313 U.S. 57 (1941), 616, United States v. Resler
|Docket Nº:||No. 616|
|Citation:||313 U.S. 57, 61 S.Ct. 820, 85 L.Ed. 1185|
|Party Name:||United States v. Resler|
|Case Date:||April 14, 1941|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued March 14, 1941
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
1. Section 212(b) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which subjects to the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission transfers of certificates and permits, applies to a transfer of operating rights though not more than twenty motor vehicles are involved, notwithstanding the provision of § 213(e) that
the provisions of this section requiring authority from the Commission for consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control shall not apply where the total number of motor vehicles involved is not more than twenty. P. 59.
2. Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Interstate Commerce Commission had authority to promulgate a rulemaking approval by the Commission prerequisite to an effective transfer of operating rights. P. 59.
Appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act from a judgment sustaining a special plea in bar to an information charging violation of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
MURPHY, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
[61 S.Ct. 821] This appeal presents two important questions affecting the administration of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 543). The first is whether § 213(e) places beyond reach of § 212(b) transfers of operating rights where not more than twenty vehicles are involved. The second is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission possessed statutory authority to rule that assent of the Commission is a condition precedent to an effective transfer which is subject to § 212(b).
In July, 1940, the United States filed an information against appellee charging that he had engaged in interstate motor carrier operations over a specified route in Colorado without a certificate of public convenience and necessity required by § 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Appellee filed a special plea in bar alleging in substance that he had not violated § 206(a) because he had acquired the requisite certificate from one Brady, to whom it had been issued originally, and that the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not necessary to validate that...
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