Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1947
• Docket Number: 100.
• Parties: ALLEN v. GLENN L. MARTIN CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

52 A.2d 605

188 Md. 290

ALLEN v. GLENN L. MARTIN CO. et al.

No. 100.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

April 17, 1947

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Herman M. Moser, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Robert Allen claimant, opposed by the Glenn I. Martin Company, employer and the Globe Indemnity Company, insurer. From an award of compensation in limited amount by the Industrial Accident Commission, claimant appealed to the Baltimore City Court and from an order thereof remanding the cause to the Commission for further proceedings, claimant appeals.

Order reversed, and case remanded for entry of judgment affirming the Commission's decision.

Paul Berman, of Baltimore (Sigmund Levin and Theodore B. Berman, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Deniel E. Klein, of Baltimore, for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

COLLINS Judge.

Robert Allen, claimant, appellant, an employee of the Glenn L. Martin Company, earning an average weekly pay of $70.20, was injured on August 30, 1944, by falling off a bench.

On June 6, 1945, he filed a claim for compensation with the State Industrial Accident Commission alleging that he sustained permanent partial disability to his back. A hearing was held before that Commission on September 20, 1945, when appellant appeared and presented a medical report from the doctor who had examined him at the instance of his attorney. The appellees also produced a doctor who had examined the appellant. Appellant's doctor's report showed that the disability of appellant's back was about 25%, and the other doctor testified that appellant had about 25% loss of use of his back. Claimant lost no time from work. After the hearing the State Industrial Accident Commission passed an order that Glenn L. Martin Company, employer, and Globe Indemnity Company, insurer, appellees here, pay unto the claimant for permanent partial disability to his back, compensation at the rate of $18 per week, payable weekly and for the period of 41 2/3 weeks, not to exceed, however, the sum of $750 under 'Other Cases'. From that decision the appellant appealed to the Baltimore City Court.

The decision of this Court in the case of Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., Md., 47 A.2d 365, having been filed, the appellees filed in the Baltimore City Court a motion to dismiss appellant's appeal, to which motion appellant answered. At the hearing on these motions, Dr. Thomas W. Koon, a member of the State Industrial Accident Commission, called by the appellant, testified as to the method used by him in arriving at the decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission in this case. The Baltimore City Court, on November 22, 1946, passed an order remanding the cause to the State Industrial Accident Commission for further proceedings, 'to determine the loss of wage earning capacity of claimant, if any, and such other pertinent matters as may be properly heard by the Commission in connection therewith.' From that order of November 30, 1946, the appellant appealed to this Court. Appellant contends (1) that there was error in the Trial Court remanding the case to the State Industrial Accident Commission; (2) that the Trial Court erred in expunging from appellant's answer to appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal, Exhibits A, B and C, and the testimony of Commissioner Thomas W. Koon relating to the method used by the Commission in all cases in arriving at amounts awarded under 'Other Cases' provision of the statute, Code Supp.1943, art. 101, § 48, except the instant case; (3) that the 'Other Cases' provision of the statute as interpreted by the decision of this Court in the case of Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., supra, is unconstitutional.

(1) Appellant contends that there was error in the Trial Court remanding the case to the State Industrial Accident Commission. The appellees, on the other hand, contend that this order was proper and, as it was not a final order, that the appellant has no right of appeal to this Court from that order. Hazlehurst v. Morris, 28 Md. 67, 71; Newbold v. Green, 122 Md. 648, 651, 90 A. 513. Under the provisions of Code 1939, Article 101, Section 70 (now Section 57), on an appeal from a decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission, '* * * the Court shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts concerning the injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the Article, and whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided. If the Court shall determine that the Commission has acted within its powers and has correctly construed the law and facts, the decision of the Commission shall be confirmed; otherwise it shall be reversed or modified. * * *' Under the plain provisions of this statute either the decision of the Commission should have been affirmed or reversed or modified. Clauss v. Board of Education, 181 Md. 513, 525, 30 A.2d 779. The statute nowhere provides for a case to be remanded by the Trial Court to the Commission and appellees so admit in their brief Monumental Printing Co. v. Edell, 163 Md. 551, 562, 164 A. 171. The order passed was without authority. The effect of this remand was to deny to the appellant his right of appeal to this Court. As pointed out by the appellant, whatever decision the Commission might make after taking the testimony required by this order, the appellant would be required to enter another appeal from that decision. The order therefore remanding the case to the Commission denied to the appellant the means of further prosecuting his appeal from the present decision of the Commission. As was said in the case of Bragunier v. Penn, 79 Md. 244, at page 246, 29 A. 12, 'The order appealed from was unquestionably final, inasmuch as it denied the petitioner the means of further prosecuting his suit. It terminated the proceeding, and it is well settled that, when that it the case, an appeal will lie * * *'. In the instant case this order passed by the Trial Court terminated the then present decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission and therefore was a final order from which an appeal lies. Waverly Mutual & P.L.L. & Building Ass'n v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 342, 1 A. 561; Adams v. Gillespie, 151 Md. 52, 54, 133 A. 831; Poe's Practice, 5th Ed., Section 826, page 801. We therefore conclude that the remand should not have been made and that the appeal from that remand is properly before this Court for decision.

(2) The Trial Judge was clearly correct in expunging from appellant's answer and from the case Exhibits A, B and C and the testimony of Commissioner Thomas W. Koon relating to the method used by the Commission in arriving at amounts awarded under the 'Other Cases' provision of the statute. These Exhibits A, B and C, were tables relating to the methods used by the Commission in deciding cases other than the instant case. On claimant's appeal no question is before us on the admissibility of the testimony of Commissioner Koon as to the method used by him in arriving at his decision in the instant case. In general, however, it may be stated that the determination whether a decision of an administrative agency is arbitrary is made from the decision itself and the record in the case, and not from the evidence of the members of the agency how it arrived at its conclusion.

(3) Appellant contends that the 'Other Cases' provision of the statute as interpreted by the decision of this Court in the case of Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., supra, is unconstitutional. Appellant argues here, as was argued in that case, that there should have been no limit less than $3,000 on the amount of permanent partial disability allowed. He argues, as was argued in the case of Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., supra, hereinafter referred to in this opinion as the Townsend case, that the Commission has the duty to determine the average weekly wage and the wage earning capacity and to fix the weekly payments at 50% of the difference between the two. This question is not raised here, as it was not raised in the Townsend case, because the appellant was allowed the weekly maximum and no appeal was taken by the employer and insurer. He contends, however, as was contended in the Townsend case, that the Commission has no power to limit the number of weeks as long as the permanent partial disability continues, and that the only limitation, unless there is a subsequent modification or death, is when the aggregate weekly payments reach the maximum fixed by the statute. He argues here that to limit it otherwise is unconstitutional, in that there is a deprivation to the appellant without due process contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of the Twenty-third Article of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland, because the 'Other Cases' paragraph, as construed, sets up no valid guide or standard whereby a lesser amount may be determined. If the statutory provision, as construed, were unconstitutional, appellant could not maintain any claim under it. However, the contention that the statute is unconstitutional is without merit. Whether statutory guides or standards to effectuate a public policy are adequate or not, depends largely upon the nature of the subject matter. Compare Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 and Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441. If the policy is sufficiently defined, it is immaterial that the process may involve the fixing of liquidated amounts without express definition. Compare Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. State Board of Forestry, 125 Md. 666, 675, 94 A. 322.

The...