Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC) Inc., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

• Citation: 274 F.3d 470
• Decision Date: 14 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01-1486,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,S.F. LOGISTICS,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,01-1486
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2001) ELIZABETH ANDERSON,, v. U.(IMC), INC.,
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 470

274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001)

ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. U.S.F. LOGISTICS (IMC), INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

No. 01-1486

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2001

December 14, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. IP 00-1364 C T/G--John D. Tinder, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Kevin W. Betz (argued), Sutherlin & Betz, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellant.

Nina G. Stillman (argued), Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, IL, Donald S. Smith, Riley, Bennet & Egloff, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellee.

Before Cudahy, Easterbrook and Williams, Circuit Judges.

Cudahy, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction, Elizabeth Anderson argues that the district court erred in concluding that she was not likely to succeed on her claim that her employer, U.S.F. Logistics ("U.S.F."), engaged in religious discrimination. We affirm.

I.

Elizabeth Anderson is a believer in and follower of the Christian Methodist Episcopal faith. As an expression of her faith, Anderson tells people to "Have a Blessed Day," especially in signing off on written correspondence or as a way to end telephone conversations. However, she does not use the "Blessed Day" phrase all of the time. For example, sometimes she does not use the phrase when she is busy.

U.S.F. is a company that does shipping for other companies. Anderson has worked for U.S.F. since December 1995. In March 1999, Anderson was promoted to office coordinator. As an office coordinator, Anderson was responsible for being the liaison between U.S.F. and its customers and vendors. Microsoft is U.S.F.'s largest customer. After becoming an office coordinator, Anderson had regular contact with Microsoft employees.

Throughout her tenure with U.S.F., Anderson often used the phrase, "Have a Blessed Day," with her co-employees and with U.S.F.'s customers. Anderson continued to use the "Blessed Day" phrase after she became an office coordinator. Neither Anderson nor U.S.F. received any complaints about her use of "Blessed Day" until June 9, 1999. On that date, Mark LaRussa, a Microsoft liaison with U.S.F., complained to Anderson that her use of the phrase was "unacceptable" and must stop. In response to LaRussa's complaint, U.S.F. instructed Anderson to remove the closing "Have a Blessed Day" from documents sent to Microsoft. The following Monday, however, Anderson sent an e-mail to Microsoft containing the "Blessed Day" phrase.

After receiving the e-mail, LaRussa called Jeffery Starnes, Anderson's immediate supervisor to complain. Thereafter, Starnes instructed Anderson to refrain from using the "Blessed Day" phrase in her daily business interactions with Microsoft. In response, Anderson notified Starnes that the "Blessed Day" phrase was part of her religious practice. She told him that if he would identify the person or persons that the phrase offended, she would not use the phrase with them. Starnes did not respond to Anderson's proposed accommodation.

On June 21, 1999, the Monday after her discussion with Starnes, Anderson again sent an e-mail to Microsoft containing the "Blessed Day" phrase. Shortly thereafter, Chuck Tolley, another of Anderson's supervisor, asked her why she continued to use the phrase in communications with Microsoft. In response, Anderson scheduled a meeting with Tolley and Starnes.

At the meeting, Anderson notified Tolley that she had personally contacted several people at Microsoft who did not object to her use of the phrase. She reiterated that it was her religious expression, and once again stated that, if U.S.F. would identify those who were offended, she would not use the phrase with them. Tolley did not identify any particular person or persons.

The following day, Tolley gave Anderson a written reprimand for her use of the "Blessed Day" phrase with Microsoft. The reprimand also notified Anderson that continued use of the phrase could result in termination. U.S.F. also issued a company policy statement to all of its Indianapolis employees that they should refrain from using "additional religious, personal or political statements" in their closing remarks in verbal or written communications with any customer or with fellow employees. Despite the language in the policy statement, U.S.F. permitted Anderson to continue to use the "Blessed Day" phrase with her co-workers.

Next, Anderson went public with the dispute. On October 10, 1999, a local Indianapolis newspaper published an article about the controversy. In the article, a spokesperson from Microsoft was quoted as saying that Microsoft did not have a problem with Anderson's use of the "Blessed Day" phrase. Based on her reading of the article, Anderson decided that she could resume using the "Blessed Day" phrase. The next day, Anderson sent a new piece of business correspondence to Microsoft containing the "Blessed Day" phrase. She was not disciplined then in any way for her use of the phrase. However, Tolley refused to withdraw the earlier reprimand.

Anderson refrained from using the "Blessed Day" phrase again until February 15, 2000. On that date, she sent an e-mail to Microsoft with the phrase "HAVE A BLESSED DAY" in all capitals, surrounded by quotation marks. She received another reprimand. Subsequently, on August 30, 2000, Anderson filed a five-count Complaint and a Verified Motion for a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction in federal district court. The Complaint alleged that U.S.F. violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq., by failing to reasonably accommodate her religious practice. The Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction sought an injunction to permit Anderson to use the "Have a Blessed Day" phrase in written communications with U.S.F.'s customers.

The district court denied Anderson's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Anderson did not have a likely chance of success on the merits because U.S.F. reasonably accommodated her religious practice. Anderson then filed an interlocutory appeal here.

II.

This court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1).¹ In examining a denial of a preliminary injunction, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, its balancing of the factors for a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. Kiel v. City of Kenosha, 236 F.3d 814, 815 (7th Cir. 2000). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to minimize the hardship to the parties pending resolution of their lawsuit. Id. at 816 n.4. In assessing whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that: 1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim; 2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and 3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is denied. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001). If the court is satisfied that these three conditions have been met, it then must consider whether the irreparable harm the applicant will suffer without injunctive relief is greater than the harm the opposing party will suffer if the preliminary injunction is granted. Id. In addition, the court must determine whether the preliminary injunction will harm the public interest. Id. Further, preliminary injunctions are disfavored in the employment context. See, e.g., Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that interlocutory relief should be rare in employment-discrimination cases).

A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail to or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's . . . religion[.]" 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). Religion includes "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(j). A plaintiff alleging religious discrimination under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case, after which the burden is on the employer to show that a reasonable accommodation of the religious practice was made or that any accommodation would result in undue hardship. Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986).

The district court assumed that Anderson had established her prima facie case. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics, 2001 WL 114270, *9 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2001). The court then denied injunctive relief because it concluded that U.S.F. reasonably accommodated Anderson's religious practice and therefore Anderson had a less than promising prospect of success on the merits. Anderson challenges the district court's conclusion about reasonable accommodation.

"A reasonable accommodation of an employee's religion is one that 'eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.'" Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)). However, it is well settled that "Title VII . . . requires only reasonable accommodation, not satisfaction of an employee's every desire." Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Further, a finding of reasonable accommodation is a finding of fact entitled to deference. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review instead of under a de novo standard).

Anderson first argues that the district court erred in concluding that because Anderson's sincere religious practice was not a requirement of her religion, she was entitled to a lesser "reasonable...