Application of Manson
Decision Date | 25 June 1964 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 7140. |
Citation | 333 F.2d 234 |
Parties | Application of Andrew John MANSON. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Laurence & Laurence, Washington, D. C. (Dean Laurence, John L. White, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellant.
Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D. C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges.
The single legal issue presented by this appeal is whether an applicant for a patent on a new process for making a known compound must establish a utility for such compound, in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 204(b) preparatory to having an interference declared between his application and a prior patent.
It is unnecessary to encumber this opinion with any of the technical details of the process covered by appealed claims 2 and 3 of appellant's application.1 These claims stand rejected as "obviously fully met" by a patent to Ringold et al.2 Appealed claim 3 corresponds to claim 4 of the Ringold patent and was so written for the purpose of provoking an interference with that patent. Appealed claims 2 and 3 differ only in scope and we shall therefore treat both claims as one for purposes of this opinion.
As required by Rule 204(b), appellant filed certain affidavits which purported to show that he was prima facie entitled to an award of priority of invention relative to the filing date of the Ringold patent. Among other things, these affidavits alleged that the compound produced by the claimed process was known in the art and that its utility was obvious to appellant at the time he invented the process. The examiner, however, took the position that the affidavits were deficient in that they did not clearly show a utility for the compound produced by the claimed process and thus that appellant had not shown that he had made a "useful" invention prior to the filing date of the Ringold patent. This position was summarized by the board as follows:
* * *"
The board, placing its reliance on language found in inter partes interference decisions dealing with what constitutes a reduction to practice of an invention, then concluded:
"* * * we cannot agree that a process is prima facie useful merely because the product is disclosed in the literature unless the product was known to be useful."
Thus the board would require that before an applicant may have his claims to a new process placed in interference to determine the issue of priority of invention pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 135, he must show that a utility for the compound produced by the process was known at the time he invented the process. This requirement cannot be justified in view of 35 U.S.C. § 101. As there defined, a process is a separate category of patentable invention. Clearly, a process which operates as disclosed to produce a known product is "useful" within the meaning of section 101. To add to this section the further requirement that such a process is "useful" only when a "use" for a known end product is disclosed seems to us to be an improper arrogation of the authority delegated to Congress by the Constitution. Had such a restriction been intended by Congress, we believe it would have been directly stated either in section 101 or in the definition of a process found in section 100(b). We take the omission of any such requirement to be determinative of the issue here.
We had hoped that our views set forth in In re Dickinson and Zenitz, 299 F.2d 954, 49 CCPA 951, as to the Commissioner's duties and responsibilities under the statutory provisions and the rules of practice here in issue, would have been considered as determinative of the issues here. While we agree with the board that the facts in the Dickinson and Zenitz case distinguish it from the facts here, we think what was there said is pertinent as to the basic legal right of the appellant to have the issue of priority of invention duly determined as provided in section 135. To the end that there shall be no mistake as to the portions of the Dickinson and Zenitz opinion which we think should have been applied in this case, they are quoted as follows (299 F.2d at 957, 49 CCPA at 957-958):
In the Dickinson and Zenitz case we held that for purposes of a prima facie showing of actual reduction to practice of a chemical compound, the utility requirement of section 101 was satisfied by alleging merely that "the utility of the claimed compound was obvious to us at the time we submitted the compound for testing which was prior to August 16, 1955 the critical date." It is our opinion that, if the requirement of a prima facie showing of utility of a claimed compound may be satisfied by the statement that such utility was "obvious" at the time the invention was made, then a fortiori the requirement is satisfied where no question is raised as to the operability of the claimed chemical process to produce a known compound.
It seems clear from the present record that the Patent Office refused to accept appellant's affidavits on the philosophical basis that unless a compound is known to be useful, a process for making the compound is not useful under section 101 and hence not patentable. Thus the case of In re Wilke and Pfohl, 314 F.2d 558, 50 CCPA 964, cited by appellant and argued by both parties, is not directly controlling here since it dealt with the adequacy of the specification with respect to a disclosure of "how to use" under section 112. Wilke is of value, however, in that it indicates the recent thinking of this court with respect to utility issues. In Wilke, speaking to the section 112 issue, we said:
* * *"
The relevance of this statement to the present case seems clear. If, to be patentable, a process must not only produce a product but a product known or proved to be useful, then it follows that an application for a patent on such a process would have to disclose how to use the product. But the holding in Wilke is to the contrary. See also In re Adams et al., 316 F.2d 476, 50 CCPA 1185.
In the Bremner case In re Bremner et al., 182 F.2d 216, 37 CCPA 1032, this court said, "It was never intended that a patent be granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, unless such product be useful." That this statement is correct with respect to product claims is beyond doubt. 35 U.S. C. § 101. As to whether a specification must show how to use the product of a claimed process, however, our holding in Wilke made it abundantly clear that it is not necessary so to do. In the present case, our holding that where a claimed process produces a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product eradicates, as to process claims, whatever remained of the so-called "rule of Bremner" subsequent to our decision in Wilke. See also In re Szwarc, 319 F. 2d 277, 50 CCPA 1571.
Neither the solicitor nor appellant has cited a case, nor have we found any, which is contrary to our present holding. To be sure, in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 247 F.2d 800 (1957), the court relied on the Bremner case in affirming a rejection of certain chemical process...
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