  • McLean Trucking Co. v. City of New York
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1952
    ...Oyster Bay, 263 App. Div. 833; Williamsburg Power Plant Corp. v. City of New York, 255 App. Div. 214, affd. 280 N.Y. 551; Robia Holding Corp. v. Walker, 257 N.Y. 431; Bogart v. County of Westchester, 185 Misc. 561, 569, affd. 270 App. Div. 274, appeal dismissed 296 N.Y. In fact, however, th......
  • Macrum v. Hawkins
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 1933
    ...terms or by clear and unquestionable implication the doing of the very acts complaimed of.’ True, in Robia Holding Corporation v. Walker, 257 N. Y. 431, 438, 178 N. E. 747, 750, this court did say: ‘A power to construct and maintain a highway may by fair intendment include the right to buil......
  • Nyctl 1998-1 Trust v. Mayfield
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    • July 20, 2007
    ...NY 283 [1931]; People ex rel. Leet v Keller, 157 NY 90 [1898]; People ex rel. Savory, Inc. v Plunkett, 295 NY 180 [1946]; Robia Holding Corp. v Walker, 257 NY 431 [1931]; Strauch v Town of Oyster Bay, 263 App Div 833 [1941]). This conclusion is in conformity with the general principle of co......
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