THE MAINE
| Decision Date | 23 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 2337.,2337. |
| Citation | 28 F. Supp. 578 |
| Parties | THE MAINE. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Emory, Beeuwkes, Skeen & Oppenheimer, Pearre, Kieffner & Jacobs, and Venable, Baetjer & Howard, all of Baltimore, Md., for Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc.
Marbury, Gosnell & Williams, L. Vernon Miller and G. VanVelsor Wolf, and Hewlett B. Cox, all of Baltimore, Md., for exceptants.
The question presented for determination is whether the petition for limitation of liability filed by the Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, owner of the barge "Maine," which was involved in injuries to certain persons under circumstances about to be stated, was filed within the period of time prescribed by Section 4285 of the Revised Statutes as amended June 5th, 1936, 46 U.S.C.A. § 185, the pertinent part of which is as follows: "The vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such owner written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the provisions of this chapter. * * *"
On September 2nd, 1938 three men, employees of the Baugh Chemical Company, of Baltimore, were injured on shore by the discharge of acid from a pipe from the barge "Maine" while preparing to connect it with the piping system of the Baugh plant, from which the barge was to take on a cargo of acid. On September 26th, 1938, the Travelers Insurance Company, the insurer of the Baugh Company, wrote a separate letter to the Standard Company respecting each of the three injured men, these letters being identical, except as to captions, and as follows:
On November 16th, 1938 the insurance company filed three suits under the Maryland Compensation Law in the Superior Court of Baltimore City against the Standard Company, these suits being to the use of the insurance company and the three injured men, respectively. On May 10th, 1939, that is to say, within six months of the filing of these suits but not within six months of the date of receipt of the aforementioned letters of the insurance company, the present petition for limitation of liability was filed in this Court by the Standard Company. Thus, if these letters constitute "written notice of claim", "given to or filed" with the vessel owner by "a claimant", the six months period within which the petitioner could limit its liability, had expired, and, therefore, its libel and petition for limitation must be dismissed.
The sufficiency of the notice as represented by these letters has been challenged on two grounds embraced in an answer to a motion to dismiss the petition, these grounds being as follows: (1) That the insurance company is not a "claimant" within the contemplation of the statute, it being asserted that the only "claimant" who could give an effective notice was one of the injured persons; (2) that no such notice was ever given by or on their behalf prior to the filing of the suits against it, and that since the petition for limitation of liability was filed within six months thereafter, it was within the permissive period of the statute; and (3) that the letters were not "notice of claim" within the contemplation of the statute in that by their terms they do not give such "notice of claim" as the statute requires, and also were not addressed to the "owner" of the vessel, because addressed to "Standard Acid Works, Inc." at petitioner's place of business in Baltimore instead of to "Standard Wholesale Phosphate and Acid Works, Inc." But this latter point is so frivolous as not to warrant a moment's consideration, since petitioner received the letters in due course, admits in its petition it is the sole owner of the barge, and makes substantially the same statement in its acknowledgment of the letters.
While prima facie not without a certain amount of persuasive force, when fully analyzed and shorn of highly technical considerations, we are not impressed with the other contentions made on behalf of the petitioner, as above stated.
Taking these other contentions up in the order in which they have been stated, we are unwilling to declare that the insurance company was not "a claimant" within the contemplation of the statute. To say that the word "claimant" as used in the statute is limited to those usually authorized in admiralty to initiate a libel against a vessel or other property, is far too narrow an interpretation, especially since, as the facts in the present case clearly establish, the insurance company is the only party that has, or can assert any claim against the petitioner for the particular injuries. On September 24th, 1938, the State Industrial Accident Commission of Maryland made awards under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the cases instituted by each of the three men who had been injured, directing the insurance company, as insurer of the Baugh Company, to make compensation payments. As a result of these awards, the Maryland statute (Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 1924 Ed., Art. 101, Sec. 58) gave a direct right to the insurance company to enforce, in its own name, the claims of the injured employees against the alleged wrong-doing third party, the Standard Company. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Variety Iron & Steel Co., 139 Md. 313, 115 A. 59, 31 A.L.R. 1021; Maryland Casualty Company v. Union Bridge Electric Mfg. Co., 145 Md. 644, 125 A. 762. Such right is exclusive for a period of two months following the award, — State for Use of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Francis, 151 Md. 147, 134 A. 26; and if, as occurred in the present case, suit is filed by the insurer within the two months, the right of the insurer to make claim for damages remains exclusive and the injured employee has no control whatsoever over the claim. Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 163 Md. 97, 161 A. 5; see, also, Hagerstown...
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