Doe v. Hursh, 4-69-Civ. 403

Citation337 F. Supp. 614
Decision Date06 June 1970
Docket NumberNo. 4-69-Civ. 403,4-69-Civ. 409.,4-69-Civ. 403
PartiesJane DOE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Morris HURSH et al., Defendants. Brenda RICHARDS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Morris HURSH et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Minnesota

Luther A. Granquist, Legal Aid Society, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiffs.

Morris Hursh, etc. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., by Craig R. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for defendants.

Douglas McClellan, Asst. Hennepin County Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for Thomas L. Olson et al., as members of Hennepin County Welfare Board, and Director of Welfare Department.

Gerard Snell and Robert M. Johnson, Asst. Anoka County Attys., Anoka, Minn., for Loren Turnquist, et al., members of Anoka County Welfare Board, and Director of Welfare Department.

Robert B. Danforth, Asst. Sherburne County Atty., Elk River, Minn., for Intervenor Sherburne County.

MEMORANDUM

LARSON, District Judge.

Minnesota participates in the Federal government's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. In these two actions the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Minnesota's so-called "90-day rule" or "three-month rule" applied to deny Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to otherwise eligible persons until such time as a parent has been continuously absent from home for a period of ninety days.

The two basic requirements for AFDC are that there be children who need financial assistance and who are deprived of the care or support of a parent by his continued absence from the home, his death, or his mental or physical incapacity. The phrase "continued absence from home" is defined in Minnesota Statutes 256.12, subd. 15, to be, insofar as it is challenged in this action, "absence from the home by the parent for a period of at least three months continuous duration." The plaintiffs also challenge that requirement insofar as it is contained in the Minnesota Public Welfare Manual VII-2224.02.

Except for the particular circumstances presented by the representative plaintiffs, the two actions are identical. Both actions are brought as class actions seeking relief for all persons in Minnesota who would be eligible for AFDC except for the operation of the 90-day rule. A hearing was held before this Court on November 24, 1969, on plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining orders, to declare a class action, and to convene a three judge court. By Order dated December 1, 1969, this Court ruled that a three judge court should be convened, that the action should proceed as a class action, that plaintiffs Doe and Richards should forthwith be granted AFDC if they met other eligibility requirements, and that pending the determination of this matter by a three judge court the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the three-month rule and denying AFDC to any person because of that rule.

A three judge court was duly convened and these matters came on for hearing on May 25, 1970, on the motions of plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction, for a declaratory judgment, and for other injunctive relief, and on the motions of defendants for an order of dismissal or, in the alternative, for an order granting summary judgment in their favor. At the time of hearing the parties submitted a ninety-one point stipulation and submitted as a Joint Exhibit statistical summaries of public assistance trends. Pursuant to the suggestion of the Supreme Court in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 24 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), the Court decided that a single judge should make a determination of the statutory claim that M.S.A. 256.12, subd. 15, and section VII-2224.02 of the Minnesota Public Welfare Manual are inconsistent with Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, et seq. Because this Court determines that the claimed inconsistency exists, no determination of the Equal Protection and Due Process arguments of plaintiffs is necessary, and the three judge court is dissolved.

Congress has determined that protection of dependent children is the paramount goal of AFDC. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L. Ed.2d 1118 (1968). The statutes challenged here must be examined in light of that paramount goal. Section 406(a) of the Social Security Act defines a "dependent child" as "a needy child ... who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent ...." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a). In the context of this case, the Act clearly requires participating States to furnish aid to families with children who have been deprived of parental support by reason of the continued absence from home of a parent.

The Minnesota statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that separation for less than three months is not "continued absence from home." No evidence is permitted by which this presumption can be overcome. At the time these lawsuits were filed, and up to the time the temporary restraining orders were entered, the 90-day rule was enforced by the defendants so as to deny AFDC benefits to otherwise eligible children and their caretaker until a parent had been absent from the home for a period of three months. The rule was applied to deny AFDC benefits to newborn...

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9 cases
  • Norton v. Lavine
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • 19 Abril 1973
    ...337 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240--241. A state may not put administrative convenience ahead of the welfare of needy children, Doe v. Hursh, 337 F.Supp. 614, 617 (D.C., Minn., 1970). Any state regulation which cuts off aid to children on the basis of conduct of the parent must bear a heavy burden of ju......
  • Norton v. Richardson
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • 22 Diciembre 1972
    ...1971); Saddler v. Winstead, 327 F.Supp. 568 (N.D.Miss.1971); Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F.Supp. 1162 (E.D.Va. 1971); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F.Supp. 614, 616 (D.Minn.1970). To this court there is no reason for the single judge to first send the non-constitutional claim to the three-judge court before......
  • Mothers and Childrens Rights Org., Inc. v. Stanton
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • 29 Agosto 1973
    ...goal is the preservation of the family unit. See King, supra, 392 U.S. at 329-330, 88 S.Ct. at 2140, 20 L. Ed.2d 1118; Doe v. Hursh, 337 F.Supp. 614 (D.Minn.1970); Ramos v. Montgomery, 313 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D.Cal.1970) (three-judge court), aff'd, 400 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 572, 27 L.Ed.2d 618. W......
  • Brunner v. State of Minnesota, 49412.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • 13 Noviembre 1979
    ...(D.N.J.1976), affirmed, 550 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir.), certiorari denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 106, 54 L.Ed.2d 86 (1977); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F.Supp. 614, 617 (D.Minn.1970). The record shows that Mary Brunner is maintaining or in the process of establishing a family setting for all three children......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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