Downing v. Independent School Dist. No. 9
Decision Date | 29 March 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 32385.,32385. |
Citation | 207 Minn. 292,291 N.W. 613 |
Parties | DOWNING v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 9, ITASCA COUNTY. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Itasca County; Alfred L. Thwing, Judge.
Suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act by Julie Downing against the Independent School District No. 9, Itasca County, Minnesota, to establish plaintiff's status under a teacher's contract with defendant. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Marshall B. Thornton, of Nashwauk, and James V. Abate, of Hibbing, for appellant.
Oscar Hallam and Bruce J. Broady, both of St. Paul, for respondent.
Plaintiff's suit under our declaratory judgments act to have the court determine and establish her status and rights under her teacher's contract with defendant resulted in findings sustaining her contentions. Upon these judgment was entered later, and defendant appeals.
Plaintiff, a duly qualified teacher, was employed as such by defendant, an independent school district, under a written contract entered into in accordance with the provisions of 1 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 2903, L.1937, c. 161 (3 Mason Minn.St.1938 Supp. § 2903), for the school year of 1938-1939. This enactment, generally referred to as the "teachers continuing contract law," so far as here material, provides that a teacher's contract
On March 8, 1939, defendant's school board, by a majority vote, adopted the following resolution:
That resolution was prepared by the board's counsel who was present at the meeting, as was also the assistant superintendent of its schools, Mr. Nellis, who was commissioned its representative to communicate the facts in respect of the passage of the mentioned resolution to the entire teaching staff, there being 76 of them. On March 13, Mr. Nellis prepared, "By and with the advice of the attorney for the board of education" and pursuant to direction of the board, he having theretofore been "clothed with all authority enjoyed by the superintendent" (who was then ill and later died), a formal notice to the teachers reading as follows, omitting name and address:
A meeting of the teachers was called by Mr. Nellis, at which time this notice was given to all of them. Naturally there was considerable discussion between Mr. Nellis and the teachers when this matter was brought before the meeting. Some of them wanted to know if the intention was that they should be "fired," and he said, "I wouldn't say we were fired." He told them that they need not be "unduly apprehensive about the meaning of this"; that the resolution mentioned in the notice was "merely a protective measure on the part of the board due to the pending" legislation, "and there was no cause for any uneasy feelings as far as our future jobs were concerned." One witness testified:
On April 27, another board meeting was held at which a motion to re-elect all teachers for the ensuing year was lost "by an equally divided vote." At the next meeting, May 10, all board members being present, 70 of the teachers were unanimously re-elected for the ensuing year, but plaintiff and five others were not. At that meeting four of the remaining six teachers on motion to re-elect were unsuccessful "by an equally divided vote." Except as mentioned, no other action has been taken by the board in respect of plaintiff's employment. She is and has been at all times "ready, willing, and able to perform her said contract * * *, but has been and is refused permission to do so."
The court thought that "The natural and reasonable interpretation" of the "resolution and notice" was that the pendency of the mentioned legislative bills "would [if enacted] materially decrease" the district's tax income, hence it was "the desire of the school board to postpone" the making of future financial commitments "until after" the threatened legislation had been disposed of. That was the "interpretation and construction" given the resolution and notice by the "assistant superintendent and by this plaintiff and others of said teachers." The bills did not pass; hence the contingency, so the court held, upon which the resolution and notice depended, did not occur. For this reason it was thought that "there has been no determination" by the board "to terminate" plaintiff's employment contract.
At the outset of the trial defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on the theory that there were no issuable facts involved. Its "contention" was that "the reasons set up in the preamble" of the resolution "are not to be taken into consideration" in its interpretation; "that the only [determinative] portion of that resolution * * * is the resolving clause which clearly states, `it being the intent of the said school board that all teachers'" within the provisions of the act, "`be discharged so that all such contracts will terminate at the close of the school year 1939.'" It therefore seems clear that if defendant's theory is correct it amounts to a torpedoing of the resolution amidship. Charity forbids the thought that any such purpose was intended if we read and consider the whole resolution. Equally so is any notion that by this wholesale discharge political pressure might be brought upon the members of the legislature having in hand the feared enactments. Nor may we impute bad or sinister motives on the part of counsel or the board to bring about a discharge of teachers without a clear majority of the board being in favor of so doing. With these preliminaries in mind and in view of the fact that there is no question here of the power of the board to discharge teachers nor of the teachers' right to receive notice of such discharge before the April 1st deadline is reached, we may proceed directly to the only question which we think determinative. It is this: Do the facts disclosed by the record justify the court's finding that there was no valid determination to discharge the teachers under and pursuant to the 1937 act?
1. The purpose of that act (L.1937, c. 161) was to do away with the then existing chaotic conditions in respect to termination of teachers' contracts. Until then in many cases teachers would be left in a state of uncertainty as to whether they would be re-elected for the ensuing year. In many instances this state of uncertainty ran over a period of months. The later in the year that a school board acted, the greater the teacher's disadvantage in event of discharge to find vacancies elsewhere. That was the situation sought to be remedied. Under it a deadline of April 1 was fixed. If no termination had been made prior thereto and adequate notice given to the...
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