INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, ETC. v. AMERICAN ZINC, L. & S. CO.

• Citation: 311 F.2d 656
• Decision Date: 11 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. 17400.,17400.
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, LOCAL 515, an Unincorporated Association of Persons, Appellant, v. AMERICAN ZINC, LEAD & SMELTING CO., a Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

311 F.2d 656 (1963)

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, LOCAL 515, an Unincorporated Association of Persons, Appellant, v. AMERICAN ZINC, LEAD & SMELTING CO., a Corporation, Appellee.

No. 17400.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

January 2, 1963.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1963.

Nathan Witt, New York City, for appellant.

Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman & O'Kelly, Horton Herman, and Robert L. Simpson, Spokane, Wash., for appellee.

Before MERRILL and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and WALSH, District Judge.

WALSH, District Judge.

Appellant and appellee are parties to a collective bargaining agreement entered into on March 6, 1957,¹ relating to appellee's Pend Oreille County, Washington, mining operations. The case before us arises out of a dispute between the parties regarding provisions of the agreement covering deductions and checkoffs to be made by appellee from the wages of members of appellant, viz.:

"Section 3.05. In the event an employee shall sign a deduction Authorization Card (the form is shown in Schedule `C\'), and the card is in the Company\'s possession, the Company agrees, after the effective date of such card, to deduct the applicable initiation or reinstatement fee and/or Union membership dues from the first pay check issued the employee and thereafter the provisions of Section 3.06 shall govern.

* * * * * *

"Section 3.06. When the employee has met the requirements of Section 3.05 above, the Company shall deduct from the earnings each month thereafter and pay to the Union the applicable Union membership dues, provided always that such deduction shall have been authorized by each employee from whose wages the deduction is made by written assignment filed with the Company as provided by Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act."

While the collective bargaining agreement was in force, members of appellant who were employed by appellee executed and delivered to appellee deduction authorization cards, addressed to appellee and in the form set out in Schedule "C" attached to the collective bargaining agreement.² In April, 1960, appellant's members voted an assessment of $10.00 per member per month as a special strike assessment to assist another local union with respect to a strike contemplated to be begun by the other local against the employer of its members. The assessment was to continue from month to month "until the conclusion of negotiations in the Coeur d'Alene and Metaline areas" and was to be paid by appellant's members in addition to appellant's established $5.00 per month per member union dues.

Appellant notified appellee of the assessment vote and requested appellee to withhold the assessments from the wages of employees who had delivered deduction authorization cards to appellee, and to pay over the assessments to appellant, pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Appellee refused to check off the $10.00 strike assessment, though it continued to check off the $5.00 per month membership dues, and appellant thereupon filed its complaint in the district court. The complaint prayed, in a first cause of action, recovery of $3,145.00 and interest claimed to be due appellant from appellee for assessments due at the time of filing the complaint, and, in a second cause of action, recovery of the sums appellant claimed would be due it for assessments coming due by the date of trial. Each party moved in the district court for summary judgment in its favor. The district court, finding that there was no issue of fact in the case, denied appellant's motion and granted that of appellee, ruling (a) that the $10.00 strike assessments were not "membership dues" within the meaning of Section 302(c) (4), Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (4))³ validating checkoffs, and (b) that such assessments were not "dues, initiation fees or reinstatement fees" within the meaning of the checkoff provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Judgment was entered dismissing appellant's complaint and awarding costs to appellee, and appellant appealed to this court. The district court had jurisdiction by virtue of Section 301, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 185); and this court has jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291

Appellant asserts, and we agree, that the district court misconstrued Section 302, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, when it held that the term "membership dues" as used in the proviso (Section 302(c) (4)) does not include and thereby make lawful an employer's checkoff of "assessments" pursuant to written assignments from employee union members. The Department of Justice, the agency charged with enforcement of Section 302, after giving consideration to the penal character of the Section and its purpose, in an opinion⁴ construed the term "membership dues" as used in Section 302 to cover "assessments". This construction of Section 302 has been followed by the National Labor Relations Board⁵ and was very recently approved in National Labor Relations Board v. Food Fair Stores, Inc. et al., 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir., 1962). On the basis of these authorities, we find the district court's construction of Section 302(c) (4) incorrect.

In urging upon us that the court below was accurate in its construction of Section 302(c) (4), appellee cites decisions of the National Labor Relations Board⁶ holding that "assessments" are not within the term "periodic dues" as used in Sections 8(a) (3) (B) and 8(b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act; and appellee argues that such decisions should be followed in construing Section 302(c) (4). This contention is well answered by the Third Circuit's exposition in National Labor Relations Board v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., supra, of the differences in purposes and policies involved in the sections:

"In acquiescing in the interpretation by the Department of Justice of Section 302 for the purpose of its administration of that statute in its penal aspects the Board did not bind itself to a similar construction in the administration of Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). Two different policies are brought into play, the operative effects of which create no conflict. Section 8(a) (3) prevents a union shop employer from discharging an employee at the request of the union unless he has reason to believe that only failure to pay uniform `periodic dues\' or `initiation fees\' is the sole cause of his lack of union membership, while Section 302, under the interpretation of the Department of Justice, permits an employer with a valid union security contract to deduct assessments, providing the employee has voluntarily signed an authorization as prescribed in the section. The broad construction granted in the administration of Section 302 by the Department of Justice is consistent with the criminal character of the sanctions it embodies. The narrow construction applied by the Board to the enforcement of Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) is consistent with the overall protection afforded by those sections to employees and equally creates no inconsistency with the enforcement of Section 302 for it is completely extrinsic thereto." 307 F.2d 12.

Turning to the alternative ground of the decision below — that assessments were not included within the term "Union membership dues" as used in the checkoff provisions of the collective bargaining agreement — we hold that the district court's ruling on this question was premature and should not have been made on the motions for summary judgment. In the light of what has been pointed out earlier regarding the interpretation of the words "membership dues" in Section 302, it is apparent that the meaning of the words "Union membership dues" used in Sections 3.05...