Robert T. McLean v. Patrick Davis

• Citation: 283 S.W.3d 786
• Decision Date: 26 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. SD 28613.,SD 28613.
• Parties: ROBERT T. McLEAN IRREVOCABLE TRUST U/A/D, March 31, 1999, by Linda McLean, Trustee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICK DAVIS, P.C., et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

283 S.W.3d 786

ROBERT T. McLEAN IRREVOCABLE TRUST U/A/D, March 31, 1999, by Linda McLean, Trustee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICK DAVIS, P.C., et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. SD 28613.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division two.

January 26, 2009.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 2009.

Edward F. Luby, St. Louis, MO, for Appellants.

Joseph C. Blanton Jr., Sikeston, MO, for Respondents.

DON E. BURRELL, Presiding Judge.

Linda McLean ("Appellant"), trustee of the Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust ("the trust") and mother of trust beneficiary Robert McLean ("Beneficiary"), brought various tort claims against several predecessor trustees and attorney J. Michael Ponder ("Respondent"), the "Trust Protector," alleging they had improperly administered the trust and depleted its assets. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment that was granted by the trial court. Because we find Respondent did not establish that he was entitled to a judgment in his favor as a matter of law on each and every claim brought against him, we reverse and remand.

I. Standard of Review

Our first task is to determine the applicable standard of review. In this case, the trial court purportedly granted both Respondent's motion to dismiss and his alternative motion for summary judgment. While appellate review of the grant of either a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is de novo, Jordan v. Willens, 937 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo.App. W.D. 1996), there is a difference between the two when it comes to determining the appropriate lens through which we are to view the facts. See Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof'l Bldg. Co., 821 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Mo. banc 1991).

When reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, all facts alleged in the petition are deemed true and construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Dent Phelps R-III School Dist. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.App. S.D.1994). If, on the other hand, a defendant goes beyond an attack based solely on the face of the petition and files a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot rest on the averments in its petition and "an appellate court looks not just to the petition but to all pertinent materials presented to the trial court to determine if there is any material fact issue and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Magee, 821 S.W.2d at 842); Rule 74.04(c).¹

Here, Respondent's motion to dismiss was combined with an alternative motion for summary judgment. Attached to that motion was an exhibit (a copy of the trust) and a statement of uncontroverted facts with a supporting affidavit. Appellant's response admitted these uncontroverted facts and also included several exhibits of her own.

Generally, a trial court must give notice to the parties when it treats a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, but notice is not required when the parties acquiesce to such treatment. Mitchell v. McEvoy, 237 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Mo.App. E.D.2007) (treating appellate review of a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment where both parties presented matters outside the pleadings, neither party objected, and both parties agreed that the motion was treated as a motion for summary judgment).²

Here, both parties presented materials outside the pleadings and, as the trial court noted in its order and judgment, "treated the matter as a summary judgment. ..." Our standard of review is therefore the one which governs the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Summitt v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Mo.App. W.D.1995); Hyatt Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co., 801 S.W.2d 382, 392 (Mo.App. W.D.1990) ("It is axiomatic that when a party introduces evidence beyond the pleadings, a motion to dismiss its complaint is automatically converted to a motion for summary judgment."). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. Behrenhausen v. All About Travel, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Mo.App. W.D.1998).

II. Facts and Procedural Background

Viewing the record presented to the trial court in the light most favorable to Appellant, the salient facts are as follows. In 1996, Beneficiary was involved in an automobile accident that left him a quadriplegic. Beneficiary ultimately hired Respondent to represent him in a personal injury lawsuit arising from that accident. The case settled for a large sum of money. Beneficiary's grandmother set up the trust at issue and it was eventually funded with the settlement proceeds. The trust was a "Special Needs Trust" designed to supplement benefits Beneficiary received from various governmental assistance programs. The trust named Merrill Lynch Trust Company and David Potashnick as trustees and designated Respondent the "Trust Protector." The function and duties of a "Trust Protector" is a question of first impression in this Court.³ Section 5.4 of the trust described the role and duties of the "Trust Protector" as follows:

5.4 Trust Protector. The "Trust Protector" of such trust shall be [Respondent]. The Trust Protector's authority hereunder is conferred in a fiduciary capacity and shall be so exercised, but the Trust Protector shall not be liable for any action taken in good faith.

5.4.1 Removal of Trustee. The Trust Protector shall have the right to remove any Trustee of the trust under this Agreement. If the Trust Protector removes a Trustee, any successor Trustee appointed by the removed Trustee shall not take office. The Trust Protector may, by written instrument, release the Trust Protector's power to remove a particular Trustee and such release may be limited to the releasing Trust Protector or made binding upon any successor Trust Protector.

5.4.2 Appointment of Successor Trustee. The Trust Protector shall also have the right to appoint an individual or corporation with fiduciary powers to replace the removed Trustee or whenever the office of Trustee of a trust becomes vacant.

5.4.3 Resignation of Trust Protector; Successor. Any person serving as Trust Protector may resign. The Trust Protector may appoint one or more persons to be successor Trust Protector to take office upon the death, resignation, or incapacity of the Trust Protector or any person serving as protector. The Trust Protector may be one or more persons, whether individuals or corporations. If more than one person is serving as Trust Protector, they shall act by majority.

When the original trustees resigned, Respondent exercised his power under the trust and appointed the law firm of Patrick Davis, P.C., Patrick Davis ("Davis"), and Daniel Rau ("Rau") as successor trustees. Davis and Patrick Davis, P.C. were originally retained by Beneficiary to represent him on his personal injury claim, but Davis then referred Beneficiary on to Respondent who thereafter handled the suit. Appellant's petition alleges that Davis, Rau, and Patrick Davis, P.C. had referred many legal clients to Respondent over the years and those referrals had netted Respondent substantial fees, a portion of which were then shared back with Davis, Rau, and Patrick Davis, P.C.

Appellant's petition claims that in 2000, Beneficiary and his attorney informed Respondent that Davis, Rau, and Patrick Davis, P.C. were inappropriately spending trust funds.⁴ In July of 2001, Davis resigned as trustee. At that same time, Respondent resigned as Trust Protector, but not before appointing Tim Gilmore ("Gilmore") as successor Trust Protector and Brian Menz ("Menz") to take Davis's place as a successor trustee.

In July of 2002, Menz resigned as trustee, and Appellant was appointed as his successor. In April of 2005, Appellant then brought this suit against former trustees Davis, Rau, and Menz and against former Trust Protectors Respondent and Gilmore. In the portions of her petition concerning Respondent, Appellant claimed, inter alia, that Respondent had:

breached his fiduciary duties to [Beneficiary] and acted in bad faith in one or more of the following respects:

a. He failed to monitor and report expenditures;

b. He failed to stop Trustee [sic] when they were acting against the interests of the Beneficiary; and

c. By placing his loyalty to the Trustees and their interests above those of [Beneficiary] to whom he had a fiduciary obligation.

(emphasis added).

Respondent then filed his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Attached to that motion was a copy of the trust, a memorandum in support of the motion, and a statement of uncontroverted facts with accompanying affidavit. The entirety of Respondent's statement of uncontroverted facts consisted of the following six paragraphs:

(1) [Beneficiary] was seriously injured in an automobile accident in 1996 causing him to become a quadriplegic. See Exhibit B—Affidavit of [Respondent], ¶ 2.

(2) As a result of the injury, [Beneficiary] hired Patrick Davis and Patrick Davis, P.C. to assist him with a products liability suit who then referred the case to [Respondent] for further handling. Id. at ¶ 3.

(3) [Respondent] successfully prosecuted the suit for [Beneficiary], achieving a large settlement. Id. at ¶ 4.

(3)[sic] Due to significant medical expenses which had been paid by Medicare and the need to continue [Beneficiary's] eligibility for all available government programs, the proceeds of the settlement were placed in a Special Needs Trust known as the "Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust U/A/D March 31, 1999.[sic] Id. at ¶ 4.

(4)[sic] Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust U/A/D March 31, 1999. Id. at ¶ 6.

(4)[sic] [Respondent] was designated as "Trust Protector" under the terms of the Trust Agreement. See Exhibit A, Trust Agreement ¶ 5.4; Exhibit B—Affidavit of [Respondent] ¶ 7.

By leave of court, Appellant filed an amended response to Respondent's motion that admitted each of...