Meyerson v. Carter
| Decision Date | 13 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 58251,58251 |
| Citation | 316 N.E.2d 240,22 Ill.App.3d 73 |
| Parties | Nick MEYERSON and American United Cab Association, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James Y. CARTER, Public Vehicle Licensing Commissioner of the City of Chicago, and James Conlisk, Commissioner of Police, City of Chicago, Defendants- Appellants, Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Attorney of Cook County, Defendant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard L. Curry, Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Robert R. Retke, Chicago, of counsel) for defendants-appellants.
Miller & Schneider, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees.
The circuit court of Cook County held unconstitutional the 'Taxicabs-bullet proof shields' statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1972, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12--605) 1, finding it to be so vague and indefinite that it is judicially unenforceable. Judgment was entered permanently enjoining enforcement of the statute. Defendants' appeal challenges the correctness of the ruling.
Approximately two and one-half years after the effective date of the statute, plaintiffs Nick Meyerson, an owner-operator of a taxicab operating pursuant to a license issued by the City of Chicago, and American United Cab Association, a taxicab affiliate acting on behalf of its affiliated members, I.e., independent taxicab owners and operators, filed their verified complaint for declaratory judgment and injunction.
The defendants-appellants are James Y. Carter (hereinafter Carter), Public Vehicle Licensing Commissioner, and James Conlisk, Commissioner of Police, of the City of Chicago. The State's Attorney of Cook County, joined as a defendant after the original complaint was filed, did not appeal. A temporary injunction issued and, after the subsequent bench trial, the trial court declared the statute to be unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that various members of American United, including plaintiff Meyerson, were notified by Carter on March 6, 1972 that, unless they complied with the statute within 30 days, their right to operate their cabs would be suspended. Plaintiffs proceeded to attack the validity of the statute alleging that its provisions violated the due process and equal protection clauses of both the United States and Illinois constitutions; that the statute constituted an invalid exercise of the police power by compelling a citizen to guard his own safety without benefiting the general public; that the bullet proof shield endangers the health, safety, and comfort of the cab operator as well as his passengers; that the statute draws an unreasonable classivication; and that it is vague and unclear in that it fails to specify the standards with which the bullet proof shield must comply.
In their answer to the complaint, defendants admitted the facts giving rise to plaintiffs' action as stated by plaintiffs; denied that the statute was unconstitutional or its enforcement illegal; affirmatively stated that the statute is a valid exercise of the state's police power intended to regulate those persons who use public ways for private profit; denied plaintiffs' allegations that the shield endangers the operator and passengers stating further that such cannot properly support an allegation that a statute is unconstitutional; and denied the remainder of plaintiffs' allegations concerning an unreasonable classification and vagueness of the statutory language. Defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs were guilty of Laches in seeking the temporary injunction.
So far as resolving the issues raised in this appeal, the significant testimony may be summarized as follows.
John H. Andrews, a mechanical engineer specializing in vehicles, testified on behalf of plaintiffs as in expert witness. He stated that, according to accepted standards within the glass industry, the transparent material used in various bullet proof shields examined on taxicabs operating in the City of Chicago would not be considered 'bullet proof.' Referring to the standards published by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Andrews described the four types of bullet resistant glass defined by those standards, to wit:
'Type MPW, a nominal thickness of an inch and three-sixteenths which is ballistically resistant to medium powered small arms ammunition;
Type HP which is one and nine-sixteenths inch, which is ballistically resistant to high powered small arms ammunition;
Type SP which is an inch and threequarters thick which is resistant to super powered small arms ammunition; and the fourth type,
Type RR which is two inches thick are (sic) ballistically resistant to high powered rifle ammunition.'
Asked by the court whether the term 'bullet proof' was synonymous with the term 'bullet resistant,' Andrews stated 'It is the same generic type of definition.' The court then inquired whether one could have type MP glass and still be considered to have bullet proof glass. The witness responded that such would be bullet resistant to small arms ammunition.
Andrews further testified that the three-quarter-inch and three-eighths- inch material presently used in the shields is not bullet resistant and that, should someone fire a bullet through material of that thickness, the bullet would not only come through the shield with a great deal of energy, but fragments of plastic would also be accelerated forward.
On cross-examination Andrews stated that he had examined approximately seven shields; that all materials have some bullet resistant qualities, but that plastic is not as strong as glass when it comes to resisting the impact of a bullet. He further testified that the terms 'bullet proof' and 'bullet resistant' imply the same idea noting bullet proof since a bullet cannot pierce it; bullet proff since a bullet cannot pierce it; that, on the other hand, while a piece of glass or plastic will reduce the bullet's energy, the bullet can penetrate the substance.
Anthony Bottalla, president of the plaintiff American United Cab Association, testified that Carter's office had notified him by letter in March 1971 that the statute in question had been passed; that he then contacted the office of the governor of the State of Illinois, the enforcing unit of the City of Chicago, and Carter, requesting the specifications of the particular bullet proof shield which Carter requested them to install; that he received no specifications; and that, when he talked to Carter he asked him what is the requirement of the law, to which Carter replied: 'The law is not specific to the dimension or the size or the thickness.'
Defendants called two witnesses who testified concerning their experience with cabs equipped with a so-called bullet proof partition.
Defendants also called Alfred Halloway, chairman of the safety committee of the Democratic Union Organization, Local 777, who testified that approximately 4,800 taxicab drivers belonged to the union and that, prior to passage of the statute in question, he had circulated a petition favoring installation of such shields and had accumulated nearly 3,500 signatures.
Defendant Carter testified that after passage of the statute he notified by letter the taxicab owners of the passage of the statute in question; that all of the Yellow and Checker cabs (approximately 80% Of the city cabs) had shields presently installed and that about 60% Of the independent cabs in the city are presently equipped with the shields; that 'there is no such thing as bullet proof'; that at the time of the statute's passage he did not know whether bullet resistant shields were made, although there were advertisements for such in trade journals; and that, from tests conducted at the police testing range, it was discovered that only two types of transparent material were bullet resistant.
On cross-examination Carter stated that, as commissioner, he has a statutory duty to examine the bodies of taxicabs once each year and a duty, by ordinance, to perform such examinations twice annually. When asked whether his office has formulated any particular statistic, dimension or type of shield, Carter stated that:
The trial court found the statute to be judicially unenforceable solely on the ground that its language was too vague and indefinite.
Defendants urge on appeal that in so ruling the trial court ignored the intent of the legislature as well as the special meaning which the term 'bullet proof shield' has acquired within the taxicab industry. Further, defendants urge that the plaintiffs are guilty of Laches (by waiting two and one-half years before filing suit) and thus have waived their right to question the validity of the statute.
The cardinal principle in construing a statute is to give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. See People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill.2d 70, 73, 285 N.E.2d 129; People v. Wallace (1974), 57 Ill.2d 285, 312 N.E.2d 263.
The subject statute was first passed by our General Assembly in 1969 and became effective August 28, 1969. It applied only to municipalities with 1,000,000 or more population--thus only to the City of Chicago.
The evidence before the trial court established that the safety committee of a taxi drivers union of Yellow and Checker cabs in Chicago presented to the legislature, prior to the passage of the statute, a petition signed by approximately 3,500 cab drivers requesting the installation of the bullet proof shield 2.
The language of the statute leaves no doubt of the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate the possibility of armed assaults upon cab drivers by passengers bent upon robbing the drivers. To this end the...
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