Moore v. Skiles
Decision Date | 20 September 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 17322,17322 |
Citation | 274 P.2d 311,130 Colo. 191 |
Parties | Tracye MOORE, Plaintiff in Error, v. Joseph A. SKILES, Defendant in Error. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Neil S. Mincer, Glenwood Springs, for plaintiff in error.
Myron H. Burnett, Denver, for defendant in error.
In the trial court plaintiff in error was plaintiff and defendant in error was defendant. We shall refer to the parties herein as they appeared in the trial court or by name.
Plaintiff alleged that on May 31, 1952 she was a passenger in a pickup truck driven by her husband; that as a result of an automobile accident which occurred on a mountain highway about fourteen miles north of Dotsero, Colorado, she sustained certain injuries resulting from the negligent driving of defendant's automobile at said time and place, causing it to collide with the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding with her husband.
By way of answer, defendant admitted the accident but denied negligence on his part; alleged the injuries complained of were caused by the sole negligence of the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding and set forth the defenses of contributory negligence and unavoidable accident.
Plaintiff amended her complaint to include a claim for damage to the pickup truck jointly owned by herself and her husband. Defendant amended his answer by including therein a counterclaim for damages to his pickup truck involved in the collision; alleged that plaintiff's vehicle was a family car and on the night of the accident was operated so negligently by plaintiff and her husband as to cause it to collide with defendant's vehicle, causing $200 damages to it, for which he demanded judgment under his counterclaim.
Trial was to a jury which returned a verdict finding the issues in favor of defendant on plaintiff's complaint and in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim. Judgment was entered on the verdict and plaintiff brings the cause here by writ of error.
On May 31, 1952 plaintiff was riding with her husband in a pickup truck jointly owned by plaintiff and her husband. He was driving the vehicle on a public road from Dotsero to Burns, Colorado from where they were returning home after an evening spent with friends. The road along which they were traveling was narrow and at the point where the accident occurred was not of sufficient width for two cars to pass. At what apparently was a blind curve a collision occurred between plaintiff's pickup truck and a pickup proceeding in the opposite direction, owned and driven by defendant. As to the speed of the respective vehicles immediately preceding the collision, the distance at which the respective drivers sighted one another and other details of the accident, the testimony was conflicting.
Plaintiff in error and her husband claimed that their automobile had come to a stop before the impact and that defendant ran his vehicle into their car. By his testimony and that of his wife, defendant claimed he had stopped his truck and that plaintiff's car ran into his vehicle.
When a husband and wife are journeying together in a vehicle jointly owned by both and engaged in a mission with a purpose common to both, can the negligence of the husband in operating the vehicle be imputed to the wife? This is the primary inquiry presented by this record.
Over objection of counsel for plaintiff, the court submitted to the jury Instruction No. 4, which defined contributory negligence and concluded with the following: 'In this case, if the jury finds and believes from a preponderance of the evidence that each driver was guilty of negligence which contributed to the proximate cause of the accident and that the accident would not have occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers, then the plaintiff cannot recover for the damages which she claims to have suffered, and the defendant cannot recover for the damages which he claims to have suffered.'
Plaintiff here contends the trial court erred in submitting Instruction No. 4 in that the trial court permitted the negligence of the husband to be imputed to the wife, and erred in permitting the jury to render its verdict solely on the basis of Instruction No. 4 without reinstructing the jury to consider all the instructions as a whole.
We said in Colorado & Southern Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 P. 801, 803 70 L.R.A. 681: '* * * the rule that a person injured by the negligence of a defendant and the contributory negligence of one with whom the injured person is riding as guest or companion is that such negligence is not imputable to the injured person; but there is a well-recognized exception to this rule when the injured person is in a position to exercise authority or control over the driver, or is guilty, or fails to exercise such care under the circumstances as he could and should exercise under the particular circumstances to protect himself.'
The question is not solely whether the passenger actually exercised control over the driver, but whether 'the occupant had the right to exercise such control over the driver, or that the occupant and the driver jointly were controlling the operation of the automobile or had a right jointly to control its operation.' Parker v. Ullom, 84 Colo. 433, 271 P. 187, 189.
A husband's negligence is not to be imputed to the wife unless he is her agent in the matter at hand, or they are jointly engaged in the prosecution of a joint enterprise. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460.
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, 1057, 109 A.L.R. 105, was a case where the plaintiff, a half-sister of defendant, was a guest in an automobile jointly owned by defendant and her husband, who on the occasion of an accident was the driver of the automobile. It was there stated: * * *
* * *'
We quote from Clark v. Town of Hampton, 83 N.H. 524, 145 A. 265, 269, 61 A.L.R. 1171:
In Tannehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry. Co., 279 Mo. 158, 213 S.W. 818, it was held that where two brothers, who, together with a third brother, were joint owners of an automobile, were returning home after being away on business or pleasure, and one of them was killed by reason of the negligence of his brother, such negligence of the brother would be imputed to the deceased brother.
We quote from Howard v. Zimmerman, 120 Kan. 77, 242 P. 131, 132: ...
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...grantee unduly influenced the grantor and that the transaction was unfair, unjust, and unreasonable. --------Notes:[111] Moore v. Skiles, 274 P.2d 311, 315 (Colo. 1954).[112] CJI-Civ. 3:8 (CLE ed. 2017).[113] Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150 (Colo. 2009).[114] In re Estate of Schlagel, 89 P.3d......
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