Delk v. State
| Decision Date | 19 October 1896 |
| Parties | DELK v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A person being tried for the commission of a crime receives "the privilege and benefit of counsel," within the meaning of the fifth paragraph of the "Bill of Rights" (Code, § 4997), whenever, being himself unwilling or unable, from poverty or other cause, to procure counsel of his own choice, the court assigns to his defense counsel from members of the legal profession who may be present at the time of the trial, and who undertake in good faith to represent the interests of the accused. In such case it will, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, be presumed that the counsel so assigned are of sufficient experience and possess the requisite legal attainment to satisfy the constitutional requirement above cited.
2. If after conviction, other counsel be employed by the accused who move for a new trial, claiming that the counsel actually assigned by the court to represent him at the trial were so inexperienced and incompetent as that their appearance upon his behalf did not amount to giving to the accused the benefit of counsel, the question thus sought to be raised is not presented where neither the motion is made upon that ground, nor the evidence submitted in support of it authenticated in such manner as to authorize its consideration by this court.
3. There was no error in refusing to continue a murder case in order to allow the accused to obtain evidence tending to show that a person jointly indicted with him had confessed the perpetration of the homicide.
4. This court will not reverse the judgment of a trial judge in refusing to grant a continuance upon grounds or for reasons not made or stated when the motion for a continuance was presented. Accordingly, where counsel for the accused did not inform the judge that they needed or desired additional time to prepare the defense, or ask for a continuance of the case or a postponement of the trial in order that they might have further time for this purpose, this court cannot assume that such time was needed, or hold that the trial judge should have allowed it without being so requested.
5. The evidence fully warranted the verdict. It does not appear that the accused was denied or deprived of any of his legal or constitutional rights; and there is nothing in the motion for a new trial, nor any reason disclosed by the record, which would warrant this court in reversing the judgment of the court below.
Error from superior court, Pike county; M. W. Beck, Judge.
Tom Delk was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
T. M O'Bryan, for plaintiff in error.
J. F. Redding, E. F. Dupree, O. H. B. Bloodworth, Sol. Gen., and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error, jointly with Taylor Delk and Tom Langford, was indicted for the offense of murder, and, at a special term of Pike superior court, was tried and convicted of that offense. Not having counsel, or the means to employ one, the court appointed certain members of the bar to represent him. When the case was called for trial, the defendant, by his counsel, moved for a continuance, upon the ground of the absence of two witnesses by whom it was alleged that he expected to prove that Tom Langford, one of the persons jointly indicted with him, had, since the perpetration of the offense for which they were indicted confessed that he himself, and not the defendant, had committed the homicide, and upon the further ground of the absence of a witness by whom he expected to prove that, prior to the killing, Tom Langford had, in the presence of the absent witness, made threats to the effect that he intended to return to the county in which the homicide occurred, and kill the person for whose murder they were afterwards jointly indicted. The truth of the facts to which the lastnamed witness would have testified had he been present was admitted, and not contested, upon the part of the state. The court overruled the motion to continue. After conviction, a motion for new trial was made, upon the general grounds that the verdict was contrary to law, evidence, etc.; upon the further ground that the court erred in refusing to grant the continuance moved for as above indicated; upon the further ground that the court did not of its own motion generally continue said case in order to allow counsel appointed time for the preparation of the defense; and upon the further ground that the defendant had been denied the benefit of counsel to which he was entitled under the constitution and...
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