Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-141,74-141
• Citation: 323 N.E.2d 714,70 O.O.2d 223,41 Ohio St.2d 127
• Parties: , 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3053, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,620, 70 O.O.2d 223 DAYTON CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSN., Appellant, v. DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 127

41 Ohio St.2d 127

323 N.E.2d 714, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3053, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,620,

70 O.O.2d 223

DAYTON CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSN., Appellant, v. DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

No. 74-141.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 19, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A board of education is vested with discretionary authority to negotiate and to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, so long as such agreement does not conflict with or purport to abrogate the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the board of education by law.

2. A binding grievance arbitration clause contained in such agreement must be honored by the board of education where (1) the grievance involves the application or interpretation of a valid term of the agreement and (2) the arbitrator is specifically prohibited from making any decision which is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement or contrary to law.

Appellant, Dayton Classroom Teachers Association (D.C.T.A.), a labor organization, is the collective bargaining representative for all 'professional staff members' employed by appellee Dayton Board of Education (board).

Appellant, the board, and appellee Superintendent of the Dayton Public Schools (superintendent), have, since 1967, engaged in collective negotiations, and have published their agreements as 'Master Agreements.' The latest Master Agreement (hereinafter the agreement) covered the period July 24, 1972, to March 3, 1974, and from year to year thereafter unless modified by the parties.

The agreement contains provisions which relate to the following matters: teaching environment, salaries, payroll deductions, leaves of absence, promotions, teacher enforcement of discipline, teacher evaluation, transfers, paydays and academic freedom.

In addition, the agreement contains a four-step procedure for the resolution of grievances. ¹ For grievances which cannot be resolved by the parties, the agreement provides for binding grievance arbitration. ² However, at that stage, 'the arbitrator shall have no power to alter, add to, or substract from the terms of * * * (the) agreement or to change official board policies.' ³

The present controversy arose when members of the D.C.T.A. filed grievances ⁴ concerning allegedly inadequate parking facilities, allegedly unsuitable working conditions, the board's alleged failure to comply with the agreement's job posting provisions, and the board's alleged wrongful failure to place a substitute teacher on regular salary.

At the outset, the boark took the position that such 'grievances' were not proper grievances, and therefore refused to allow the matter to go to arbitration.

The D.C.T.A. then instituted an action ⁵ in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, requesting that the board be enjoined in honor the agreement's grievance procedure and to proceed to arbitration.

The Court of Common Pleas entered summary judgment for the board, after finding that neither the board nor the superintendent 'can delegate the responsibility of operating' the Dayton schools, that the agreement 'is an attempt on the part of' the D.C.T.A., the board and the superintendent to 'delegate this authority contrary to' law, and that the agreement is, therefore, unlawful and unenforceable.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court, by holding that the agreement was valid in principle, but affirmed the judgment to the extent that the agreement's arbitration clause unlawfully delegated the board's responsibilities and was, therefore, invalid.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of D.C.T.A.'s motion to certify the record.

Griffith & Legler, James R. Kirkland, Dayton, Green, Schiavoni, Murphy & Haines and Eugene Green, Youngstown, for appellant.

Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Thomas J. Harrington, David L. Hall, Bieser, Greer & Landis and Leo F. Krebs, Dayton, for appellees.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

Labor relations law in the public sector lacks uniformity from state to state. For instance, that of Hawaii is regulated by an extremely comprehensive statutory scheme. ⁶ Public labor relations acts are present in an overwhelming majority of states, ⁷ but Ohio has none. Some commentators argue that such acts are an anathema to democratic government, ⁸ whereas others believe that the adoption of such acts only serves to deter public-sector collective bargaining which flourishes in the absence of such legislation. ⁹

I

This case presents two questions: (1) Whether a board of education may validly enter into a collective bargaining agreement and (2) whether a binding grievance arbitration clause in such agreement is valid and enforceable.

The board argues that the agreement is 'extra-legal,' an 'understanding' rather than a contract, and, that even if it were a contract, it would be unlawful, constituting an improper delegation of the board's power. ¹⁰ Another implicit defect is that a binding contract would restrain the board from changing its policy at will. ¹¹

II

The board's basic reason for failing to enter into arbitration is its belief that it lacks capacity to enter into, and become bound by, the agreement herein.

A board's contractual capacity, or power, is described in paragraph one of the syllabus of Schwing v. McClure (1929), 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N.E. 230, as follows:

' Members of a board of education of a school district are public officers, whose duties are prescribed by law. Their contractual powers are defined by the statutory limitations existing thereon, and they have no power except such as is expressly given, or such as is necessarily implied from the powers that are expressly given.'

In addition, it has been recognized that '* * * '(i)n democratic political systems dealings between public employers and public employee organizations-whether they are called negotiations or discussions-must necessarily be limited by legislatively determined policies and goals. " ¹²

Thus, the question becomes whether a board's attempt to bind itself to a written collective bargaining agreement exceeds statutory limitations placed upon its contractual power.

R.C. 3313.47 grants to a board of education the management and control of all public schools within its district. R.C. 3313.17 provides: 'The board of education of each school district shall be a body politic and corporate, and, as such, capable of * * * contracting and being contracted with * * *.' (Emphasis ours.) The latter section is slightly modified by R.C. 3313.33, which provides that '(n)o contract shall be binding upon any board unless it is made or authorized at a regular or special meeting of such board.' ¹³

R.C. 3319.08 requires boards of education to 'enter into written contracts for the employment and reemployment of all teachers.' (Emphasis ours.)

Finally, a board of education is required to 'make such rules and regulations as are necessary for its government and the government of its employees * * *.' R.C. 3313.20.

From the foregoing, we conclude that a board of education has been granted broad discretionary powers in its dual role of manager of schools and employer of teachers.

Our research discloses that agreements entered into by boards of education are generally invalidated by courts upon unlawful-delegation grounds only when the board seeks to absolve itself of the duties acquired thereunder.

On the other hand, where a school board has benefited from an agreement and seeks to have it upheld, the courts generally apply normal principles of contract law to test the contract's validity and binding effect.

In one such case, this court held that a board of education is vested with discretionary authority to authorize one of its schools to join a private association wherein member schools were bound to '* * * abide by and conform to the constitutional rules, bylaws, interpretations and decisions of the association.' State, ex rel. Ohio H. S. Athletic Assn., v. Judges of the Court of Common Pleas (1963), 173 Ohio St. 239, 241, 181 N.E.2d 261, 262.

In principle, we cannot distinguish that case from the one here under consideration. The issues presented in both cases are whether a school board may authorize entry into a pact, and whether decisions made by tribunals that administer the pact are binding on entities of the board of education. In Athletic Assn. this court answered both questions in the affirmative.

Accordingly, we hold that a board of education is vested with discretionary authority to negotiate and to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees.

III

Much of what has been said in part II concerning the validity of the agreement herein applied as well to the binding grievance arbitration clause.

In Campbell v. Automatic Die & Products Co. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 321, 329, 123 N.E.2d 401, 405, this court observed that:

'It is the policy of the law to favor and encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts. * * *'

Arbitration is favored because its purpose is 'to avoid needless and expensive litigation.' Springfield v. Walker (1885), 42 Ohio St. 543, 546.

We also recognize that the availability of arbitration may contribute to more harmonious relations between a school board and its employees, ¹⁴ and that factor fosters the public policy of keeping the schools open. Although teacher strikes are illegal in practically every state, ¹⁵ during the period July 1960 through June 1971, teacher strikes numbered 631 nationwide ¹⁶ and 72 in Ohio, ¹⁷ resulting in lost time of 5,955,689 ¹⁸ and 51,434 ¹⁹ man-days, respectively.

Against that backdrop, and finding no statutory prohibition against the subject arbitration clause, we reject appellees' contention that such clause is invalid and unenforceable.

We find that the following discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court applies...