City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 26 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. S093628.,S093628.
• Citation: 52 P.3d 129,29 Cal.4th 1,124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202
• Parties: CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Jeremy Brandon, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202

29 Cal.4th 1

52 P.3d 129

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

Jeremy Brandon, Real Party in Interest.

No. S093628.

Supreme Court of California.

August 26, 2002.

James K. Hahn and Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorneys, Cecil W. Marr, Assistant City Attorney, and Julie S. Raffish, Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioner.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General of the State of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Mastagni, Holstedt, Chiurazzi & Amick, Christopher W. Miller, and David P. Mastagni, Sacramento, for Peace Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund and Peace Officers Research Association of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Diane Marchant, Los Angeles, for Los Angeles Police Protective League as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Jones & Mayer and Paul R. Coble, Long Beach, for California State Sheriffs' Association, California Police Chiefs' Association and California Peace Officers' Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Richard Leonard for Real Party in Interest.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster and Mark G. Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, for Los Angeles County Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

KENNARD, J.

Defendant Jeremy Brandon, who was charged with sexually molesting a seven-year-old boy, sought discovery of certain information in the personnel records of the two arresting officers. The trial court reviewed the materials in chambers and, as relevant here, ordered the disclosure of a citizen complaint filed against one of the officers 10 years before the arrest in this case. Although Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) expressly precludes discovery of citizen complaints "occurring more than five years before" the accused's criminal act, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's order as necessary to protect defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial. (Italics added.)

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. Facts And Procedural Background

On February 1, 2000, two Los Angeles police officers arrested defendant for the sexual molestation of a seven-year-old child that had occurred earlier that day. The district attorney charged defendant with lewd conduct on a child under age 14 (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and with failing to register as a sex offender (id., § 290, subd. (g)(2)), a requirement imposed as a consequence of defendant's 1992 conviction of child molestation.

Defendant filed a pretrial motion in the superior court seeking discovery of certain information in the personnel files of the two arresting officers. Specifically, defendant sought the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons who had filed complaints against the officers "relating to acts of falsification of police reports, lying, perjury, dishonesty, untruthfulness or other acts of moral turpitude that reflect on the officers' honesty or truthfulness." Defense counsel's accompanying declaration stated that defendant "may" assert as a defense to the charges "that the civilian witnesses in this case were coached as to the statements and testimony they should make" and that this "coaching was done in [an] effort to fabricate evidence against the defendant and to suborn perjury." In asserting entitlement to this information, defendant cited this court's decision in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (Pitchess) and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (Brady). Defendant served the motion on both the district attorney and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

The district attorney did not respond to the motion. But the LAPD's custodian of records brought to the superior court, for review in chambers, materials from the personnel files of both officers. These materials included an internal report regarding a 1996 complaint against Officer C, alleging that he had failed to report a fellow officer's assault on a prisoner. The 1996 report made reference to a 1990 incident involving Officer C.'s failure to report the improper use of mace by a partner officer. The superior court found the information about both the 1996 and the 1990 incidents "relevant" to defendant's case, and ordered the LAPD's custodian of records to provide to the defense the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the complainants and witnesses for the two incidents. The City of Los Angeles (City), representing the LAPD, sought reconsideration, contending the 1990 complaint predated the arrest in this case by 10 years and thus fell outside the scope of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1)¹ (section 1045(b)(1)). Under that provision, "complaints concerning [police officer] conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction which is the subject of the litigation in aid of which discovery ... is sought" must be "exclude[d] from disclosure." (§ 1045(b)(1), italics added.) The trial court denied the City's motion for reconsideration.

The City challenged that ruling in a petition for writ of mandate filed in the Court of Appeal. After issuing an alternative writ and staying enforcement of the superior court's disclosure order, the Court of Appeal ordered defendant and the City to brief these additional issues: (1) The scope of a defendant's right to pretrial discovery under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; (2) the constitutionality of the five-year exclusion as provided for in section 1045(b)(1); and (3) the appropriate test for determining the constitutional validity of a state evidentiary rule that affects a defendant's federal due process right to a fair trial. In its decision, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's discovery order, reasoning that "to enforce [section 1045(b)(1)'s] five-year limitation" on the disclosure of police personnel records "would unduly infringe ... defendant's right to a fair trial." The decision also addressed an argument raised in an amicus curiae brief by the Los Angeles County Public Defender, in support of defendant, that the LAPD "ordinarily does not produce for in camera inspection complaints that are over five years old." After observing that information over five years old might qualify as evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the Court of Appeal held that police agencies responding to a defense motion seeking in camera review of police personnel records "must produce for inspection ... all of the records or information described in the motion ... without limitation as to time." We granted the City's petition for review.

II. Controlling Legal Principles

We here consider the interplay between the United States Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and California's statutory discovery procedures enacted after this court's 1974 decision in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305. In Brady, the high court announced a rule, founded on the due process guarantee of the federal Constitution, that requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable and "material" to the defense. Under California law, the procedures that the Legislature enacted to codify our Pitchess decision allow defendants access to certain information in the arresting officer's personnel records that is "material" to their defense. Although Brady and Pitchess both require disclosure of material evidence, they employ different standards of materiality.

A. Brady Disclosure

Under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87,83 S.Ct. 1194,10 L.Ed.2d 215, the prosecution must disclose to the defense any evidence that is "favorable to the accused" and is "material" on the issue of either guilt or punishment. Failure to do so violates the accused's constitutional right to due process. (Id. at pp. 86-87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) Evidence is material under the Brady standard "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.) Although Brady disclosure issues may arise "in advance of," "during," or "after trial" (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107-108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342), the test is always the same. (Id. at p. 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) Brady materiality is a "constitutional standard" required to ensure that nondisclosure will not "result in the denial of defendant's [due process] right to a fair trial." (Ibid.)

Because the Brady rule encompasses evidence "known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor," it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence "known to the others acting on the government's behalf in [a] case, including the police." (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 437-438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; see In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879, fn. 3, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715, and cases cited therein.) The prosecution's disclosure duty under Brady applies even without a request by the accused; it pertains not only to exculpatory evidence but also to impeachment evidence. (Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280-281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286; United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375; United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392.)

Closely related to the Brady rule requiring the prosecution to disclose material evidence favorable to the defense is the prosecution's obligation to ...