283 U.S. 553 (1931), 449, Smith v. Cahoon

Docket NºNo. 449
Citation283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264
Party NameSmith v. Cahoon
Case DateMay 25, 1931
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Page 553

283 U.S. 553 (1931)

51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264

Smith

v.

Cahoon

No. 449

United States Supreme Court

May 25, 1931

Argued April 22, 1931

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Syllabus

1. When a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue of a license or certificate as a condition precedent to carrying on a business or following a vocation, one who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed to make the required application, is not at liberty to complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration. P. 562.

2. This principle does not apply to one who is being criminally prosecuted for failure to procure a license under a statute that, as concerns him, is invalid upon its face. Id.

3. A state statute applicable by its terms (with certain exceptions) to all who operate motor vehicles in the business of transporting persons or property "for compensation or as a common carrier" over public highways in the state, prohibits such persons from so operating without having first obtained from a state commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity; application for such a certificate shall be accompanied by a schedule of tariffs; no certificate shall be valid without the giving of a bond or an insurance policy by the applicant for the protection of the public against injuries resulting from negligence in the operation of such vehicles and for the protection of the persons and property carried; it vests the commission with supervisory authority over

Page 554

those to whom it applies, and with authority to fix or approve their rates, regulate their service, prescribe their methods of keeping accounts, and generally to make rules governing their operations, and it provides that schedules of their rates shall be open to the public and that all alterations in their tariffs shall be under the commission's control. The statute also lays a mileage tax, in part payable upon the issuance of such certificate, and makes violation of any of its provisions a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or by both.

Held:

(1) Since the statute on its face affixes the same conditions, without discrimination, to all who apply for certificates of public convenience and necessity, and embraces in those conditions a scheme of supervision and control which constitutionally can be applied only to common carriers, a private carrier for hire may not constitutionally be arrested under it for failure to procure a certificate and pay the required tax. P. 562.

(2) A section of the statute declaring that, if any of its provisions are held unconstitutional, the validity of the others shall remain unaffected cannot serve, in advance of judicial decision, to separate those parts which are constitutionally applicable to private carriers from those that are not. P. 563.

(3) If the statute be regarded as intending to afford one constitutional scheme for common carriers and another for private carriers, it fails to define the constitutional obligations of private carriers with the certainty required of criminal statutes, and is therefore void. P. 564.

(4) In a penal prosecution for violation of a state statute, it is a defense that the statute, as applied to defendant, is unconstitutional on its face, and an arrest cannot be upheld upon the ground that later, when the defendant sought relief by habeas corpus, the statute was relieved of its infirmity by a construction placed upon it by the state court. Pp. 564-565.

(5) The unconstitutionality of the statute in this case is not removed by a decision of the state court declaring that the statutory provisions are severable, and that only those that are legally applicable to private carriers are intended to apply to them, without deciding which are so applicable. P. 565.

4. A state statutory provision which requires those who operate motor vehicles on the highways in the transportation of goods for hire to furnish a bond or insurance policy for the protection of the public against injuries received through negligence in such operation, but which does not apply to those

engaged exclusively

Page 555

in the transporting agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and fresh and salt fish and oysters and shrimp from the point of production to the assembling or shipping point en route to primary market, or to motor vehicle used exclusively in transporting or delivering dairy products

held repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 566.

99 Fla. 1174, 128 So. 632, reversed.

Appeal from a judgment reversing a judgment discharging the appellant in habeas corpus.

Page 556

HUGHES, J., lead opinion

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, a private carrier for hire, was arrested upon a warrant charging him with operating vehicles upon the highways in Duval County, Florida, without having obtained the certificate of public convenience and necessity, and without having paid the tax, required by Chapter 13700, Laws of Florida 1929. At the preliminary hearing, the appellant challenged the validity of the statute, as applied to him, upon the ground that it was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The appellant was held for trial. Upon return to a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court

Page 557

of the county decided that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was unconstitutional, and the appellant was discharged from custody. This judgment was reversed by the supreme court of the state, which upheld the statute. 99 Fla. 1174, 128 So. 632. The case comes here on appeal.

The statute provides for the regulation, through the state railroad commission, of "auto transportation companies." These companies are thus defined in § 1(h):

The term "auto transportation company," when used in this Act, means every corporation or person, their lessees, trustees or receivers, owning, controlling, operating or managing any motor propelled vehicle not usually operated on or over rails, used in the business of transporting persons or property for compensation or as a common carrier over any public highway in this state between fixed termini or over a regular route; Provided, That the term "auto transportation company" as used in this Act, shall not include corporations or persons engaged exclusively in the transportation of children to or from school, or any transportation company engaged exclusively in the transporting agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and fresh and salt fish and oysters and shrimp from the point of production to the assembling or shipping point enroute to primary market, or to motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or delivering dairy products or any transportation company engaged in operating taxicabs, or hotel busses from a depot to a hotel in the same town or city.

Every auto transportation company as thus defined is prohibited (§ 2) from operating

any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property for compensation on any public highway in this state without first having obtained from the Railroad Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity requires or will require such operation.

There is an

Page 558

exception in case of operation exclusively within the limits of an incorporated city or town.

Application for such "Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity" (§ 3) must set forth certain information with respect to the applicant and proposed service. Upon hearing, the commission may issue the certificate as prayed for,

or refuse to issue the same, or may issue the same with modification, or upon such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require.

The commission may take into consideration various matters bearing [51 S.Ct. 584] upon the applicant's previous operation and reliability, as well as the effect that the granting of the certificate may have upon "other transportation" facilities and upon "transportation as a whole" within the territory sought to be served, and "any other matters tending to qualify or disqualify" the applicant "as a common carrier." It is further provided that, upon hearing, the certificate shall be granted "as a matter of right" to such auto transportation companies as were operating in good faith on the 19th day of April, 1929, over the route for which the certificate is sought, "who shall comply in full with the provisions of this Act." When application is made for a certificate "to operate in a territory or on a line already served by a certificate holder," the commission shall grant the certificate "only when the existing certificate holder or holders serving such territory fail to provide service and facilities to the satisfaction of said Commission."

The following provision as to the giving of a bond in connection with the application for certificate is found in § 4:

The Commission shall, at the time of granting a certificate to operate any transportation company for transporting persons or property, fix and determine the amount of the bond to be given by the applicant for the protection, in case of passenger vehicle, of the passengers

Page 559

and baggage carried in said vehicle and of the public against injury caused by negligence of the person or corporation operating the said vehicle, and, in the case of the vehicle transporting freight, for the protection of the said freight so carried and of the public against injuries received through negligence of the...

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319 practice notes
  • 14 F.Supp. 922 (S.D.Cal. 1936), 759, Morf v. Ingels
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 9th Circuit Southern District of California
    • May 5, 1936
    ...secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the several states be materially abridged and impaired. ' See, also, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. Most, if not all, of the cases relied upon for the validity of the act are common carrier cases-- cases arising from ......
  • 23 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.Cal. 1938), Paul Gray, Inc. v. Ingels
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 9th Circuit Southern District of California
    • July 9, 1938
    ...for hire and those who carry other commodities has been condemned as an arbitrary distinction by the Supreme Court, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264. Since public safety was the ultimate object, the distinction was held to be discriminatory, as not based on anythin......
  • 243 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1957), 12856, North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. United States
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Courts of Appeals Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
    • April 10, 1957
    ...59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commissioner, 286 U.S. 210, 243, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 564, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 456, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146; Connally v. General Constructio......
  • 622 F.Supp. 721 (N.D.Ill. 1985), 84 CR 246, United States v. Yonan
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 7th Circuit Northern District of Illinois
    • November 15, 1985
    ...Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 565, 51 S.Ct. 582, 586, 75 L.Ed. 1264. The fundamental principle that "the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
316 cases
  • 14 F.Supp. 922 (S.D.Cal. 1936), 759, Morf v. Ingels
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 9th Circuit Southern District of California
    • May 5, 1936
    ...secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the several states be materially abridged and impaired. ' See, also, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. Most, if not all, of the cases relied upon for the validity of the act are common carrier cases-- cases arising from ......
  • 23 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.Cal. 1938), Paul Gray, Inc. v. Ingels
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 9th Circuit Southern District of California
    • July 9, 1938
    ...for hire and those who carry other commodities has been condemned as an arbitrary distinction by the Supreme Court, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264. Since public safety was the ultimate object, the distinction was held to be discriminatory, as not based on anythin......
  • 243 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1957), 12856, North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. United States
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Courts of Appeals Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
    • April 10, 1957
    ...59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commissioner, 286 U.S. 210, 243, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 564, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 456, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146; Connally v. General Constructio......
  • 622 F.Supp. 721 (N.D.Ill. 1985), 84 CR 246, United States v. Yonan
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States District Courts 7th Circuit Northern District of Illinois
    • November 15, 1985
    ...Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 565, 51 S.Ct. 582, 586, 75 L.Ed. 1264. The fundamental principle that "the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas
    • United States
    • West's Encyclopedia of American Law Milestones in the Law
    • January 1, 2005
    ...to any valid legislative purpose. See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553; Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535. See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S.......
  • The jurisprudence of the Hughes Court: the recent literature.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 89 Nbr. 5, May - May 2014
    • May 1, 2014
    ...Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (Brandeis, J.); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (Brandeis, J.); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) (Holmes 8c Brandeis, J].); W. 8c Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (Holmes 8c Brandeis, JJ.); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (19......
  • Interest definition in equal protection: a study of judicial technique.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 108 Nbr. 2, November 1998
    • November 1, 1998
    ...captures this historical connection between policies' perceived character and their supporting government interests. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553,566-67 (1931) ("In determining what [legislative classifications are] arbitrary, regard must be had to the particular subject of the st......