Eysink v. Board of Sup'rs of Jasper County

• Decision Date: 18 February 1941
• Docket Number: 45451.
• Citation: 296 N.W. 376,229 Iowa 1240
• Parties: EYSINK v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF JASPER COUNTY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

296 N.W. 376

229 Iowa 1240

EYSINK v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF JASPER COUNTY.

No. 45451.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 18, 1941

Appeal from District Court, Jasper County; P. J. Siegers, Judge.

John Eysink appealed to the district court from the action of the board of supervisors of Jasper County in allowing him but one-half of the homestead tax credit on certain property. The district court held Eysink entitled to the full credit. The board appeals to this court.

Affirmed.

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., John E. Mulroney, Asst. Atty. Gen and Luther M. Carr, Co. Atty., of Newton, for appellant.

Ver Ploeg, Ver Ploeg & Ver Ploeg, of Oskaloosa, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Justice.

John Eysink, appellee, occupied the property in question as his homestead during the entire year 1936. He had acquired an undivided one-half interest in the property by deed, and the remaining interest was owned by blood relatives. Appellee had already paid the taxes for 1936. On May 28, 1937, he filed application for homestead tax credit for 1936. On July 22 1937, the board of supervisors allowed a refund for 1936 in proportion to the undivided half interest owned by appellee. In other words, half of the maximum tax credit was allowed. In the month of October, 1937, appellee received a refund for the 1936 tax of $29.18, this being one-half the full credit. On March 14, 1940, appellee appealed to the district court where he was allowed the full credit. It is the contention of appellant board that its action in allowing appellee the credit proportionate to his interest in the property was correct under a proper interpretation of the Homestead Tax Credit Act, now Chapter 329.6, Code 1939.

I.

The Act in question, Ch. 195, Acts 47th G.A., now Code, Sec. 6943.152, provides as follows:

" Definitions . For the purpose of this chapter and wherever used in this chapter: * * * The word, ‘ owner’, shall mean the person who holds the fee simple title to the homestead, and in addition shall mean the person occupying as a surviving spouse or the person occupying under a contract of purchase where it is shown that not less than one-tenth of the purchase price * * * has been paid * * *, or the person occupying the homestead under devise or by operation of the inheritance laws where the whole interest passes or where the divided interest is shared only by blood relatives, or by legally adopted children, or where the person is occupying the homestead under a deed which conveys a divided interest where the other interests are owned by blood relatives or by legally adopted children." (Italics supplied.)

Sec. 11 of the act provides in part: " Any person who is the owner of a homestead, as defined in this act, and who desires to avail himself of the benefits provided hereunder for the 1936 taxes payable in 1937 * * * may do so by filing a verified statement with the county auditor," etc.

The law took effect in March, 1937. The first taxes affected by the act were those for the year 1936.

Appellant concedes, as well it must, that appellee falls plainly within the statutory definition of owner. No question is made with regard to his occupancy of the property as a homestead under a deed which conveyed to him an undivided one-half interest, the remaining interest being owned by blood relatives. The principal point urged upon us is that since this is a tax credit statute, it was the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the act as a whole, that the credit should be limited to the amount which the appellant himself was under legal liability to pay.

With regard to this same act, this court observed in Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 Iowa 229, 283 N.W. 889, that the statute should be strictly construed, and those claiming exemption thereunder must show themselves entitled thereto. See the authorities cited on page 231 of 226 Iowa 283 N.W. on page 890. A further authority for strict construction of statutes under which tax exemptions are claimed is Hale v. Board, 223 Iowa 321, 326, 271 N.W. 168. It is doubtless true, as appellant contends, and as we observed in the Ahrweiler case at page 231 of 226 Iowa 283 N.W. on page 890, that in attempting to arrive at the correct interpretation of the act, the court should consider the entire act, and construe its various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole. Even though we are to observe the rule of strict construction and consider all of the provisions of the act, appellant has not pointed out, nor have we been able to find, any provision of the act which casts any doubt upon the correctness of the conclusion that appellee was an owner within the terms of this law.

It will be observed that in addition to a fee-simple titleholder, the term " owner" also includes, according to the statute: (1) Surviving spouse; (2) purchaser under recorded contract, with ten percent of the purchase price paid; (3) devisee or heir of deceased owner; (4) devisee or heir of an undivided interest where the remaining interest passes to blood relatives or adopted children; and (5) grantee of a deed of a fractional interest where the other interests are owned by blood relatives or adopted children.

None of these five enumerated classes of owners other than a fee-simple titleholder is necessarily under legal liability to pay all the taxes, with the exception of one who is a sole devisee or heir. Were we to adopt appellant's theory that the amount of the tax credit is limited by the liability of the appellant personally to pay the tax, we would remove from the class of owners not only appellee and those similarly situated, but also the surviving spouse, the contract purchaser, and the heir or devisee of a fractional interest where the remaining interest is held by blood relatives or adopted children.

We find nothing doubtful or ambiguous about the statute. It must be remembered that it is only where a statute is of doubtful or uncertain meaning that courts are at liberty to apply rules of construction. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the expressed terms of the statute. This court has no power to write into the statute words which are not there. These rules are of course elementary, and do not require the citation of authorities. As especially applicable, however, see 25 R.C.L., p. 957, § 213; Palmer v. State Board of Assessment, 226 Iowa 92, 95, 283 N.W. 415; Mathewson v. Board, 226 Iowa 61, 67, 283 N.W. 256; Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. District Court, 223 Iowa 269, 271, 272 N.W. 416; Smith v. Sioux City Stock Yards Co., 219 Iowa 1142, 1149, 260 N.W. 531, 534; Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa 543, 551, 255 N.W. 695, 699.

As this court observed in a case involving the construction of the Sales Tax Act, " in construing this statute, we are bound by the definition of terms made use of by the Legislature. * * * ‘ the Legislature is its own lexicographer." ’ Sandberg Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 225 Iowa 103, 107, 278 N.W. 643, 645, 281 N.W. 197.

Appellant relies upon the Ahrweiler case, supra. In that case we held that the word " and" used in the Homestead Tax Credit Act allowing an owner credit " for the 1936 taxes payable in 1937 and for the 1937 taxes payable in 1938", Acts 47th Gen. Assem., c. 195, § 11, should be construed as a conjunctive with reference to a homestead eligible to the exemption for both years, but when used with reference to a homestead eligible for only one of the two years, the word " and" should be construed as a disjunctive, equivalent to the word " or." The correctness of the decision in the Ahrweiler case can scarcely be questioned and was arrived at by a consideration of well-recognized rules of construction. This court should be glad to do anything it properly can to discourage use by the legislature of the hybrid " and/or."

The following language from the Ahrweiler opinion, page 235 of 226 Iowa 283 N.W. at page 892, is inconsistent with appellant's position and indicates that the exemption contemplated by the statute is to the homestead rather than to the owner: " The tax credit is not a credit to the owner, but to the homestead, although this results in benefit to the owner and cash refunds were allowed taxpayers who had paid such taxes prior to the allowance of the credit. That the credit is to the property, as distinguished from the owner, is evident from various provisions of the act. The credit (or refund) is given against the tax on the homestead and the taxpayer makes claim therefore as owner of the homestead."

II.

Appellant urges that if the homestead tax credit law is interpreted to give full credit to an owner of an undivided interest, then it is discriminatory and in violation of Section 6, Article I, and Section 30, Article III of the State Constitution. This contention cannot avail appellant. In the first place no such claim seems to have been made until the case reached this court. Appellee says that if any such contention had been made in the court below, it would have offered pertinent evidence bearing...