U.S. v. Rincon

• Decision Date: 17 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 90-50491,90-50491
• Citation: 28 F.3d 921
• Parties: 39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 684 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugo RINCON, Defendant-Appellant. . Decided:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 921

28 F.3d 921

39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 684

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugo RINCON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-50491.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Decided: June 17, 1994.

Neison M. Marks, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee.

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.

Before: Chief Judge WALLACE, TROTT, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON.

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

I

OVERVIEW

Hugo Rincon (Rincon) was convicted on two counts of unarmed bank robbery. On Rincon's first appeal to this court, he contended that the district court erred in refusing to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. We affirmed the district court's exclusion of that expert testimony in United States v. Rincon (Rincon I), 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1993). After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court remanded this case and asked us to reexamine that issue in light of Daubert. We remanded to the district court for reconsideration. The district court upheld its earlier decision to exclude the expert testimony. We affirm.

II

BACKGROUND

Rincon was indicted on two counts of unarmed bank robbery. Count one charged Rincon with the April 21, 1988 robbery of California Federal Savings and Loan. Count two charged him with the April 27, 1988 robbery of Culver National Bank. The district court denied Rincon's pretrial motion in limine in which he sought to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification. After a jury trial, Rincon was convicted of both robberies. On appeal, Rincon contended that the district court erred both in refusing to admit the expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications and in allowing the jury to review certain evidence. We rejected both arguments and affirmed Rincon's convictions in Rincon I, 984 F.2d at 1003. ¹

After our decision, the Supreme Court held that Fed.R.Evid. 702 regarding the admissibility of expert testimony superseded the general acceptance theory as set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). See Daubert, 509 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Accordingly, on October 4, 1993, the Supreme Court granted Rincon's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our decision in Rincon I and remanded for further consideration in light of Daubert. See Rincon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 41, 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993). We then remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of reexamining the admissibility of the expert testimony on eyewitness identification in light of Daubert. See United States v. Rincon, 11 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.1993).

On remand to the district court, Rincon again proffered the testimony of an experimental

psychologist and full professor at the Claremont Graduate School of Psychology, Kathy Pezdek, Ph.D. If permitted to testify, Dr. Pezdek would explain to the jury, among other things, the three phases of eyewitness identification, including perceiving and encoding, storage and retention, and retrieval of information. Dr. Pezdek would also testify as to the effect of various psychological factors on each phase, including stress, the observer's state of mind, suddenness, suggestibility, and cross-ethnic identifications. In addition, she would testify that empirical research contradicts numerous lay notions of eyewitness identifications. Dr. Pezdek, however, would offer no definitive opinion concerning the reliability or certainty of the witnesses identifications in this case. After reconsidering the issue, the district court affirmed its earlier order denying Rincon's motion in limine and excluding the expert testimony. Rincon challenges the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony.

III

EXPERT TESTIMONY

We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir.1993) (reviewing admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification); see also United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (9th Cir.1993).

In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Fed.R.Evid. 702 ² supersedes the general acceptance standard established in Frye. 509 U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2793-94. It noted, however, that notwithstanding its holding, the Federal Rules of Evidence still place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95. "Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. The Court established a two-part test for determining whether to admit expert testimony: "[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. These preliminary questions must be established by a preponderance of proof. Id. at ---- n. 10, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 10. Finally, the Court stated that evidence otherwise admissible may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2798.

On remand, the district court excluded the expert testimony on eyewitness identification, ruling that:

1. The proposed testimony invades the province of the jury (i.e., it does not assist the trier of fact);

2. No showing has been made that the testimony relates to an area that is recognized as a science; and

3. The testimony is likely to confuse the jury.

Moreover, the district court stated that "the proposed expert eyewitness identification testimony is being offered by the defense more in the role of an advocate and not as a scientifically valid opinion." We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Pezdek's expert testimony because Rincon's proffer failed to satisfy the admissibility standard established in Daubert.

A. Scientific Knowledge ³

"[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must The first inquiry, then, under Daubert is whether the proposed testimony of Dr. Pezdek was on a "scientific" subject. On remand, the district court denied Rincon's motion on three grounds, one of which was that "no showing has been made that the testimony relates to an area that is recognized as a science."

                be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation--i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."  Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.   The scientific knowledge requirement establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.  Id.  The district court must make a preliminary assessment as to whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.  Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.  Daubert set forth several factors which the district court may consider in determining whether a theory or technique constitutes "scientific knowledge," including:  (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested;  (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;  (3) the known or potential rate of error;  and (4) the particular degree of acceptance within the scientific community.  Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97.   This list is not exhaustive.  Nor did the Court "presume to set out a definitive checklist or test."  Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796
                

In the initial motion, Rincon asserted that Dr. Pezdek held a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and was a full professor at the Claremont Graduate School of Psychology. She would testify that there are three phases of eyewitness identification: perception and encoding; storage and retention (memory); and retrieval. In turn, the perception and encoding phase are affected by the factors of stress, duration of exposure, cross-racial identification, and availability of facial features (whether or not the face is partially obscured). The storage and retrieval stages are affected by time delay and suggestibility.

Dr. Pezdek would also discuss certain lay notions of eyewitness identification that are contradicted by research, such as: the certainty of the identification is a measure of the reliability of the identification; accuracy of memory is improved by stress; and memory of a face does not diminish over time.

The declaration of Rincon's counsel which accompanied the motion expanded on each of these matters, with statements such as: "There is a wealth of research supporting this point, ..."; "The research is clear...."; "The research suggests...." However, none of the research was submitted or described so that the district court could determine if the studies were indeed scientific on the basis the Court explained in Daubert: "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid...." Daubert, at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.

On remand, Rincon supplemented the record with a copy of an article entitled The "General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony. ⁴ The article described a survey of sixty-three experts on eyewitness testimony relating to their views of the scientific acceptance of research on a number of topics, including those that Dr. Pezdek would testify to. As the article said:

The results are discussed in relation to the "general...