Clauss v. Board of Ed. of Anne Arundel County

• Decision Date: 17 March 1943
• Docket Number: 21.
• Citation: 30 A.2d 779,181 Md. 513
• Parties: CLAUSS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

30 A.2d 779

181 Md. 513

CLAUSS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.

No. 21.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 17, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Anne Arundel County; Ridgely P. Melvin Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by William Clauss claimant, opposed by the Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, employer. The Industrial Accident Commission decided all the issues in claimant's favor, and from a decision of the circuit court that the employer was not subject to the act, claimant appeals.

Reversed and judgment entered affirming the Commission's decision.

Preston A. Pairo, of Baltimore (George B. Woelfel, of Annapolis, and J. Calvin Carney, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Emanuel Klawans, of Annapolis, and Carlyle Barton, of Baltimore (H. Warren Buckler, Jr., of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before SLOAN, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, MARBURY, and GRASON, JJ.

MARBURY Judge.

The question in this case is whether an employee of the Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, engaged in extrahazardous work for which he was paid a weekly salary of $30, is entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law for accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. All of the issues involved were decided in his favor by the Accident Commission. On appeal to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the case was heard before the court without a jury, and all the issues submitted as between the claimant and the Board of Education, were decided in favor of the claimant except one. That issue was whether the Board of Education of Anne Arundel County was subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. To that issue the court below returned a negative answer. The appeal here is by the claimant from that decision of the court.

The Workmen's Compensation Law in Maryland was first enacted by Chapter 800 of the Acts of 1914. Section 34 of that Act read as follows: 'Whenever the State, County, City or any municipality shall engage in any extra-hazardous work within the meaning of this Act in which workmen are employed for wages, this Act shall be applicable thereto. Whenever and so long as by State law, City Charter or Municipal Ordinance, provision equal or better than that given under the terms of this Act is made for municipal employes injured in the course of employment, such employes shall not be entitled to the benefits of this Act.' By Chapter 303 of the Acts of 1922 this section, which had become Section 35 of Article 101 of the Annotated Code, 1924, was amended to insert in the first sentence after the words 'within the meaning of this Act' the words 'Whether for pecuniary gain or otherwise.' It was again amended in 1924 by Chapter 332, which inserted a sentence reading as follows: 'In time of peace and while engaged in military service all officers and enlisted men of the organized militia of the State of Maryland, shall be deemed workmen of the State for wages within the meaning of the preceding sentence.' The italics are supplied. In 1927, by Chapter 83, the provision concerning the militia was taken out, and the section left as it had been made by the Act of 1922, Chapter 303. However, by Chapter 395 of the same session of 1927, the section was again repealed and re-enacted by inserting a sentence between the first and last sentences reading as follows: 'The officers of the Maryland State Police Force and all Guards employed by any of the penal institutions of this State shall be deemed workmen for wages within the meaning of this Section.' Italics supplied. In 1937 by Chapter 288, the officers of the County Police of Prince George's County were declared to be 'workmen for wages' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and by Chapter 315 of the same session it was enacted that the police of the town of Laurel should be considered 'workmen for wages' under the provisions of Article 101. In 1939, Chapter 317, Section 35 was repealed and re-enacted and the second sentence was amended to include the officers of the Montgomery County Police, as well as those of the Maryland State Police Force and the guards in the penal institutions. All of these were declared to be 'workmen for wages.' A further amendment made by Chapter 652 of the same session, put back the officers and enlisted men of the militia in time of peace, left out the Montgomery County Police, and put in the officers of the State Police and the guards at the penal institutions. All of these were declared to be 'workmen for wages'. Article 101 of the Annotated Code of 1939 codified the various acts in Section 46 and included among those especially enumerated the officers and men of the militia, the officers and men of the State Police, and the Montgomery County and Prince George's County Police, the police of the town of Laurel and all guards employed by any of the penal institutions of the state. All of these were declared to be 'workmen for wages' within the meaning of the Article.

By Chapter 433 of the Acts of 1941, Section 46 was again repealed and reenacted, and as finally drawn included as 'workmen for wages' not only those specifically mentioned in the Code section, but also 'the regular members of the police force, the paid firemen, the Engineers and Linemen of the Electric Light Plant of Frederick City.'

These amendments were probably made to meet an early decision of this court that a park policeman employed by the Board of Park Commissioners of Baltimore City was not a 'workman employed for wages'. Harris v. Baltimore, 151 Md. 11, 133 A. 888, 893. After the passage of the amendment of 1922, including within the scope of the Act officers and enlisted men of the organized militia, this court said that a member of the National Guard was a workman for wages under that amendment, although he did not receive any wages, and we carried out what was held to be the intention of the amendment by working out a theoretical wages for him. Merrill v. State Military Department, 152 Md. 474, 136 A. 897. The point is made by the appellee that inasmuch as by the several amendments employees of certain specifically named agencies are covered by the Act, an intention is indicated to exclude the employees of all other State, County and Municipal agencies. This contention is based upon the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. It can have no application here because the purpose of the amendments was to designate as 'workmen for wages' certain employees who would not otherwise be so considered. The amendments were concerned with the nature of the employment, and not with the agencies by whom the included classes were employed.

The right of the claimant to compensation must depend upon the decision of the question whether his employment by the Board of Education of Anne Arundel County is an employment by the State or by the County. Clearly, he is not employed by any city or municipality. That leads to an examination of Article 77 of the Code, which is that providing for a system of public education in the State. This Article was passed in substantially its present form by Chapter 506 of the Acts of 1916. There have, of course, been amendments added since. The Act of 1916 was passed as a result of the report of a commission authorized by Chapter 844 of the Acts of 1914. This commission requested the General Education Board to undertake a survey of public education in this State. This was done, and a most thorough and exhaustive report was filed, prepared under the direction of Abraham Flexner and Dr. Frank P. Backman. This report was submitted to the Governor, transmitted by him to the Legislature of 1916, and as a result, the present system of education was adopted.

Article 77, as thus enacted, provides for a State Board of Education which is to be at the head of a State Department of Education and to which is entrusted educational matters affecting the State and the general care and supervision of public education. Educational matters affecting counties are under the control of County Boards of Education. The Governor appoints the State Board, and also appoints the County Board. The State Board appoints the State Superintendent of Schools, and the County Board appoints the County Superintendent of Schools, who is the executive officer of the County Board and its secretary and treasurer. The money for the support of the schools in each County is obtained chiefly from the tax levy of the County. Additional amounts may be obtained from State funds. General control of schools, teachers and the construction of school buildings is placed in the County Boards, subject, however, in various ways to supervision by the State authorities. The whole scheme of the Act is to provide a uniform system of public schools throughout the State which shall provide as nearly as possible the same kind and type of education in each of the counties of the State.

The appellee claims that it is neither a State nor a County, but an independent corporation created by the Legislature, and, therefore, it does not come within the provisions of Section 46. Neither the State nor the County, however, can act directly. Each must act through agencies, and whether such agencies are individuals or unincorporated commissions or corporate bodies, if they are acting within the power and authority given them, they are agencies of the State or County, as the case may be. The State Roads Commission is an unincorporated agency of the State. It has been held to be a quasi corporation. Postal Telegraph Company v. State Roads Commission, 127 Md. 243, 96 A. 439; State v. Rich,

126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956. Yet, in the case of State Roads Commission v. Reynolds, 164 Md. 539, 165 A. 475, an employee of...