KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts

Decision Date18 August 2000
Citation223 F.3d 1351,55 USPQ2d 1835
Parties(Fed. Cir. 2000) KCJ CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KINETIC CONCEPTS, INC. and KCI THERAPEUTIC SERVICES, INC., Defendants-Appellees. 99-1248 DECIDED:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Stacy Y. Daniels, Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With her on the brief were Michael F. Saunders,Teresa A. Woody, and Therese M. Schuele.

Lawrence A. Rouse, Rouse Hendricks German May PC, of Kansas City, Missouri argued for defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were Kirk T. May andDavid J. Rempel. Of counsel were Marcus Neil Bozeman and Vivian Williams McLeod.

Before PLAGER, CLEVENGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges.

RADER, Circuit Judge.

On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled that Kinetic Concepts, Inc. and KCI Therapeutic Services, Inc. (collectively, Kinetic) did not infringe KCJ Corporation's (KCJ's) U.S. Patent No. 4,631,767 ('767 patent). See KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Kan. 1999) (KCJ II). Because the district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that the claims at issue cannot cover the accused device, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, this court affirms.

I.

KCJ is the assignee of the '767 patent entitled "Air Flotation Mattress." The patent claims therapeutic mattresses for preventing bedsores. These mattresses, according to the patent, "evenly distribute[] the weight of the body without the necessity of internal spines or other patient-contacting solid supports . . . [and] permit airflow to all areas of the skin to absorb moisture and prevent heat accumulation." '767 patent, col. 2, ll. 31-35. Claim 1, the only independent claim, recites (with bracketed notations added for ease of reference):

1. An air flotation, ventilated mattress apparatus comprising:

[(a)] means defining a lower, continuous, inflatable chamber having an air-permeable, flexible upper wall portion,

[(b)] said upper wall portion being constructed for substantially uniform airflow therethrough over substantially the entire plan surface area of said upper wall portion;

[(c)] air-permeable secondary wall means above said chamber upper wall portion and operably coupled with said chamber-defining means,

[(d)] said secondary wall means being constructed for substantially uniform passage of air therethrough over substantially the entire plan surface area of said secondary wall means,

[(e)] said secondary wall means and upper wall cooperatively defining therebetween an inflatable compartment above said chamber; and

[(f)] means for continuously introducing positive pressure air into said chamber in order to continuously maintain positive air pressure conditions throughout the entirety of said chamber during the entirety of operation of said mattress apparatus and to inflate both said chamber and compartment by passage of said air into said chamber and thence through said upper wall portion and thereby maintain positive air pressure conditions in said compartment, and to cause said continuous passage of air through said secondary wall means,

[(g)] said mattress apparatus being free of solid internal support structure for supporting a patient,

[(h)] said air introduction means, upper wall portion and secondary wall means being cooperatively configured and arranged for continuous passage of sufficient positive pressure airflow through the chamber, upper wall portion, compartment, and secondary wall means for even, substantially uniform flow of air from said mattress apparatus so that a person lying atop the secondary wall means is supported by said pressurized air without the presence of weight-supporting structure within said mattress apparatus.

Id. at col. 6, ll. 8-49 (emphasis added). As shown below, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate an embodiment of the invention [Tabular or Graphical Material Omitted]

Figure 2 is a perspective view of the mattress with a portion of the upper secondary wall folded back to reveal the upper wall. Figure 3 is a side sectional view of the mattress 16 with a top wall 26. The bottom, side, and top walls 22, 24, and 26 define a lower inflatable chamber 34. See id. at col. 4, ll. 20-22. Bottom wall 22 and side walls 24 are substantially impervious to airflow while the top wall 26 is pervious. See id. at col. 4, ll. 25-29. "[M]attress 16 is devoid of any internal solid patient supports which could present areas of pressure contact to a patient lying on the mattress." Id. at col. 4, ll. 47-50.

During prosecution of the '767 patent application in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) as obvious over Schild et al., U.S. Patent No. 4,391,009, in view of Gammons et al., U.S. Patent No. 4,347,633. In response, the patentee amended claim 1 to add,inter alia, the "continuous" limitation in clause (a) and limitations that issued as clauses (b) and (d). The examiner then allowed the claims of the '767 patent.

Kinetic makes and sells low-air-loss mattresses. Kinetic's mattresses prevent skin breakdown by reducing the interface pressure between the skin of a bedridden patient and the support device. These accused devices include an inflatable mattress, an air supply unit, and a removable cover sheet. Each inflatable mattress is a one-piece unit consisting of three separately inflatable sections for the head, body, and legs of the patient.

In 1997, KCJ sued Kinetic, alleging infringement of the '767 patent. On December 17, 1998, the district court held a hearing to construe claim 1 of the '767 patent. See KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (D. Kan. 1998) (KCJ I). Specifically, the district court construed "a lower, continuous, inflatable chamber" limitation of clause (a) as follows: "A person of ordinary skill in the art of air bed engineering would read the phrase 'continuous' to mean without interruption and the word 'a' to mean one." Id. at 1325. The court, therefore, determined that "a . . . continuous . . . chamber" means "one non-interrupted inflatable chamber." Id.

As to clauses (b) and (d), the district court determined:

"A person of ordinary skill in the art of air bed engineering would read 'substantially uniform airflow' to mean airflow that does not substantially fluctuate over time. When added to the words 'over substantially the entire plan surface,' the claim requires [an] air flow at substantially the same rate at substantially all locations on the surface."

Id. at 1326.

After construing the claim, the district court granted Kinetic's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. See KCJ II. Adopting the claim construction of KCJ I, the district court determined that the accused devices do not literally infringe claim 1 because "[KCJ] concedes that the limitations of Clause (a) and Clause (b) are not met by any of the accused devices." Id. at 1289 n.2. The district court further held as a matter of law that prosecution history estoppel barred a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. KCJ appeals.

II.

This court reviews without deference a district court's grant of summary judgment. See Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1355, 53 USPQ2d 1734, 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Whether the accused device contains each claim element exactly or its equivalent is a question of fact. See Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In reviewing the district court's summary judgment in favor of Kinetic, this court draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-movant, KCJ. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

A patent infringement analysis involves two steps: claim construction and application of the properly construed claim to the accused product. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The first step, claim construction, is a matter of law that this court reviews without deference. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46 USPQ2d 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The central focus of the infringement inquiry remains on the claim language, as illuminated by the written description and the prosecution history. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

A.

The disputed claim construction on appeal involves limitations of clauses (a), (b), and (d). Clause (a) requires "a . . . continuous . . . chamber." At the heart of the dispute over this limitation is the meaning of the article "a." Specifically, does the article limit the number of chambers to only one or does it cover one or more chambers?

The district court limited clause (a) to only one non-interrupted inflatable chamber. The district court stated that "the concept of multiple chambers is at fundamental odds with the concept of continuity and discrete multiple chambers cannot be read into the patent without sacrificing the concept of continuity." KCJ I, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. Thus, the district court "ha[d] little hesitation in concluding that [the claim] means exactly what it says: one continuous chamber." Id. Based on that construction, the district court held as a matter of law that clause (a) of claim 1 does not read on Kinetic's accused devices having multiple continuous chambers.

As noted before, the claim language itself governs claim scope. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. This court has repeatedly emphasized that an indefinite article "a" or "an" in patent parlance carries the meaning of "one or more" in open-ended claims...

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