Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner
Decision Date | 15 February 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 62926,62926 |
Citation | 161 Ga.App. 576,287 S.E.2d 716 |
Parties | The BRADLEY CENTER, INC. v. WESSNER et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
S. E. Kelly, Jr., J. Ronald Mullins, Jr., Columbus, for appellant.
Lee R. Grogan, Michael Agnew, Columbus, for appellee.
The instant wrongful death action raises an issue of apparent first impression in this state--whether appellant, a private mental health hospital, may be held civilly liable for the murder of appellees' mother by appellees' father, a patient in appellant's facility.
The relevant facts are as follows: Appellant admits patients only on a "voluntary" basis. In other words, patients of appellant's private facility "have to sign themselves in." Appellees' father, Matthew Wessner, and mother, Linda Wessner, had been experiencing marital problems for some time, the apparent primary source of which was Mrs. Wessner's extramarital affair. It was because of this disquieting domestic situation that Matthew Wessner originally became a "voluntary" patient in appellant's facility in October of 1974. At the time of his admission, Mr. Wessner made the following response to appellant's inquiry concerning his "chief problems": In a "Clinical Record" dated October 22, 1974, and signed by a physician employed by appellant, the following notations were made concerning Mr. Wessner: Thereafter, the medical records for Mr. Wessner's first admission reflect that he was being treated for what can best be termed, in the words of his physician, as "emerging homicidal impulses..."
On November 27, 1974, when Mr. Wessner was finally discharged from his first voluntary admission into appellant's hospital, his wife had likewise been a "voluntary" patient there for some five days. Mrs. Wessner's diagnosis was "depressive neurosis". In a "Doctor's Order Sheet" dated November 21, 1974, the following was noted concerning Mrs. Wessner's admission: Thereafter and until the time of her final discharge on January 8, 1975, Mrs. Wessner's medical records reflect that she was being treated for the depression occasioned by her marital situation and its resolution. Suffice it to say that the medical records demonstrate that no small part of the resolution of that situation involved Mrs. Wessner's fear of her husband and his threats. Mrs. Wessner's "Patient Discharge Summary", signed by her psychologist, noted that she
On January 14, 1975, after he attempted suicide, Mr. Wessner was voluntarily admitted for the second time into appellant's hospital. On January 24, 1975, the "Team Conference" noted that . The events of the week of February 2 to 9, 1975, are of critical importance to an understanding of Mr. Wessner's final tragic breakdown. On February 3, 1975, the following "In-patient Progress" note was made concerning Mr. Wessner: Also on February 3, 1975, Mr. Wessner "[e]xpressed intense fear of hurting someone--expressed need for help with controls." The "Nursing Notes" of February 5, 1975, reflect that Mr. Wessner "was denied privilege to go bowling because (1) his expression of wanting to leave [the hospital] and harm others as stated in team a. m. [conference] (2) I didn't feel comfortable taking him alone with one more [patient]..." Apparently, at either the "team a. m." conference of February 5, 1975, referred to in the above discussed nursing notes or the conference of February 6, 1975, Mr. Wessner On February 7, 1975, Mr. Wessner's "Treatment Plan Review", signed by his physician, contained the following notation: ...
Also on February 7, 1975, the "Doctor's Order Sheet" reflected that Mr. Wessner would be issued a pass "until 11 p. m. today (2-7-75) ... 10 a. m. to 11 p. m. on Sat. (2-8-75) ... 8 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. on Sunday ..." On the morning of Sunday, February 9, 1975, Mr. Wessner exercised his unrestricted pass privilege and left appellant's facility, stating that he was "going to take [his] children to church, have [a] steak dinner and return to [the hospital] about 1:30 p. m." Mr. Wessner drove to Mrs. Wessner's home to pick up the children who were in their mother's custody. The children were outside the house waiting for him and Mr. Wessner did not see his ex-wife at that time. On the way to church one of his children told Mr. Wessner, "Daddy, Mother does not want you to know, but Uncle George is in our house with her." After church, Mr. Wessner spotted his rival's car headed toward his ex-wife's house and he apparently "snapped". Mr. Wessner then secured his gun, confronted his ex-wife and her paramour and shot and killed both of them. Mr. Wessner was subsequently tried and convicted of two counts of murder.
The instant wrongful death action was instituted by appellees on the theory that their father's criminal act was reasonably foreseeable to appellant and that the death of their mother was the proximate result of appellant's negligence both in issuing the pass for the ill-fated day and in failing to exercise more restraint on their father's freedom to leave the premises. The case was tried by a jury and a substantial verdict for appellees was returned. Appellant appeals from the entry of judgment on this jury verdict.
1. Appellant's first assertion is "that the verdict is contrary to law and evidence in that the evidence failed to establish the requisite physician-patient relationship between [appellees'] deceased and [appellant]." Citing Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga.App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936), appellant argues, in essence, that "[i]t is fundamental in Georgia Law that an action against a medical professional can be maintained only by one within the physician-patient relationship." It is true that some cases in this state express adherence to a strict privity requirement in suits against professionals for the negligent performance of their professional services. See Smith v. International Lawyers, 35 Ga.App. 158, 132 S.E. 245 (1926) (attorney); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga.App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973) (accountant). The rationale of such cases is, as in any negligence case, that Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga.App. 341, 344, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978). It does not appear, however, that this strict privity requirement is "fundamental" in the medical malpractice area. Buttersworth does not explicitly state such a requirement. On its facts, that case merely stands for the proposition that where there is no physician-patient relationship established there can be no professional duty owed, the breach of which constitutes medical malpractice. As thus construed, Buttersworth does not limit the permissible scope of a physician's liability solely to the patient where a physician-patient relationship does...
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