McEldowney v. Wyatt

• Decision Date: 09 April 1898
• Citation: 30 S.E. 239,44 W.Va. 711
• Parties: McELDOWNEY v. WYATT.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

30 S.E. 239

44 W.Va. 711

McELDOWNEY v. WYATT.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

April 9, 1898

Submitted February 7, 1898

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general law; one relating to particular persons or things of a class is special.

2. If the title of an act is broad enough to cover its enactment and give fair and reasonable index to the purpose of the act it need not descend to particulars of the enactment.

3. Where title to property has vested under the statute of limitations, no act can, by extending the statute or reviving the remedy, impair such title. It would be unconstitutional because depriving one of property without due process of law but where the demand is on contract, or any class of action where the statute merely gives a defense, and does not vest property, there is no vested right to such mere defense, and the legislature may, by repeal of the statute or otherwise revive the action, and deprive one of such defense.

Appeal from circuit court, Wetzel county; Romo H. Freer, Judge.

Bill by John c. McEldowney against J. N. Wyatt for an injunction and equitable relief. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Wiley & Keifer and Hall & Hall, for appellant.

Robt. McEldowneY and T. P. JACOBS, for appellee.

BRANNON, P.

J. N. Wyatt was sheriff of Wetzel county, and, as such, held tax bills, for the years 1889, 1890, 1891, and 1892, against John C. McEldowney, and the right to levy had become barred by lapse of time. Wyatt instituted an action of assumpsit in the circuit court to recover the taxes, and later the legislature passed chapter 63, Acts 1897, giving sheriffs whose terms expired in December, 1892 and 1896, further time until 31st December, 1899, to levy unpaid taxes for the years 1889 to 1892, inclusive. After this act, Wyatt dismissed the action in court "without prejudice." Later McEldowney obtained an injunction against Wyatt to restrain him from a meditated levy and collection of said taxes, which having been perpetuated. Wyatt appeals. The case turns upon the question whether said act of the legislature is constitutional. It is claimed that it is unconstitutional, because it is special legislation; but as it applies to sheriffs of all counties, and such taxes therein, it does not seem so to me.

The act, it is true, applies only to certain claims of sheriffs and taxes; but, surely, the legislature can select all of a class which may, in its judgment, call for legislation. It may select certain trades, vocations, or men as distinguished from women, or minors as distinguished from adults, or sane people as distinguished from the insane, and enact such legislation as may, in its judgment, be a requisite for them, without the enactment falling under the inhibition of the constitution relating to special legislation. "A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general law; one relating to particular persons or things of a class is special." Suth. St. Const. p. 149; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Ex parte Lichtenstein (Cal.) 7 P. 728. This act operates uniformly on all persons and things of a class.

It is said that the title of the act is bad, as it does not fully specify its object. The title is "An act extending the time in which distraint and sale may be made for taxes," and the enactment in the act relates only to certain sheriffs and taxes for certain years. It is plain that what the act does enact is covered by the title, as the enactment is narrower than the title. Its enactment con tains nothing not contained in the title. The Constitution does not require that "The subject of the bill shall be specifically and exactly expressed in the title, and hence we conclude that any expression in the title which calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required." Suth. St. Const. p. 96. The same book tells us that the title "may be general but must be specific enough to answer reasonably the purpose for which the subject is required to be expressed in the title. When the subject is stated in the title, the constitution is so far complied with that no criticism of the mode of statement will affect the validity of the act. The statute is valid in such a case. The degree of particularity in expressing the subject in the title is left to the discretion of the legislature. No particular form has been prescribed in the constitution for expressing the subject or...