Naucke v. City of Park Hills

• Decision Date: 27 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1809.,No. 01-1808.,01-1808.,01-1809.
• Parties: Charles NAUCKE; Theresa Naucke; John Duval, Appellants, v. CITY OF PARK HILLS; James Link, personally and in his official capacity as City Administrator for the City of Park Hills, Appellees, Wheaton USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendant. Charles Naucke; John Duvall, Appellees, v. City of Park Hills, Defendant, James Link, personally and in his official capacity as City Administrator for the City of Park Hills, Appellant, Wheaton USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 923

284 F.3d 923

Charles NAUCKE; Theresa Naucke; John Duval, Appellants, v. CITY OF PARK HILLS; James Link, personally and in his official capacity as City Administrator for the City of Park Hills, Appellees, Wheaton USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendant.

Charles Naucke; John Duvall, Appellees, v. City of Park Hills, Defendant, James Link, personally and in his official capacity as City Administrator for the City of Park Hills, Appellant, Wheaton USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendant.

No. 01-1808.

No. 01-1809.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: December 14, 2001.

Filed: March 27, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Larry A. Bagsby, argued, St. Charles, MO, for appellant.

Robert J. Krehbiel, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.

Before LOKEN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Theresa Naucke appeals the district court's¹ adverse grant of summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Park Hills (Park Hills) and James Link, personally and in his official capacity as City Administrator for Park Hills. Charles Naucke and John Duvall appeal the district court's partial denial of attorney's fees claimed in conjunction with their successful § 1983 claims. James Link cross-appeals the jury's verdict finding him liable to Charles and John under § 1983. We affirm.

I.

Charles Naucke, Theresa Naucke, and John Duvall are residents of Park Hills, Missouri. Charles and Theresa are husband and wife. John is Theresa's brother. In 1998, Charles was employed as Chief of the fire department of Park Hills, and John was employed as a part-time firefighter with the department. Theresa was President of the fire department's ladies' auxiliary.

In early 1998, James Link, the City Administrator for Park Hills, proposed various changes within Park Hills' fire department, including changes to an emergency medical service regulation which precluded certain firefighters from responding to emergency medical calls. In response to the proposed changes, Theresa approached Link and expressed her dissatisfaction. Sometime thereafter, Link stopped Charles and John at an intersection in the city and told them they were in jeopardy of losing their jobs if they did not censure Theresa. Later, Theresa had her name put on the agenda for an upcoming City Council meeting so she could speak out against the proposed changes to the regulation. Before her scheduled appearance at the City Council meeting, Charles was removed from his position as fire chief. At approximately the same time, the ladies' auxiliary was ordered to disband. Several months later, Charles was removed from the fire department entirely.

Theresa attended the City Council meeting along with John. John addressed the Council regarding what he believed was the illegal employment of a minor on the fire department, and claimed the new fire chief was attempting to hide the violation. John was fired from his part-time position with the department the following day.

After Charles's removal as fire chief and John's termination, Theresa continued to voice her dissatisfaction to the City Council on a number of issues. She criticized Link and the City Council on issues related to labor violations, unlawful staffing of the fire department, competency of fire department personnel, and an ordinance requiring citizens wanting to appear before the Council to submit written comments for pre-approval. Theresa claims she was ridiculed and humiliated by Link, individual Council members and the Council as a whole in retaliation for her public speech. She alleges Link made derogatory comments to her in public places, and he or members of the Council posted a picture in a local grocery store of her home which bore the caption "The Naucke house. Donations needed." Theresa also alleges she was the subject of a letter which circulated around town stating one of her children had been fathered by Link.

Theresa brought suit under § 1983 claiming the actions of the City Council and Link, in response to her exercise of free speech, caused damage to her reputation, personal humiliation, disgrace, and mental anguish and suffering. She alleged she was no longer able to go out in public in Park Hills, and, for the first time on appeal, alleges she has sustained economic damages because of Charles' termination as fire chief. Charles and John also brought suit under § 1983 alleging, among other things, Link and the City Council retaliated against them because of Theresa's and John's public speech. Link and Park Hills moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed Theresa's claim finding she had failed to state a claim for damages cognizable under § 1983, and had failed to establish a causal connection between the damages claimed and any actions of the Appellees. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment as to Charles and John, and the case proceeded to trial.

On November 6, 2000, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Charles and John. The jury determined Charles lost his job as a direct result of his support for Theresa's speech rights. He was awarded back pay of $8,542, emotional distress damages of $50,000, and punitive damages of $100,000. The jury found John had been removed from the fire department as a direct result of the exercise of his own free speech rights and awarded him $6,750 in back pay, $10,000 for emotional damages, and $30,000 in punitive damages. Link moved for judgment as a matter of law (JAML) arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts and the damages awards. The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

II.

A. Theresa Naucke — Summary Judgment.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir.1999). Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be awarded to a party if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir.1997) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258, 263 (8th Cir.1997)). However, a "nonmovant must present more than a scintilla of evidence and must advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Bell, 106 F.3d at 263 (quoting Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods. of St. Louis, Inc., 64 F.3d 1202, 1211 (8th Cir.1995)). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment under § 1983, the plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right. Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (8th Cir. 1988).

Theresa's complaint alleges "damage to her reputation, personal humiliation, disgrace, mental anguish and suffering" resulting from Appellees' § 1983 violations.² Theresa claims Appellees retaliated against her exercise of free speech rights by (1) conducting a public audit of the fire department's ladies' auxiliary while she was President, (2) publicly scolding her at City Council meetings, (3) engaging in public name calling, (4) posting a picture of her home in a public place with the caption "The Naucke House. Donations Needed.", and (5) circulating a letter suggesting Link was the father of one of her children. The district court held the injuries claimed were insufficient as a matter of law to support Theresa's First Amendment claim or were not traceable to any actions taken by Appellees.

"[C]riticism of public officials lies at the very core of speech protected by the First Amendment." Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir.1999) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). Retaliation by a government actor in response to such an exercise of First Amendment rights forms a basis for § 1983 liability. Pendleton v. St. Louis County, 178 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir.1999). To establish a claim for retaliation under § 1983, a plaintiff must show "she was engaged in constitutionally protected activity that [the government official's] adverse action caused her to suffer an injury which would `chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing ... in that activity,' and that the adverse action was motivated in part by ... exercise of her constitutional rights." Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.1998)).

We believe Theresa's criticism of the City Council and City Administrator is the type of speech intended to be protected by the First Amendment. Further, we assume, without deciding, that any retaliatory action taken against Theresa by members of the City Council and Link was motivated in part by exercise of her protected First Amendment rights. We disagree, however, that the actions attributed to the City Council and Link were sufficiently egregious to "chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing ... in that [constitutionally protected] activity." Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678.

In some cases, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress may be sufficient to support a § 1983 claim. Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir.1999). But, "`it would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise.'" Bloch, 156 F.3d at 679 (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982)); cf. Bechtel v. City of Belton, 250 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising First...