Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1ST, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 01-51.,Civ.A. 01-51. |
| Citation | 279 F.Supp.2d 530 |
| Parties | FISHER-PRICE, INC., Plaintiff, v. SAFETY 1ST, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Patricia Smink Rogowski and Francis DiGiovanni of Connolly, Bove, Lodge & Hutz LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, William E. Wallace III, Robert W. Busby, Jr., and Christopher Guest of Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP, Washington, D.C., of counsel, for plaintiff.
Frederick L. Cottrell, III of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Delaware, James J. Foster, Michael A. Albert, Robert M. Abrahamsen of Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, of counsel, for defendants.
On January 26, 2001, Fisher-Price, Inc. ("Fisher-Price") filed suit against Safety 1st, Inc. ("Safety 1st"), Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., and Dorel Design and Development, LLC (collectively "Safety 1st" or "the defendants"), alleging infringement of several patents. The patents-in-suit, United States Patent Nos. 5,660,435 ("the '435 patent"), 5,947,552 ("the '552 patent"), 6,257,659 ("the '659 patent"), 6,247,755 ("the '755 patent"), and 431,940 ("the '940 patent"), relate generally to various carriers, strollers, and bassinets for infants. The accused products are the Magic Motion Bassinet ("Magic Motion") and the 2-in-1 Bouncenette ("Bouncenette").1
Safety 1st asserted the affirmative defense of invalidity as to the '755, '940, '435 and '552 patents. The court held a Markman hearing and issued an order construing the disputed terms of the '435, '552, and '659 patents on April 2, 2002.2 The court granted summary judgment in favor of Safety 1st with respect to infringement of the '435, '552, and '659 patents, holding Fisher-Price did not meet its burden of proof for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 2002 WL 1307333, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10569 (D.Del.2002).
A jury trial commenced on January 13, 2003. Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that: (1) the Bouncenette and Magic Motion products infringe claim 36 of the '552 patent; (2) claim 36 is not invalid due to obviousness or anticipation of prior art; (3) Safety 1st's Magic Motion Bassinet product infringes claims 1 through 12 of the '659 patent; (4) Safety 1st's 2-in-1 Bouncenette and Magic Motion Bassinet products infringe claims 1 through 16 of the '755 patent; (5) the '755 patent is not invalid due to an inadequate written description; (6) Safety 1st's 2-in-1 Bouncenette infringes the '940 design patent; (7) the '940 and '755 patents are not invalid due to the on-sale bar; (8) Fisher-Price began marking substantially all products with the '940 patent number on November, 16, 2000; (9) Safety 1st's infringement was willful; (10) Fisher-Price is entitled to lost profits damages totaling $1,000,000; and (11) Fisher-Price is entitled to $900,000 in damages for profits Safety 1st made from the infringement of the '940 design patent. See Jury Verdict (D.I.279).
During trial, both parties properly moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reserved judgment on all JMOL motions. Following the jury's verdict, the parties filed eight post-trial motions pursuant to Rule 50(b). Of these, the court will address the following motions in this memorandum: the defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Various Issues (D.I.312); the defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment of Invalidity of the '755 and '940 Patent as a Matter of Law Because of the On-Sale Bar (D.I. 309); the plaintiff's Motion for Enhanced Damages, Pre-Judgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest, Attorneys' Fees and Literal Infringement of Claims 26, 27 and 32-34 of the '552 Patent and a New Trial on Certain Issues (D.I.302); and the defendants' Motion for a New Trial (D.I.306). In companion memoranda and orders, the court will address the remaining four post-trial motions.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a court may render judgment as a matter of law after the moving party is fully heard on an issue at trial, if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). If the court denies a motion for JMOL during trial, the motion may be renewed within ten days of entry of judgment in the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). To prevail on a renewed motion for JMOL following a jury trial, a party "`must show that the jury's findings, presumed or express, are not supported by substantial evidence or, if they were, that the legal conclusion(s) implied [by] the jury's verdict cannot in law be supported by those findings.'" Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.1998) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir.1984)). "`Substantial' evidence is such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review." Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d. at 893. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.; Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir.1997). The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury, given the facts before it, could have arrived at the conclusion it did. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed.Cir. 1998). The court may not determine the credibility of the witnesses nor "substitute its choice for that of the jury between conflicting elements of the evidence." Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 893.
The plaintiff moves for a new trial on the issue of damages only. The court may grant a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions of law in the courts of the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). A court should grant a new trial in a jury case, however, only if "the verdict was against the weight of the evidence ... [and] a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir.1991). In making this determination, the trial judge should consider the overall setting of the trial, the character of the evidence, and the complexity or simplicity of the legal principles which the jury had to apply to the facts. Lind v Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 58, 5 L.Ed.2d 60 (1960)
Safety 1st moves for judgment as a matter of law to reverse the jury's finding that the Magic Motion and three Bouncenette products infringe claim 36 of the '552 patent. The defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no dispute concerning the structure of the products. Rather, the dispute lies only in claim construction, which is a question of law for the court.
Literal infringement3 of a claim occurs when every limitation recited in the claim appears in the accused device, i.e., when "the properly construed claim reads on the accused device exactly." KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2000). Infringement analysis is a two step process in which the court first construes the claims as a matter of law. Eaton Corp. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 243 F.Supp.2d 77, 86 (D.Del.2003). The properly construed claims are then compared to the accused device to determine, as a question of fact, whether all of the claim limitations are present in the accused device. Id. At trial, Fisher-Price bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused products include each limitation of claim 36 of the '552 patent. Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1995). With that legal framework in mind, the court will briefly review claim 36.
The '552 patent relates to a collapsible bassinet with a canopy in which a child can sit up or lie down according to the position of the product. The patent specifically addresses the invention's ability to fold and become compact for portability. Claim 36, the only asserted claim, reads:
An infant-supporting device convertible between a compact configuration and an [sic] deployed configuration, comprising:
a suspension assembly including a first substantially U-shaped member and a second substantially shaped U-shaped member releasably connected to each other at their ends, wherein the second member is disposed apart from the first member in the deployed configuration and substantially adjacent the first member in the compact configuration;
a collapsible support frame movably connected to the suspension assembly, wherein the support frame supports the suspension assembly above a supporting surface in the deployed configuration and the support frame is disposed substantially adjacent the first rim member in the compact configuration; and
a receptacle for supporting an infant including a support surface and an annular side wall with an upper edge connected to the suspension assembly and a lower edge connected to the support surface, the support surface having a first end and a second end movably connected to the first end, wherein the receptacle is suspended from the support assembly above the supporting surface in the deployed configuration and the first end of the support surface is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.
... ... , Fujitsu Limited's counsel points to an unpublished Federal Circuit opinion, Fisher-Price Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 109 Fed. App'x 387 (Fed. Cir. 2004), authored by Judge Page 8 Alvin A ... ...
-
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.
... ... , Fujitsu Limited's counsel points to an unpublished Federal Circuit opinion, Fisher-Price Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 109 Fed. App'x 387 (Fed. Cir. 2004), authored by Judge Page 8 Alvin A ... ...