Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah

• Decision Date: 10 June 1943
• Docket Number: 14523.
• Citation: 26 S.E.2d 359,196 Ga. 126
• Parties: WASHINGTON NAT. INS. CO. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF SAVANNAH.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

26 S.E.2d 359

196 Ga. 126

WASHINGTON NAT. INS. CO. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF SAVANNAH.

No. 14523.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 10, 1943

Washington National Insurance Company filed its petition in equity against the mayor and aldermen of the City of Savannah seeking injunction against the enforcement of certain executions which had been issued by the defendant municipality against the insurance company. This course was taken because, as contended, the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law since there was no provision in the defendant's municipal charter whereby an affidavit of illegality may be filed in defense to the executions. The executions had been issued against the plaintiff insurance company for several different years in pursuance of a municipal ordinance providing for a license or occupational tax upon various businesses, a pertinent part of which is as follows: "Insurance Companies. Every life and health and accident insurance company or association doing business whether directly or through an agency, or through a broker or subagent, one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) for each and every agency or broker or subagent." The validity of the ordinance is not attacked by the plaintiff, but it is contended that it has duly paid its license or occupational tax levied by this ordinance for each of the years that it has done business in the City of Savannah. The defendant by its answer admitted that plaintiff had paid for each year it had done business in the city one such license or occupational tax but further contended that it was liable for each of the years involved for an additional $150 tax or license fee for the reason that, as substantially stated, the plaintiff company did business in the city through two separate and distinct agencies. Upon interlocutory hearing the judge heard evidence which on the controlling question is not in any substantial dispute. The facts are largely agreed to and any controversy in respect to them exists only in the conclusions which might be drawn from what is admitted to be true. The evidence and admissions make substantially the following case: The plaintiff, a non-resident insurance company with its home office in Chicago, Illinois, has been for some years doing a general life and industrial insurance business in the City of Savannah, and about 1931 acquired by purchase "all of the monthly premium sick and accident business from the American National" [insurance company?]. Under the record it appears that plaintiff thereafter maintained the agency that it had thus purchased and operated it as a place of business in the Blun Building in Savannah. Several different agents worked out of, through and reported to this established agency which transacted a general insurance business, writing policies of various kinds, receiving premiums and generally serving policy-holders whose business was written through this agency in behalf of the plaintiff company. In addition to this business activity carried on by the plaintiff, it, during the years involved, had another agent, viz., James A. Godbee, whose duties were "to solicit monthly premium industrial insurance, sick and accident." He collected the first or initial premiums on such policies and wrote no other class of insurance for the plaintiff. He apparently had nothing to do with these policies after they were once issued and all subsequent premiums on such policies were paid by the policy-holders to the Industrial Savings and Loan Company, a local banking institution in Savannah by whom they were remitted, less the bank's commission for collection, to the plaintiff company. None of these transactions have any connection with the business done by the agency in the Blun Building, nor does Mr. Godbee have any connection with the agency in the Blun Building. He does not report to such agency nor act in any way under its direction, his activities according to the record being wholly unrelated to the business done by that agency. The evidence shows that his activities, although it does not appear that he has any fixed office or place of doing business, are under the supervision of an agent of the company located in Atlanta, and that he reports and is accountable only to such Atlanta agent or to the company's home office. Plaintiff also offered evidence to the general effect that in the enforcement of this ordinance the city did not exact the payment from any other insurance company of more than one license or occupational tax regardless of the number of agents used by the company. This evidence was not objected to and in all instances applied to cases where an insurance company had one "agency" but several soliciting agents operating under or through such "agency." The judge denied the injunction and plaintiff excepted.

Gilbert E. Johnson, of Savannah, for plaintiff in error.

Spence M. Grayson and Joseph C. Hester, both of Savannah, for defendants in error.

REID Chief Justice.

1. "The rule that this court will not interfere with the discretion...