People v. Arenda

• Decision Date: 18 February 1983
• Docket Number: 65579,No. 15,Docket Nos. 65578,15
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mike T. ARENDA, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar416 Mich. 1, 330 N.W.2d 814
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 814

330 N.W.2d 814

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mike T. ARENDA, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 65578, 65579.

Calendar No. 15.

416 Mich. 1, 330 N.W.2d 814

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 3, 1981.

Decided Dec. 23, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1983.

George B. Mullison, Bay County Pros. Atty. by Thomas J. Bleau, Asst. Pros. Atty., for Bay County, Mich., Bay City, for plaintiff-appellant.

State Appellate Defender Office by Lynn Chard, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

COLEMAN, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. ¹ The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions based on the erroneous admission of similar-acts evidence. ² Justice Kavanagh's opinion would hold that the similar-acts evidence was properly admitted but that reversal is required because of the erroneous exclusion of certain evidence offered by defendant.

Our conclusions are that M.C.L. Sec. 750.520j; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(10), the rape-shield law, is not unconstitutional and that reversal is not required on the facts before us in this case.

I

The charges against defendant arose out of incidents involving an eight-year-old boy. The prosecutor filed a motion in limine, based on the rape-shield law, to prohibit the admission of any evidence of sexual conduct between the victim and any person other than defendant. The prosecutor stated that he had no knowledge or evidence of such conduct, but that defense counsel indicated that he might bring out such evidence at trial.

Defendant claimed that evidence of sexual conduct was relevant and admissible to explain the witness's ability to describe vividly and accurately the sexual acts that allegedly occurred. Because of the complainant's age and his detailed description of events, defendant wanted to establish the right to introduce evidence, if any, of the complainant's sexual conduct with others.

The trial judge granted the motion to exclude this evidence.

Despite the earlier ruling, defendant was not completely foreclosed from inquiring into the complainant's sources of knowledge about sexual conduct. During cross-examination, the complainant was asked if he had witnessed his friends or others engage in sexual activity. He answered "No". He was asked if he had engaged in this activity with someone other than defendant. Again, he answered in the negative. After a similar question was asked and the same answer received, the trial judge cautioned defendant not to pursue this questioning in light of the prior order prohibiting it.

The trial judge's ruling prohibiting the admission of evidence of sexual conduct between the victim and persons other than defendant was based upon the rape-shield statute. M.C.L. Sec. 750.520j; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(10) provides:

"(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:

(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.

(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1)."

II

Defendant contends that these statutory prohibitions infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).

In Chambers, supra, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1046, the Supreme Court stated:

"The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process.' Dutton v. Evans, 400 US 74, 89 [91 S.Ct. 210, 219-220, 27 L.Ed.2d 213] (1970), Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123, 135-137 [88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476] (1968). It is, indeed, 'an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.' Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 405 [85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068-1069, 13 L.Ed.2d 923] (1965). Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. E.g., Mancusi v Stubbs, 408 US 204 [92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293] (1972). But its denial or significant diminution calls into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing interest be closely examined. Berger v. California, 393 US 314, 315 [89 S.Ct. 540, 541, 21 L.Ed.2d 508] (1969)."

The right to confront and cross-examine is not without limits. It does not include a right to cross-examine on irrelevant issues. ³ It may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process, see Mancusi, supra, and other social interests, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).

The rape-shield law is one part of a relatively recent revision of our penal laws relating to sexual conduct, 1974 P.A. 266. This revision was a reflection of a nationwide concern about the prosecution of sexual conduct cases. The law is similar to provisions recently enacted by many other states ⁴ and by the federal government. ⁵ In People v. Khan, 80 Mich.App. 605, 613-614, 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978), the Court of Appeals discussed the public policies underlying the law, stating:

"Returning to MCLA 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), we observe that this provision--an integral part of Michigan's criminal sexual conduct act--represents an explicit legislative decision to eliminate trial practices under former law which had effectually frustrated society's vital interests in the prosecution of sexual crimes. In the past, countless victims, already scarred by the emotional (and often physical) trauma of rape, refused to report the crime or testify for fear that the trial proceedings would veer from an impartial examination of the accused's conduct on the date in question and instead take on aspects of an inquisition in which complainant would be required to acknowledge and justify her sexual past.

* * *

" 'Primarily, * * * [rape shield statutes] serve the substantial interests of the state in guarding the complainant's sexual privacy and protecting her from undue harassment. In line with these goals, they encourage the victim to report the assault and assist in bringing the offender to justice by testifying against him in court. Insofar as the laws in fact increase the number of prosecutions, they support the government's aim of deterring would-be rapists as well as its interest in going after actual suspects. These statutes are also intended, however, to bar evidence that may distract and inflame jurors and is of only arguable probative worth. To the degree that they aid in achieving just convictions and preventing acquittals based on prejudice, they naturally further the truth-determining function of trials in addition to more collateral ends.' " (Emphasis added.)

The rape-shield law, with certain specific exceptions, was designed to exclude evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than defendant. Although such evidence was admissible at common law in relation to certain issues, this practice has repeatedly been drawn into question. The courts, with increasing frequency, have recognized the minimal relevance of this evidence, see Anno.: Modern status of admissibility, in statutory rape prosecution, of complainant's prior sexual acts or general reputation for unchastity, 90 A.L.R.3d 1300, and Anno: Modern status of admissibility in forcible rape prosecution, of complainant's prior sexual acts, 94 A.L.R.3d 257.

The prohibitions contained in the rape-shield law represent a legislative determination that, in most cases, such evidence is irrelevant. ⁶ This determination does not lack a rational basis and is not unreasonable. In fact, it is consistent with the results reached by the judiciary in resolving this issue, see State ex rel. Pope v. Mohave Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976).

The prohibitions in the law are also a reflection of the legislative determination that inquiries into sex histories, even when minimally relevant, carry a danger of unfairly prejudicing and misleading the jury. Avoidance of these dangers is a legitimate interest in the criminal trial process, see MRE 403. The prohibition indirectly furthers the same interests by removing unnecessary deterrents to the reporting and prosecution of crimes.

At the same time, the prohibitions protect legitimate expectations of privacy. Although this interest may not be as compelling as those mentioned above, it is entitled to consideration, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).

The interests protected and furthered by the rape-shield law are significant ones. Given the minimal relevance of such evidence in most cases, the prohibitions do not deny or significantly diminish defendant's right of confrontation. Defendant has not demonstrated that the...