Cotter v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 25 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1459.,No. 02-1404.,No. 02-1458.,02-1404.,02-1458.,02-1459. |
| Parties | Winifred COTTER, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. The CITY OF BOSTON; Dennis A. White; Harold White; Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office for Administration and Finance Human Resources Division, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Michael C. McLaughlin, for appellants.
Rory FitzPatrick, with whom Irene C. Freidel, Andrew C. Glass, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, William V. Hoch, Office of the Legal Advisor, Boston Police Department, were on brief, for appellee The City of Boston.
Rheba Rutkowski, with whom Jonathan M. Albano, Bingham McCutchen LLP, and Nadine M. Cohen, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association, were on brief, for appellees Dennis A. White, Harold White and Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers.
Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, FARRIS,* Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants, seven Caucasian officers of the Boston Police Department ("BPD" or the "Department"),1 allege that their constitutional rights to equal protection were violated when the Department promoted three African-American police officers to sergeant instead of the appellants, who had the same ranking on the list of officers eligible for promotion.2 The district court found that the race-conscious action of the City was narrowly tailored to the compelling state interests of remedying past discrimination and avoiding litigation, and therefore, passed strict scrutiny. Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F.Supp.2d 323, 357 (D.Mass.2002). The district court also retained jurisdiction to consider future racially motivated decisions by the Department. Id. at 356-57. Appellants appeal the district court's decision, and the City cross-appeals on the issues of standing and retained jurisdiction. First, we find that appellants have standing to seek immediate promotion only. Next, we affirm the district court's decision that the City's action was constitutional, finding that the City has demonstrated the compelling state interest of remedying past discrimination. Finally, we reverse the district court's retention of jurisdiction.
In December, 1997, the BPD sought to promote thirty police officers to sergeant. A score was computed for each candidate who took a 1996 sergeant promotion examination given by the Human Resources Division ("HRD"). The score was based on a state examination, a Boston examination, education, and training. Following standard hiring procedure, the Department obtained a list ranking the top sixty-nine performers.
If promotions had been made in strict rank order, twenty-nine non-African-American officers and one African-American officer would have been promoted, all of whom had a score of eighty-five or higher. The Department determined that this promotional decision would violate the "four-fifths rule" in the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, indicating possible adverse impact on minority candidates.3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2003). Such adverse impact may signify that the testing or past hiring was discriminatory. For this reason, and others that we will discuss below, the BPD sought greater African-American representation among sergeants. Therefore, the Department promoted the top twenty-six officers in strict rank order; this included all officers scoring eighty-six and above, with the exception of one officer who was bypassed for cause. Seven non-African-American officers had scored eighty-five; two of them were promoted. Finally, the Department promoted the three African-American officers who had scored 84 (the "African-American Officers"), while choosing not to promote ten Caucasian officers who also scored eighty-four.
Because it had elected to promote officers scoring eighty-four before officers scoring eighty-five, the BPD was required by Massachusetts law to provide a statement to the HRD explaining the reasons for its departure from strict rank order. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, § 27 (2002). The BPD sent a letter to the HRD stating that the departure from strict rank order to promote the African-American Officers was done to "ensure compliance with current EEOC guidelines, and applicable federal and state discrimination laws." The HRD rejected this explanation, contending that the BPD was erroneously acting under a terminated consent decree.4
In response to the HRD's rejection, the Department promoted six additional officers (one formerly bypassed for cause and five with a score of eighty-five). Thus, the end result was that all thirty-three officers scoring eighty-five and higher were promoted, the three African-American Officers scoring eighty-four were promoted, and ten non-African-American officers scoring eighty-four, including the seven Caucasian plaintiffs, were not promoted. Of the thirty-six officers promoted to sergeant, four were African-American and thirty-two were not African-American.
On May 21, 1999, plaintiffs filed suit against the City alleging that the Department violated plaintiffs' civil rights under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2003) by failing to promote plaintiffs to sergeant because of their race.
After full discovery, the City moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the promotions of the African-American Officers were a narrowly-tailored means of meeting several compelling governmental interests. Specifically, the City claimed that the promotions furthered compelling governmental interests by (a) remedying past discrimination in the Department's promotions of minority officers to sergeant; (b) avoiding the reasonable likelihood of Title VII litigation if the Department made strict rank order promotions; and (c) meeting the Department's operational needs.
On March 22, 2002, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims and entered judgment in favor of the City. The district court found that the City's actions were a narrowly-tailored means of remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination and avoiding litigation. See Cotter, 193 F.Supp.2d at 350. The district court retained jurisdiction post-judgment to oversee all of the Department's future hiring and promotional decisions involving race. Id. at 356-57. This appeal and cross-appeal timely followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate upon a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2003). We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo, in the light most favorable to the losing party. Houlton Citizen's Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir.1999). We may affirm the district court's decision on "any independent ground that is apparent in the record." United States v. Puerto Rico, 287 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir.2002).
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to deciding actual cases or controversies. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Inherent in this limitation is the notion that "federal courts may exercise power only as a last resort, and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. at 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The most important Article III doctrine is that of standing, which ensures that plaintiffs have alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Requiring a plaintiff to have standing sharpens the presentation of issues and illuminates difficult constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
At an irreducible constitutional minimum, a party attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish that (1) he has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury was caused by the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) a favorable ruling would likely redress his injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315. We review the district court's standing decision de novo. Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir.2002).
The plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages, immediate promotion, and an order prohibiting the Department from considering race in future promotions. Since a plaintiff must establish standing for each type of relief sought, id. at 116, we consider appellants' standing to seek damages and injunctive relief separately.5
The appellants first argue that they have standing to obtain damages. Prior precedent bars this effort. In Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 120 S.Ct. 467, 145 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983." Id. at 21, 120 S.Ct. 467. It is uncontested that had the Department not used race-conscious criteria, it would have only promoted candidates with a score of eighty-five or higher. Because appellants only scored eighty-four, they cannot show standing for damages.
Lesage could be distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff i...
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